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It has been well documented that the unprecedented and increased use of computerized technology to 
process personal information in the 1960s in Europe and the US led to concerns about individual 
privacy, which resulted in the introduction of a branch of law regulating the processing of personal 
data, known today as personal data protection law. Over the years though, not only has its principles 
evolved to include processing of non-digital information, this relatively new domain of law has 
introduced informational rights and obligations which appear to have the capacity to regulate a vast 
variety of domains of activity in as much as they involve collecting and processing information about 
humans. This publication-based thesis regroups five published/accepted articles which generally seek 
to appreciate the significance of rights and obligations of this branch of law within the EU and Africa, 
while identifying the differences between both jurisdictions and exploring the impact of EU data 
protection law on its contemporary African counterpart.  
The Chapters in this thesis focus on a limited variety of selected themes in data protection law. The 
first Chapter addresses the lack of clarification of the meaning of a breach of security in EU data 
protection law, and the second Chapter examines the level of personal data security protection 
guaranteed by African regional data protection instruments in comparison with the current European 
data protection regime. The third and fourth Chapters both explore the potential effect of the 
transposition of EU data protection legal standards into African soil, respectively focusing on the 
processing of public examination results and on curtailing the prevalence of teacher-student abuses on 
university campuses. The fifth and final Chapter presents a comparative analysis between the EU 
GDPR, the Ghanaian Data Protection Act 2012 and Kenyan Data Protection Act 2019 in their 
approaches to consolidate the OECD data protection principles, demonstrating the influence of the 
GDPR on the Kenyan Act as opposed to that of Ghana. The thesis conclusively finds that transposing 
EU data protection standards into Africa could help regulate some under-regulated domains of activity. 
But the continent’s institutions still need to do a lot in terms of harmonising and promoting personal 
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This general introduction presents the general background, methodology, structure, and scope 
of the thesis. It provides information on the objectives of the research questions, the purpose and 
rationale of the study, and describes the research and data collection methods employed. It also 
presents an overall summary of the publications regrouped in the thesis. 
Background of the thesis 
 
The (emergence of the) Right to Personal Data Protection 
The origins of the right to personal data protection lie partially in the data protection rules of northern 
European countries, which arose in several nations in the 1970s, and the Council of Europe’s 
Resolutions on data processing and partially in the USA and the realization of so called Fair 
Information Practices (FIPs), which were developed because the right to privacy was thought to be 
unfit for the ‘modern’ challenges of large automated data processing.1 By the beginning of the 1960s, 
computers were already being depicted as a major threat to the privacy due to their ability to easily 
and inexpensively process massive amounts of information and hence governments’ ability to store 
massive amounts of information about their people.2 This scale of vast, automated processing made it 
increasingly difficult to protect the traditional right to privacy3, raising the need for a novel set of rules 
to control automated processing of personal information.  
In response to this development, the US Department of Health, Education and Welfare 
conceived a set of principles referred to as a Federal Code of Fair Information Practices (FIP) in 1973. 
It incorporated five core principles as follows: 
- There must be no personal data record-keeping systems whose very existence is secret. 
                                                          
1 Bart Van der Sloot. "Legal Fundamentalism: Is Data Protection Really a Fundamental Right?" In Data protection and 
privacy:(in) visibilities and infrastructures, pp. 3-30. Springer, Cham, 2017.3 
2 Alan Westin. Privacy and Freedom. (Originally published in 1967). Ig Publishing. 2015 (e-book). 209 
3 Privacy in this context refers to informational privacy, which Westin defines as the claim of individuals, groups, or 
institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others’ 
(Alan Westin. Privacy and Freedom (2015) ibid, 23). It should be mentioned that today, the word “privacy” is currently 
used to describe a myriad of different things: freedom of thought, control over personal information, freedom from 
surveillance, protection of one's reputation, protection from invasions into one's home, the ability to prevent disclosure of 
facts about oneself…” (Daniel Solove. "Conceptualizing privacy." Calif. L. Rev. 90 (2002): 1096). The earliest mention of 
“privacy” as a distinct legal concept can be traced back to the late 19th Century, in the essay titled “The Right to Privacy” 
by Judge Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in 1890 3, in which they defined the right to privacy as the right of an 
individual to “be let alone”. The right was later embedded by the United Nations in Article 12 of the Declaration of Human 
Rights of 10th December 1948, prohibiting arbitrary interference with the ‘privacy, family, home or correspondence’ of a 
person, or ‘attacks upon his honour and reputation’. 
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- There must be a way for an individual to find out what information about him is in a record and how 
it is used.  
- There must be a way for an individual to prevent information about him that was obtained for one 
purpose from being used or made available for other purposes without his consent. 
- There must be a way for an individual to correct or amend a record of identifiable information about 
him. 
- Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating records of identifiable personal data 
must assure the reliability of the data for their intended use and must take precautions to prevent misuse 
of the data.4 
These principles, in essence, aim at protecting individuals by giving them some form of control 
over information processed by government agencies, and form an essential part of the normative core 
from which is developed contemporary personal data protection law. Or in other words, they lay a 
partial foundation for the contemporary right to personal data protection.  
Within the European Community, data protection as a (fundamental) right can be traced from the 
adoption of the European Charter of Human Rights (ECHR) in 1950 by the Council of Europe as a 
European adaptation to the UN General Assembly’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, 
consolidating a right to privacy in its Article 8, as follows: ‘Everyone has the right to respect for his 
private and family life, his home and his correspondence.’ It has been pointed out that this right to 
privacy, like the entire European Charter and UN Declaration, came about as a means to curtail the 
powers of abusive totalitarian states before and during the just ended Second World War,5 and was 
aimed at protecting individuals from interference by the state into their private life.  Apparently in an 
attempt to ensure compatibility of the right with the rising use of ICTs in human correspondences, the 
European Court of Human Rights adopted a generally broad approach to the notion of ‘private life’, 
extending it far beyond the intimate sphere of the physical home, and even bringing in telephone 
conversations computers, video-surveillance, voice-recording and Internet and e-mails under the 
coverage of Article 86.  However, by the early 1970s and just as was the case in the US as discussed 
above, the Council of Europe concluded that Article 8 ECHR suffered from number of limitations in 
                                                          
4U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data 
Systems, Records, Computers, and the Rights of Citizens (Washington, D.C.: 1973), p.41 
5 Bart van der Sloot. "Do groups have a right to protect their group interest in privacy and should they? Peeling the onion 
of rights and interests protected under article 8 ECHR." In Group Privacy, pp. 197-224. Springer, Cham, 2017.200. Also 
see Bart van der Sloot. Privacy as virtue. Intersentia, 2017. pp. 23-24. 
6 Paul de Hert and Serge Gutwirth. "Data protection in the case law of Strasbourg and Luxemburg: Constitutionalisation 
in action." (2009) supra,.16 
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the light of new developments, particularly considering new developments in the area of information 
technology7. In a report by the Committee of Ministers in the 1960s on whether the ECHR gave 
sufficient protection to the right to privacy in view of developments in information processing, the 
Committee pointed out three main problems. First, Article 8 was targeted against state interference on 
the individual, and did not consider or apply to interference by elements of the private sector. Actually, 
as per Article 35 of the ECHR, complaints based on the Charter against elements of the private sector 
were not admissible before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) for lack of rationae 
personae jurisdiction; only state institutions could be sued before the Court under the Charter. 
Secondly, the right to private life under Article 8 ECHR does not cover all forms of personal 
information, which leaves a large category of unprotected information (an example being identifiable 
information). Thirdly, the right of access to information about one’s self is not covered under Article 
8 ECHR.8 
 Following this report, efforts were made at national level to adopt laws regulating the processing 
of personal information by the early 1970s, beginning notably with Sweden9 and Germany10.  Later, 
following recommendations by the Council of Ministers, Convention 10811 protecting individuals with 
regard to the processing of their personal data was adopted by the Council of Europe on 28th January 
1981. This period also witnessed a landmark reasoning by the German Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassungsgerichsthof) in its decision of 15th December 1983 12 , also referred to as the 
Population Census Decision13 considered to be one of the normative foundations of contemporary data 
protection law in Europe. The Court established a right of every citizen to ‘information self-
determination’, founded on the right to the ‘free development of one’s personality’ (or personality 
right) as protected by Article 2.1 of the German Constitution. In essence, just as the internationally 
recognized right to self-determination protects an individual’s right to plan or decide freely without 
                                                          
7Peter Hustinx. "EU data protection law: The review of directive 95/46/EC and the proposed general data protection 
regulation." Collected courses of the European University Institute’s Academy of European Law, 24th Session on 
European Union Law (2013): 1-12.4 
8 See Paul de Hert and Eric Schreuders. “The relevance of Convention 108.” Published in: European Conference on Data 
Protection on Council of Europe Convention 108 for the protection of individuals with regard to automatic processing of 
personal data: present and future. 2001. 
9 Swedish Datalag (Data Act) of 11 may 1973 
10 Gesetz zum Schutz vor mißbrauch personenbezogener Daten bei der Datenverarbeitung (Law 
on protection against the misuse of personal data in data processing) (Bundesdatenschutzgesetz— 
BDSG) (Federal Data Protection Act) of 27 January 1977, Bundesgesetzblatt (BGBl) 
11 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, Strasbourg, 28 
January 1981, ETS 108. 
12 Judgment of 15 December 1983, 1 BvR 209/83, BVerfG 65, 1 
13 Orla Lynskey. The foundations of EU data protection law. Oxford University Press, 2015. 94 
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being subject to pressure or influence, the right to information self-determination aims to ‘preclude a 
social order in which citizens no longer can know who knows what, when, and on what occasion about 
them.’14 If citizens cannot oversee and control which or even what kind of information about them is 
openly accessible in their social environment, or know who may have access to this information, or 
unsure of whether their dissenting behaviour is noticed or stored, they may be inhibited in exercising 
their fundamental human rights like freedom of speech or choice 15 . A decade later, the EU 
Commission adopted the Data Protection Directive of 1995, 16  with the objective to ‘protect the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right to privacy with respect 
to the processing of personal data’ (Article 1(1)), reflecting the Council of Europe’s Convention 108 
and further consolidating the above position of the German Constitutional Court into EU law. Five 
years later, the right to data protection officially attained the status of a fundamental right in the 
European Union, embedded in Article 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights of 7th December 
2000. Then came the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),17 replacing the 1995 Directive and 
establishing harmonised personal data protection rules directly applicable to all EU member states.  
For purposes of conceptual clarity, this thesis shall formulate and adopt a definition of personal 
data protection based on the 2013 analysis of the above Convention 108 and the 1995 Directive by the 
then European Data Protection Supervisor, Peter Hustinx. He interpreted the concept as referring to 
those set of rules and safeguards to be observed when processing personal data in order to protect the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals (including privacy) from any eventual violation.18 
Extraterritoriality of EU (data protection) law 
Legal scholars have shed light on how the EU has been increasingly confident to influence external 
regulatory spaces.19 Despite being overshadowed on the international economic and military scene by 
                                                          
14 Antoinette Rouvroy & Yves Poullet. "The right to informational self-determination and the value of self-development: 
Reassessing the importance of privacy for democracy." In Reinventing data protection?, pp. 45-76. Springer, Dordrecht, 
2009. 49 
15 Gerrit Hornung & Christoph Schnabel. "Data protection in Germany I: The population census decision and the right to 
informational self-determination." Computer Law & Security Review 25, no. 1 (2009): 84-88. 85 
16 DIRECTIVE 95/46/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. 
17 REGULATION (EU) 2016/679 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 27 April 2016 
on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, 
and repealing Directive 95/46/EC 
18Peter Hustinx. "EU data protection law” (2013) supra 1-12. 
19 For a discussion on the extraterritorial effects of EU standards, see Joanne Scott. "Extraterritoriality and territorial 
extension in EU law." The American Journal of Comparative Law 62, no. 1 (2014): 87-126; Anu Bradford. "The Brussels 
Effect’ (2012)." Northwestern University Law Review 107 (2012): 1; Maria O’Neill. "The Legal Reach of Police and 
14 
 
the US and Asia, Europe still wields a rather underestimated influence on global standards.20 In the 
last decades, standards set by EU institutions in various domains are increasingly being regarded 
around the globe as the standards to comply with, leading to what Bradford terms “unilateral regulatory 
globalization” which occurs when a state is able to externalize its regulations outside its borders 
through market mechanisms, resulting in the globalization of its standards.21 Or where a law of one 
jurisdiction migrates into another in the absence of the former actively imposing it or the latter 
willingly adopting it.22 Bradford observes that the EU manages to do this due to its imposing market 
size [with 500 million consumers and a GDP of over 20 trillion USD by 201723], capacity to impose 
significant costs on noncompliant external entities by excluding them from their market, and capacity 
to maintain strict regulatory standards on its consumer markets, taking advantage of their inelasticity.24 
As a result, foreign business agents wishing to be part of the EU market must either comply with EU 
standards or, as shall be discussed further in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 of this thesis, foreign states may 
decide to ease access to EU markets by internalising similar EU standards. It therefore turns out that 
the EU effort to create a European single market, has led to a probably unintentional effect of 
establishing the EU as a global regulatory hegemon,25 which Bradford terms the “Brussels Effect”.26 
In the same light, Scott asserts the emergence of the image of an EU that is “unilateralist, 
hegemonic and where the direction of regulatory travel is all one way, namely from the EU to the rest 
of the world.”27 She notably argues that the EU makes use of a mechanism she terms “territorial 
extension”, which she defines as “the application of a measure triggered by a territorial connection but 
in applying the measure the regulator is required, as a matter of law, to take into account conduct or 
                                                          
Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters (PJCCM) Measures across EU Borders: Extraterritoriality, Territorial Extension 
and the “Brussels Effect”. In EU Borders and Shifting Internal Security, pp. 139-156. Springer, Cham, 2016. 
20See Anu Bradford. "The Brussels Effect." (2012) ibid: 1 
21 Ibid, 3. Bradford further points out that unilateral regulatory globalization is different from “political globalization of 
regulatory standards” where regulatory convergence results from negotiated standards, including international treaties or 
agreements among states or regulatory authorities; and also from “unilateral coercion”, where one jurisdiction imposes its 
rules on others through threats or sanctions. 
22 Ibid, 4 
23 European Union, CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
worldfactbook/geos/ee.html (Accessed 7th May, 2020) 
24 Anu Bradford. "The Brussels Effect." (2012) supra. 11 – 17. He also notes that unlike capital targets (i.e. goods used for 
production) which can be relocated from the EU if found unsatisfactory for businesses, the consumer market remains 
mostly inelastic. Which is why the EU focuses its regulation on consumer goods, because its consumer population cannot 
be relocated elsewhere to be subject to less strict standards. 
25 Ibid, 42. 
26 Ibid, 3 
27 Joanne Scott "Extraterritoriality and territorial extension in EU law." (2014). supra. 88 
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circumstances abroad”28 The EU sets standards across a range of areas, such as food, competition, and 
even privacy and data protection, which then dictate how other states or regions end up regulating 
these sectors as they adjust their own regulatory standards in order to access the EU consumer market. 
This effect is reflected in the influence of EU data protection law across the globe, and significantly 
on African jurisdictions.  
Euro-African legal “compatibility” 
Long before the creation of the EU, Africa had already been largely affected by European standards 
owing to its colonial relationship with European powers during the colonial era (between the 1880s 
and 1960s). During this period, a handful of European powers moved in and annexed African 
territories in their quest to establish overseas strongholds, with about 80% of the continent falling 
under the control of Britain and France after receiving German colonies following the latter’s defeat 
during the First World War. 29  The European powers generally subjected the colonial officials 
administering their colonized territories to the laws of the mother state, before extending their 
application to the locals while abolishing customary law hitherto practiced by the natives towards the 
end of the colonial era.30 After obtaining their independence in the 1960s and 1970s, many African 
nations decided to maintain the political and legal institutions left behind by their various former 
colonial masters, notably in the education, administration and legal justice sectors31. European law 
especially English common law introduced by England and droit civil continental (civil law) designed 
by continental European powers were therefore maintained by the newly independent African 
colonies, and most national laws and rules of procedure in these countries are still inspired from these 
legal systems and still operates in most territories to date.32 Africa is therefore no stranger to European 
law, which favours the continent’s ability to appropriate contemporary and future European (legal) 
standards. 
                                                          
28 Ibid, 90. She also distinguishes territorial extension from traditional extraterritoriality, which is the application of a 
measure triggered by something other than a territorial connection with the regulating state 
29 Worldwide Perspectives GMMS 2007. ‘The 25 Unbelievable Years: Colonial Africa in 1945’ [Map]. Available at 
https://www.missioninfobank.org/mib/index.php?main_page=product_info&products_id=3576 
30Alexander Lee & Kenneth A. Schultz. "Comparing British and French colonial legacies: A discontinuity analysis of 
Cameroon." In APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper. 2011.13 
31For a discussion on the inheritance of the colonial systems of administration and legal justice law by independent African 
countries, see Sandra Fullerton Joireman. "Inherited legal systems and effective rule of law: Africa and the colonial 
legacy." The Journal of Modern African Studies 39, no. 4 (2001): 571-596. 
32 Joireman (ibid) points out that this inheritance also came about because African elites who received training in Europe 
became experts in these foreign legal systems, and were instrumental in using them to negotiate for the independence of 
African states. They therefore were more comfortable with the system and desired to see it continue. See Ibid, 577 
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Scope of the thesis 
It is against the above background that this thesis addresses some selected legal issues related to 
personal data processing in Europe and Africa, while examining the current and potential 
appropriation of EU standards in African national and regional data protection law. The articles 
regrouped herein address personal data security law in Europe and Africa, and the substantive and 
potential influence of EU data protection law on its African counterparts. The thesis discusses, in terms 
of its scope, relevant regional European and African laws relating to personal data processing. For 
Europe, analysis are centred on the General Data Protection Regulation33 the 1995 Data Protection 
Directive34 as well as the Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive.35 For Africa, selected 
legislations include the ECOWAS 36  Supplementary Act A/SA.1/01/10 Personal Data Protection 
within the ECOWAS of 16th February 2010, the African Union Convention on Cybersecurity and 
Personal Data Protection, the Ghanaian Data Protection Act 2012 and the Kenyan Data Protection Act 
2019. Specifically, the thesis chapters: 
- attempt a critique of the definition of a personal data breach in EU data protection law in 
relation to the notification of data breaches to data subjects; 
- examine the state of the art of the legal responses by the ECOWAS and AU Data Protection 
legislations to personal data security risks in Africa; 
- discuss the potential effect of EU data protection law’s appropriation of examination results as 
personal data on African jurisdictions, 
- demonstrate how EU case law relating to the personal data protection right of access to 
examination scripts could have parallel effect in Africa and help curb teacher-student abuses in 
institutes of higher education; 
- make a comparative analysis between the GDPR on the one hand and the Ghanaian and Kenyan 
data protection Acts on the other hand with regard to their incorporation of international data 
protection standards laid down by the OECD, demonstrating the influence of EU data protection law 
its African counterpart. 
                                                          
33 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural 
persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) 
34 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals 
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data 
35 Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 concerning measures for a high 
common level of security of network and information systems across the Union. 
36 Economic Community of West African States 
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Purpose of the study and approach 
The general purpose of the papers regrouped in this thesis is to explore and evaluate certain legal issues 
relating to personal data security in Europe and Africa, and also how the legal and ethical realities of 
both continents influence or could inspire each other in their various conceptions of personal data 
protection law. The results and conclusions in each of these articles is intended to contribute to general 
legal literature to the domain of personal data protection, and to assist legal scholars, lawyers, judges, 
business executives, governmental officials, and policy makers in deciding on best practices and areas 
of improvement in their conception, discussions and interpretations of personal data protection law. 
As regards the approach used in the articles, they generally employed involved three classic 
levels of policy analysis: macro, mezzo, and micro. The macro level of analysis involved basing 
arguments on general theory and principles of international legal standards and generally accepted 
principles. The mezzo level involved analysis of data protection laws, policies, and practices in Europe 
and Africa.  At micro level, certain specific areas of EU and African data protection law as were 
examined and/or compared. The conclusions and recommendations were based on an integration of 
all three levels of analysis. It should however be noted that considering the themes, chosen topics, 
conditions of publication and author guidelines of each of the journals and conferences in which the 
thesis articles were reviewed and accepted, these three levels of policy analysis are not uniform in all 
the articles. While some articles involved all three levels of analysis, others only involved analysis at 
mezzo and macro level.  
Objectives of the thesis and research questions 
As private organizations and governments keep manifesting insatiable appetite for data, trusting in its 
ability to inform decision-making through data analytics and render it more efficient, personal data 
protection law has steadily become a principal means to place checks and balances on the processing 
of personal information to avoid violation of an individuals’ stemming from any misuse of or 
omissions in the processing activity. As discussed above, these checks and balances come in the form 
of rights and obligations for data subjects and data controllers or processors respectively. This thesis, 
through the article publications regrouped herein, generally seeks to appreciate the significance of 
rights and obligations under EU and African data protection law, while identifying the differences 
between both jurisdictions and discussing the current and potential impact of EU data protection law 
on its contemporary African counterpart. In doing so, it highlights and examines the notion of personal 
data security within the EU and Africa, the interplay between EU and African regional law on the 
notion personal data and the right of access to personal data, and also provides a comparative analysis 
between the substantive data protection texts of the EU and selected African states. 
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In detail, the aim of the thesis is two-fold. Firstly, on personal data security, it seeks to 
contribute to data protection literature by highlighting the limitations of the current definition of a 
personal data breach in EU law in relation to protecting data subjects through breach notification, 
while clarifying the conceptual difference between a personal data breach and a breach of security, 
and also by examining the state of the art of Africa’s multilateral response to the personal data security 
concerns of the continent.  While there has been a lot of literature on personal data breaches in EU 
data protection law37, not so much has been dedicated to address the potential limitations of the 
definition of a personal data breach in EU texts. And while the ECOWAS and AU data protection 
legislations have been examined in a number of scholarly articles38, there has been a significant lack 
in the literature focused specifically on their provisions and shortcomings relating to personal data 
security. 
 Secondly, the thesis strives to illustrate the potential effect of EU law on African data 
protection law first through the latter’s adoption of the notion of personal data and its potential similar 
application to academic examination scripts and results as well as the socio-legal effects of these 
eventualities. There have indeed been scholarly works analyzing and mapping Africa’s adoption of 
data protection laws,39 but these works do not focus properly on the substantive interpretation of these 
laws and their socio-cultural or legal effect on Africans. This thesis seeks to fill this gap by illustrating 
the significance the notion of personal data in the African education sector, and how data protection 
rights can introduce unprecedented and novel means of protecting African students against big data 
risks and even help combat teacher-student abuse in African university campuses. Also, a comparative 
                                                          
37 See Rebecca Wong. Data security breaches and privacy in Europe. Springer, 2013. Also Spencer Wheatley, Thomas 
Maillart & Didier Sornette. "The extreme risk of personal data breaches and the erosion of privacy." The European 
Physical Journal B 89, no. 1 (2016): 1-12. 
38 See Uchenna Jerome Orji. "Regionalizing data protection law: a discourse on the status and implementation of the 
ECOWAS Data Protection Act." International Data Privacy Law 7, no. 3 (2017): 179-189; "A Comparative Review of 
the ECOWAS Data Protection Act." Computer Law Review International 17, no. 4 (2016): 108-118; "Multilateral legal 
responses to cyber security in Africa: Any hope for effective international cooperation?" In 2015 7th International 
Conference on Cyber Conflict: Architectures in Cyberspace, pp. 105-118. IEEE, 2015. Also see Graham Greenleaf & 
Marie Georges. "The African Union's Data Privacy Convention: A Major Step toward Global Consistency?" 131 Privacy 
Laws & Business International Report, 18-21 (2014). Also Lukman Adebisi Abdulrauf & Charles Manga Fombad. "The 
African Union’s data protection Convention 2014: a possible cause for celebration of human rights in Africa?" Journal of 
Media Law 8, no. 1 (2016): 67-97. 
39 See Alex B. Makulilo, ed. African data privacy laws. Springer International Publishing, 2016; "Privacy and data 
protection in Africa: a state of the art." International Data Privacy Law 2, no. 3 (2012): 163-178. Also Cynthia Rich. 
"Privacy laws in Africa and the Middle East." The Bureau of National Affairs, editor. Privacy and security law report. 
Bloomberg: BNA (2014). Also Lee A. Bygrave."Privacy and data protection in an international perspective." Scandinavian 
studies in law 56, no. 8 (2010): 165-200. 
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analysis between the EU GDPR and the Ghanaian and Kenyan data protection laws on their 
consolidation of the OECD data protection principles seeks to provide a novel appraisal of the 
influence of the GDPR on national African data protection laws; in this case the Kenyan Data 
Protection Act of 2019. 
These aims will be achieved by analyzing and attempting an interpretation of the relevant 
provisions relating to personal data protection and personal data security in the EU and Africa. Both 
the law (substantive texts) and its application (case law and practical outcome) will be closely 
examined as it is often the case when reading the legal rules of two regimes against each other to 
identify theoretical similarities and differences. Also, through publications which consider and 
compare EU data protection provisions against African data protection legislations, this thesis aims to 
make the essence of data protection law more digestible for African lawyers in light of its significance 
in protecting the fundamental rights of individuals through the spectrum of their personal information. 
Accordingly this thesis poses the following general research questions: What is the state of the 
art of personal data security law in the EU and Africa? How can EU data protection law and practice 
influence African national and multilateral data protection regimes? These questions can be 
subdivided into five sub-questions, each corresponding to and addressed by one of the five articles 
regrouped in the thesis: What are the limitations in the current definition of a personal data breach in 
EU law with regard to its difference with a breach of security and the protection of data subjects 
through breach notification? What is the current state of the art of Africa’s multilateral response to 
personal data security concerns in the continent? How can EU data protection law and practice lead to 
examination results be considered personal data in Africa, and what are the benefits and hindrances in 
implementing corresponding data protection rights on examination results within an African setting? 
Similarly, how can EU data protection law potentially influence the application of a data protection 
right of access to evaluated examination scripts in Cameroon universities, and how could this 
contribute to curtailing teacher-student abuses? What are, and how has the GDPR been instrumental 
in the differences between the 2012 Ghanaian Data Protection Act and 2019 Kenyan Data Protection 
Act in their consolidation of the OECD personal data processing guidelines? 
Rationale of the thesis 
The published articles regrouped in this thesis are particularly important for academic research, legal 
practitioners and policy makers working in the field of personal data protection. In their attempts to 
provide an answer to each of the research problems highlighted above, the articles contribute novel 
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layers of thought and analysis which could aid the understanding and promotion of the data protection 
machinery.  
In terms of examining the limitations of the definition of a personal data breach, the thesis 
discusses the difference between a breach of security and a personal data breach, and argues that 
discarding, from the scope of the definition, security incidents which have not resulted in an obvious 
compromise of personal data limits protection for data subjects in terms of breach notification. By 
proposing an alternative definition to personal data breaches and suggesting an alternative approach 
to notifying data subjects of security incidents the thesis hopes to trigger a thought process among EU 
and other data protection scholars and professionals on how to further improve protection of data 
subjects. Also, with no current definition of a ‘breach of security’ in EU legal texts, and considering 
that EU law requires certain actions for personal data breaches different from actions for breaches of 
security, understanding this distinction becomes crucial for data controllers in terms of compliance. 
On the question of the state of the art of personal data security in Africa, the thesis provides an 
analysis of the security provisions of the ECOWAS and AU data protection texts, pointing out their 
achievements and grey areas which they fail to cover. This analysis would be of particular interest to 
African data protection academics and regional policy makers, who could respectively initiate research 
and political mechanisms to address these legal loopholes. Such analysis is also beneficial in terms of 
setting an albeit “soft” legal threshold for African countries which do not yet have national data 
protection legislations and who will tend to look up to these legislations as a model to which data 
controllers in their respective territories could abide by.  
The analysis of examination results as personal data in Africa, by highlighting a novel 
perspective to the influence of EU law and practice on African data protection law, contributes further 
to the literature on Euro-African relations. More importantly, it also raises awareness among African 
education policy makers on the hitherto neglected significance of exam results as personal information 
(which misuse could expose Africans to risks especially associated with big data analytics), and could 
influence a new phase in the regulation of their processing. Similarly, demonstrating that evaluated 
examination scripts could be personal data under the AU Data Protection Convention, and hence could 
benefit from a right of access which then presents a novel way of curtailing teacher-student abuse in 
university campuses is of particular importance to student unions or associations working on students’ 
rights, as well as policy makers in the higher education sector in Cameroon and other African 
countries. Finally, the comparative analysis between the GDPR and the Ghanaian and Kenyan data 
protection Acts in their consolidation of the OECD data protection Guidelines adds to the general 
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literature on comparative (data protection) law. It also provides an opportunity for African states still 
to enact national data protection laws to better appreciate the privacy and risk-based approaches to 
data protection and hence adopt informed national policies (i.e. either of, or a hybrid of both 
approaches) based on their respective national priorities. 
Methodology and data collection 
Based on the nature of the objectives and subject matter of the articles in this thesis and the 
corresponding nature of the research questions, this research makes use of both the descriptive 
exploratory and comparative methods of research. In essence, apart from the first chapter on a breach 
of security, all the articles in this thesis employ a blend of all three research methods. 
 Descriptive methodology, also referred to as phenomenological methodology, refers to “how 
things appear, an observable fact, or to let things speak for themselves”, characterized as bringing 
reflective awareness to the nature of events experienced in the world in which we live in, favouring a 
deeper understanding of the nature or meaning of everyday lifeworld experiences.40 It favours an 
intensive examination to grasp a deeper meaning of a phenomenon, presenting a picture of specific 
details of a situation and focuses on reflection questions.41 As regards the exploratory research method, 
Fouché and Vos note that this is undertaken when more information is needed concerning a new area 
of interest or when researchers want to understand a certain situation better.42  
Comparative law can be defined as an ‘intellectual activity with law as its object and 
comparison as its process’43 or as ‘the juxtaposing, contrasting and comparing of legal systems or parts 
thereof with the aim of finding similarities and differences.’ 44  These definitions, although quite 
general, considerably satisfy the purposes of the last four articles presented in this thesis. Zweigert and 
Kotz argue that ‘comparative law procures the gradual approximation of viewpoints, the abandonment 
of deadly complacency, and the relaxation of fixed dogma’45 which is exactly what this thesis aims to 
achieve when it compares the EU and African data protection systems. And according to Orucu, 
comparative law enables ‘access to legal knowledge which can be used not only for the purposes of 
                                                          
40  Marsha Smith Blount. A phenomenological analysis of artistic creativity—contemporary artists' practice and 
philosophy. Stephen F. Austin State University, 2007.33 
41 Christa Fouché & A. S. De Vos. "Formal formulations." Research at grass roots: For the social sciences and human 
service professions 4 (2011): 89-100.96 
42 Ibid 106 
43 Hein Kotz & Konrad Zweigert. "Introduction to Comparative law." Vol. II (T. Weir trans. 2ed 1987) (1998).2 
44 Esin Orucu, ‘Developing Comparative Law’ in Esin Orucu and David Nelken (eds), Comparative Law; A Handbook. 
Hart Publishing (2007) 43, 44 
45 Hein Kotz & Konrad Zweigert. "Introduction to Comparative law." (1998) supra, 3 
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law reform, or as a research tool, or to promote international understanding, but to fulfil the essential 
task of furthering the universal knowledge and understanding of the phenomenon of law which is 
under examination’46 
It should be highlighted that thesis features comparisons between African national and regional 
data protection instruments with the EU GDPR and 1995 Data Protection Directive all of which, 
presumably, may not be regarded as a traditional comparative study in the sense of comparing the 
legal systems of sovereign states. A legal system has been said to refer to ‘the legal rules and 
institutions of a country in the narrow sense or, in the broad sense as the juristic philosophy and 
techniques shared by a number of nations with broadly similar legal systems.’47Being made up of 
countries with fundamentally similar but nevertheless different legal systems and practices, African 
regional legislations (the AU Data Protection Convention and ECOWAS Data Protection Act) and EU 
laws like the GDPR probably does not fall within the narrow definition of what a ‘legal system’ is. 
However, these international instruments represent an agreed move by 27 (EU), 15 (ECOWAS) and 
55 (AU) states to comply with specific rules and regulations in terms of processing personal 
information; a fact which favours their consideration as (data protection) legal systems in their own 
right. Moreover, a legal system ‘has a vocabulary used to express concepts, its rules are arranged into 
categories, it has techniques for expressing rules and interpreting them, it is linked to a view of the 
social order itself which determines the way in which the law is applied and shapes the very function 
of law in that society.’48 The GDPR, ECOWAS and AU data protection instruments seemingly satisfy 
these requirements as they have as objective to shape the law governing personal data within their 
various communities. Their nature as non-traditional legal systems cannot be ignored but could simply 
be considered inconsequential to the achievements of the comparative exercise in the articles presented 
in this thesis. After all, comparative research is considered to be open-ended with no standard 
methodology49, and as Reitz observes, no promising avenue [of improving our understanding of the 
impact of law on society through research] meliorating should be barred by orthodoxy.50 On this basis, 
this thesis considers it convenient to carry out an exercise of comparative law between the GDPR, 
ECOWAS, AU instruments and national laws on personal data protection. 
                                                          
46 Esin Orucu. ‘Developing Comparative Law’ (2007) supra, 46 
47 Peter de Cruz. Comparative Law in a Changing World. 3rd edition. Routledge Cavendish. (2007) 3. 
48 David and Brierly as quoted by Orucu, ‘Developing Comparative Law’ (supra) 57 
49 Orucu, ‘Developing Comparative Law’ supra, 48-49 
50 John Reitz, ‘How to Do Comparative Law’ 46 (4) AJCL (1998)  617, 618 
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Both descriptive and exploratory methods were employed in the first article of this thesis: the 
exploratory method was employed to clarify the meaning of a “breach of security” in the EU data 
protection law based on a descriptive analysis of its rules of secure processing and some relevant 
provisions of the EU Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive (NIS). The descriptive 
method was then employed to portray the limitations of the EU definition of a personal data breach in 
relation to notifying data subjects of potentially harmful incidents, leading to the suggestion of an 
alternative, information security-based approach. In the second article, the descriptive method was 
used to provide an explanation and understanding of personal data security risks and concerns in Africa 
and the corresponding legal responses by the AU and ECOWAS bodies. Comparative law was then 
used to measure these responses to the EU (and to an extent US) instruments addressing personal data 
security to point out the weaknesses of the former. 
The third and fourth articles make use of all three research methods. In the third article, a 
descriptive analysis was employed to produce a general appraisal of the socio-cultural context of 
privacy and data protection in Africa with regard to examination results, and exploratory method was 
used to interpret the decision in Nowak v. Irish Commissioner as granting a personal data status to 
examination results. Comparative law was then employed to examine and highlight the similarity of 
the definitions of personal data in both African and EU regional data protection instruments, while 
further use of exploratory research led to the analysis founding the potential interpretation examination 
results as personal data under the African data protection instruments. Similarly, the fourth article 
described the contemporary situation of teacher-student abuse in Cameroonian universities, before 
relying on comparative law and exploratory research to conclude that examination script evaluations 
could take up a personal data status in Cameroon upon the entry into force of the AU Data Protection 
Convention, and explain how this could help fight against teacher-student abuse. The fifth article takes 
a pure comparative law approach to directly compare, on the one hand, the GDPR’s materialization of 
the OECD personal data processing guidelines with that of the Ghanaian and Kenyan data protection 
laws on the other hand, identifying the similarities and differences between the EU instrument and 
African national legislations. All the while demonstrating, in the process, the GDPR’s influence on 
the Kenyan data protection Act. 
Data analysed in the various articles in this thesis were collected from primary and secondary 
sources. Primary data sources of legal research have been said to refer to data produced by the legal 
process itself, including legislations and case law, while secondary sources include documents which 
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interpret and discuss the primary sources.51 For this thesis primary sources include European data 
protection and security instruments in Europe, Africa and the OECD. The sources in Europe include 
the Council of Europe’s Convention 108 on the automatic processing of personal data, the EU 1995 
Data Protection Directive, GDPR, and the NIS Directive. African instruments include the 2010 AU 
Convention on Cybersecurity and Data Protection 2014, the 2010 ECOWAS Data Protection Act, the 
2012 Ghanaian Data Protection Act and the 2019 Kenyan Data Protection Act. For the OECD, primary 
data was collected from the 1980 OECD Privacy Guidelines (Revised in 2013). Secondary data on the 
other hand was obtained from books, articles and handbooks by legal scholars interpreting and 
analyzing the above primary sources or providing more insight on personal data protection law and 
information security in general. Data was also obtained from reports by national and international 
organs addressing personal data processing and information security. Both primary and secondary 
resources were obtained via online desk and library research, and are all (fortunately) available in 
English and/or French language. 
Summary of the thesis articles/chapters 
As indicated above, this thesis is presented as a collection of publications focused on personal 
data security in Europe and Africa, and the effects of the EU impact on substantive African data 
protection law. The publications each address a specific part of the research problem under these 
topics, and are presented in the form of chapters. This subsection presents a brief summary of the main 
points of discussion each of the five publications in the thesis, and how they seek to address the 
problem statements highlighted above. 
Chapter 1 presents an analysis of personal data security law in the EU, specifically an attempted 
critique of the definition of a personal data breach as it relates to a breach of security and the 
notification of breaches to data subjects. Contemporary EU data protection law provides for the 
notification of ‘personal data breaches’, which it summarily defines as a breach of security leading to 
a data compromise, indicating that an incident cannot be considered a ‘personal data breach’ unless it 
is established that it has led to a compromise of personal data. This basically means only determined 
data compromises can be subject to notification requirements. While this is in line with the EU risk-
based approach of data protection, it tends to however exclude notification of security incidents, which 
by their nature and data involved, present significant risks to data subjects but following which a data 
compromise cannot be readily ascertained by the data controller. It is on this premise that the Chapter, 
after providing some clarification between a personal data breach and a breach of security in EU data 
                                                          
51 Khadijah Mohamed. "Combining methods in legal research." The Social Sciences 11, no. 21 (2016): 5191-5198. 5195 
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protection law, suggests an alternative approach to breach notification to address this problem. It 
suggests that the EU legislator could either by including a risk or probability of data compromise in 
the definition of a personal data breach, or provide for the direct notification of data subjects in the 
event of a sensitive breach of security for which a resulting data compromise, for technical reasons or 
due to the nature of the breach itself, cannot be readily determined by the data controller or processor.  
Chapter 2 discusses the state of the art of multilateral personal data security legislation in 
Africa, in an attempt to examine its response to contemporary data security challenges of African 
citizens. Following the continent’s advancements in information and communication technologies, 
internet penetration and mobile telephony, its international community felt the need to address the data 
protection and security risks which these developments equally exposed the African populations to. 
Studies show that these developments have led Africans to produce and share massive amounts of 
personal data, which can be vulnerable to unauthorised access and misuse.  In response to these data 
protection concerns, the ECOWAS and AU have both adopted corresponding legislations: the 
ECOWAS Data Protection Act 2010 and the AU Convention on Cybersecurity and Data Protection. 
The ECOWAS legislation acts as a directive for West African states, while the AU legislation will 
serve the same purpose for all AU member states once it comes into force.  
Focusing on the personal data security (as a section of personal data protection), the article 
first discusses general contextual challenges which could hinder the promotion of personal data 
security in Africa, before examining safeguards set up by these international legislations to ensure the 
security of personal data of African residents. By discussing these safeguards in relation to what 
obtains in other jurisdictions like the EU, the article intends to demonstrate that both the ECOWAS 
and AU legislations come up short in some significant areas of personal data security. It should be 
clarified here that while there currently exist comprehensive national legislative responses to personal 
data security concerns among 26 African states, the article focuses solely on the multilateral response. 
The reason for this is to get the widest general appraisal of the current legislative landscape of personal 
data security in the African continent, and especially considering that many African states still do not 
have data protection laws, and will so far depend on these legislations to address data protection issues 
they may face within their respective national territories. 
Chapter 3 explores the general theme of the influence of European law on African (data 
protection law), focusing on the impact which the EU’s interpretation of examination results as 
personal data could have within an African educational context. Specifically, it discusses the potential 
benefits of according a personal data status on examination results in Africa (as is the case in the EU) 
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as well as some limitations in enforcing some data protection rights on these results within an African 
context. The article first discusses the notion of personal data as it has been defined in EU data 
protection texts (the 1995 Data Protection Directive and the GDPR) and which, following the 
reasoning of the Attorney General of the European Court of Justice, would most likely include 
examination results. With the EU definition of personal data being copied into African ECOWAS and 
AU data protection legislations, coupled with African inheritance of European law and current 
dependence on European case law to address grey areas in national law, the article argues that the 
exam results could equally be considered personal data on African soil. Based on this premise, the 
article then discusses the advantages which such protection could offer to African examination 
candidates, as well as the limitations likely to be encountered in enforcing data protection rights on 
examination results in the continent. 
Chapter 4, in the same line as the previous article on examination results, discusses the 
potential impact of the EU-African data protection relationship in the education sector, focusing on 
the right of access to examination scripts as personal data in institutions of higher learning in 
Cameroon. The article makes the premise that with no national substantive data protection law yet in 
effect in Cameroon, the country would most probably inspire its data protection regime from the AU 
Data Protection Convention, either when it comes into force or if the country enacts a corresponding 
national legislation before then. And based on the definition of personal data in this convention, 
inspired by EU substantive and case law (from the Nowak case), and in the absence of an express 
provision to the contrary, examiners’ evaluations on examination scripts would equally be considered 
personal data in Cameroon. From this premise, the article discusses the eventuality of such a 
development serving as a working instrument against teacher-student abuses in institutions of higher 
learning in the country.  
Specifically, the article argues that a data protection right of a right of access to personal data, 
if granted to and exercised by higher education students in the country, could permit them to consult 
their examination scripts; and be able to verify how it was evaluated and raise objections where 
necessary. Such a right not yet expressly granted in national texts on student rights and obligations, 
and abusive lecturers who usually take advantage of this to demand sexual and other favours in 
exchange for grades. The article hence discusses how the right of access could contribute to forcing 
fair evaluation by abusive lecturers and hence limit student-teacher abuses in institutions of higher 
learning in the country. 
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Chapter 5 presents a comparative analysis between EU data protection law and African 
national data protection instruments, specifically the GDPR on the one hand and the Ghanaian and 
Kenyan data protection laws on the other hand. In essence, the article discusses the adaptation of the 
1980 OECD personal data processing Guidelines into the GDPR, the 2012 Ghanaian Data Protection 
Act and the 2019 Kenyan Data Protection Act. The first global instrument to lay down principles of 
personal data processing, the OECD Guidelines set basic principles of personal data processing which 
have been adapted into and influenced contemporary data protection regimes worldwide. In this light, 
the article comparatively examines how these OECD principles have been adapted into the GDPR, the 
Ghanaian Data Protection Act and the Kenyan Data Protection Act.  
The aim of this comparison is two-fold: in the first place, with data protection law being older 
and more advanced in Europe than it is in Africa, and the GDPR being one of the most significant 
changes in data protection regulation of the 21st Century, measuring it against the Ghanaian and 
Kenyan data protection acts would be a rational method of assessing the substantive quality of the 
African legislations. Secondly, with the GDPR adopted between the Ghanaian and Kenyan 
legislations, this comparison also enables the assessment of the influence of substantive EU data 
protection law on corresponding African national laws. The article, in this way, tries to explore the 
difference between pre-GDPR (Ghanaian Act 2012) and post-GDPR (Kenyan Act 2019) African 
national data protection laws, hence illustrate the GDPR’s overseas or “Brussels effect” in Africa. 
It is in this light that this paper attempts a comparative review on how these principles are 
consolidated in Europe and Africa: that is, between the EU’s GDPR on the one hand and the Ghana 
and Kenyan data protection instruments on the other hand. Being a more advanced legal regime in 
terms of data protection, the GDPR serves here as a measuring rod to examine how the basic OECD 
Principles are reflected in the personal data processing rights and obligations provided in the Ghana 
Data Protection Act of 2012 and the Kenyan Data Protection Act of 2019. The paper concludes with 
a general note that while the Kenyan Act appears to duplicate the GDPR risk-based approach in 
consolidating the OECD data protection principles, the Ghanaian Act rather adopts a less rigorous 
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Chapter 1: Breach of security vs personal data breach: effect of the EU definition of a personal 
data breach on breach notification to data subjects 
Currently under review at the Computer Security and Law Review journal 
Abstract 
Contemporary EU data protection law provides for the notification of personal data breaches to data 
subjects if they present a high risk of harm. Personal data breaches are identically defined across EU 
data protection instruments as breaches of security leading to a compromise of personal data. This 
definition implies that for an incident to be legally considered a personal data breach and hence 
qualified for notification, it must involve an actual, determined or ascertained adverse effect on 
personal data. However, EU legislators appear to place less focus on the eventuality of security 
breaches which by their very nature present risks to data subjects, but are accompanied by an 
impossibility or difficulty to promptly determine whether or not personal data has been affected. 
 Against this backdrop, this article attempts a critique of the definition of a personal data breach 
in EU data protection law, and argues that some breaches of security by their nature could be risky to 
data subjects, regardless of whether a resulting data compromise can be ascertained. In the absence of 
the definition in EU data protection instruments, the article first discusses situations which would be 
considered a breach of security in EU law, inspired by information security literature and the EU NIS 
Directive. It then identifies the problem of limiting notification only to ascertained personal data 
compromises, which could be detrimental to data subjects who may be at risk of harm by the very 
nature of a breach of security in the absence of a determined compromise of personal data. The article 
then examines an alternative approach to address this limitation, which involves the substantive 
inclusion of a risk or probability (alongside the establishment) of a personal data compromise within 
the definition of a personal data breach, or alternatively, a requirement to directly notify data subjects 










1.1   Introduction 
In the European Union (EU), data controllers and processors are required to implement appropriate 
technical and organisational measures appropriate to the risk of processing personal data, and notify 
data protection authorities and data subjects of personal data breaches which present a high risk to 
their rights and freedoms. Notifying data subjects of personal data breaches presents a significant 
method of protecting them against harm which could result from a compromise of their personal data, 
as they will be able to be on the alert against identity theft, social engineering scams or take other 
mitigating measures. However, based on its definition of a personal data breach, EU law allows for 
the notification and even recording only of incidents which have caused an actual adverse effect on 
personal data. In essence, it insists on two components to make up a personal data breach and hence 
an incident worth notifying or recording: a “breach of security” (1) which causes a compromise of 
personal data (2). As such, considering that not all breaches of data security are personal data breaches 
as has been indicated by the EU Article 29 Working Party52, complying to the breach notification 
requirement necessitates an understanding by data controllers and processors of what exactly 
constitutes a personal data breach and a breach of security in EU law, as well as their ability to separate 
both concepts. However, EU law so far has not concisely clarified the conceptual difference between 
a breach of security and a personal data breach, though it is clear from the law’s definition of the latter 
that both concepts are very much related. And more importantly, by focusing on the notification only 
of incidents which can be ascertained or determined to have led to a compromise of personal data, the 
law appears to overlook the possibility of harm to data subjects caused by data compromises which 
may be technically difficult or practically impossible to ascertain following a breach of security. 
Personal data protection law in Europe has considerably addressed (personal or non-personal) data 
breaches, spread across at least eleven instruments53. Among these are four laws regulating personal 
data protection, namely the General Data Protection Regulation 54  (GDPR), the Data Protection 
Regulation for EU Institutions55, the Data Protection Law Enforcement Directive (popularly referred 
to as the Police Directive)56 and the Directive for the processing of personal data over public electronic 
                                                          
52 See infra 
53 Maria Grazia Porcedda, ‘Patching the patchwork: appraising the EU regulatory framework on cyber security breaches’ 
(2018) Computer Law & Security Review 34, no. 5, 1077-1098, 1079 
54 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural 
persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) 
55 Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and 
on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC 
56 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural 
persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, 
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networks (known as the ePrivacy Directive)57. They all adopt an identical definition of a personal data 
breach, as ‘a breach of security leading to the accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, 
unauthorised disclosure of, or access to, personal data transmitted, stored or otherwise processed’58. 
They equally require, as mentioned above, that these personal data breaches be recorded and, in the 
event of high risk to data subjects, notified to the latter.59 However, they do not define a “breach of 
security”, an oversight common among other EU instruments addressing information security.60  Even 
the Article 29 Working Party61 (WP29) appears to have overlooked the concept so far. In its Opinions 
addressing personal data breaches62, the data protection advisory body expounded on the parts of 
above definition of a personal data breach relating to a compromise of personal data (destruction, loss 
and loss of access to, alteration and unauthorised disclosure of or access) without elucidating on the 
“breach of security” component. It does insist, however, that only “personal data breaches” (breaches 
of security which are determined to have actually led to an actual adverse effect on personal data) are 
subject to breach notification requirements.  
  It is in this context that this article argues that while making actual data compromise a condition for 
notification admittedly helps focus protection only on data subjects with a real risk of harm, it however 
tends to overlook the eventuality of a breach of security whose effect on personal data may not be 
easily or promptly determined by the data controller considering the nature and circumstances of the 
incident, or even with state of the art technology in place.  It seeks to first of all provide an 
understanding of what would constitute a breach of security in EU data protection law, before making 
a case that they could by their very nature present real risks to data subjects in the absence of a 
determined compromise of personal data. The lack of a certain compromise of personal data would 
                                                          
investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA 
57 Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 amending Directive 
2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services, 
Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic 
communications sector and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for 
the enforcement of consumer protection laws. 
58 Article 4(12) GDPR, Article 3(11) of Regulation 2016/680, Article 2(h) of Directive 2001/136/EC (amending 
Directive 2002/58/EC), Article 3(16) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 
59 See Articles 33 and 34 GDPR, Articles 34 and 35 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725, Article 4(3) of the ePrivacy Directive 
(Consolidated version including amendments), Articles 30 and 31 of Directive (EU) 2016/680. 
60Porcedda notes a general lack of a definition a ‘breach’ in EU instruments bearing on (non-personal) data security like 
the Directive 2009/140/EC (The Better Regulation Directive), Regulation 910/2014/EU (Electronic Identification and 
Assurance Services (eIDAS) Regulation), Directive 2015/2366/EU (Payment Services Directive) and even Directive 
209/1148/EU (the Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive). See Porcedda, (n.10). p.1081 
61The Article 29 Working Party was created by Article 29 of the Data Protection Directive as the EU advisory authority 
on the matters of data protection. It was replaced by the Data Protection Board under the GDPR. 
62 The Article 29 Working Party. ‘Guidelines on Personal data breach notification under Regulation 2016/679 (WP250)’ 
and ‘Opinion 03/2014 on Personal Data Breach Notification (WP213)’ 
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consequently prevent notification to data subjects under the current approach, and hence limit 
protection for data subjects in such cases. The article then suggests and examines the inclusion of a 
probability or risk, alongside the establishment of data compromise into the current definition of a 
personal data breach as an alternative approach to address this limitation. 
1.2   ‘Breach of security’: a brief information processing overview 
There is some considerable literature bearing on what constitutes a breach of security in terms of 
information processing and management. To begin with, Black’s law dictionary defines a ‘breach’ as 
‘a violation or infraction of a law or obligation.’63This is a common definition in law, especially tort 
law, where a breach of contract means [negligent or intentional] non-respect of or failure to perform 
one’s duties as specified by the terms of a contract.64 In terms of an employment relationship for 
example, a breach could refer to the cognitive evaluation that an organisation is failing to fulfill its 
obligations to the employee65, and/or vice versa. In a nutshell, a breach is generally interpreted to mean 
non-respect of or failure to follow pre-determined rules or principles of a specific domain of activity. 
It follows from the above that a breach of security would refer generally to the non-respect of or failure 
to comply with pre-determined security principles and rules. This approach is not so different from a 
general use of the term in relation to information security; where it would include (but may not be 
limited to) a failure to comply or ensure compliance with information security principles. Michael 
Krausz, in his 2015 book titled Managing Information Security Breaches, proposes a definition of the 
term ‘breach’ in light of the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information flows within an 
organisation. He contends that a breach of confidentiality ‘occurs every time the need-to know 
principle, on which all dissemination of information should be based, is violated’ (emphasis added), 
noting that the breach does not occur when damage becomes visible, but occurs at the point in time 
when the company’s security guidelines have been violated.66 A breach of availability ‘can occur when 
the availability of your IT systems is reduced due to an adverse event…e.g. a virus…or when the 
Service Level Agreements (SLAs) that are in place are not adhered to, quite independently of any 
actual damage that may, or may not, result’(emphasis added). 67  And an integrity breach occurs 
‘whenever the integrity of information or its means of storage are violated, for example, by 
                                                          
63 Bryan A. Garner (ed). "Black's Law Dictionary—Ninth Edition.’ Thomas Reuters. (2009). 
64 See Rita S. Kohn. "The Model Contract." Ent. & Sports Law. 11 (1993): 9.11 
65Guo‐hua Huang, Xiongying Niu, Cynthia Lee, and Susan J. Ashford. ‘Differentiating cognitive and affective job 
insecurity: Antecedents and outcomes.’ Journal of Organizational Behavior 33, no. 6 (2012): 752-769.753 
66 Michael Krausz. Managing information security breaches: studies from real life. IT Governance Publishing, 2015.52 
67 Ibid, 53 
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transmission errors, by intentional manipulation, by unintentional handling errors or by the corruption 
of file content or structure due to electrical, magnetic or other failures’ (emphasis added).68 
It is worthy to mention here that the concept of a breach of security in the physical realm is not so 
different from that of an information management context. In both instances, there is the prevailing 
idea of an overarching security infrastructure composed of technical measures and procedural rules 
which are respectively bypassed or not complied with. For example, Skinner defines a breach of 
security as ‘a successful attack on a computer system’s security controls in order to penetrate the 
system to acquire or corrupt information on the system, thus disrupting the confidentiality, integrity, 
or availability of the information on the system’, noting that these attacks can come from outside or 
from within a company or institution.69 Manro et al further contend that physical breaches of security 
also consist a threat to information security, advancing that they refer to situations where ‘somebody 
with malicious intent has physical access to the hardware where either your application is running or 
where your data is stored.’70 They equally note however that in the domain of information security, 
physical security consists (or should consist) of first layer security, and if other forms of security which 
protect the hardware are in place [e.g protective metal cages], a physical security breach may not 
always result in loss of data.71 An illustrative example will be an intruder who, with the intention of 
physically destroying a server storing data, breaks into a data centre by forcing open the main door 
(hence bypassing first layer security), but discovers the targeted server is protected in a reinforced 
steel cage, which he cannot open or break. So though there was a physical security breach, there was 
no effect on processed data.  
While Skinner and Manro et al focus on the physical threats to a system, Krausz on the other hand, as 
suggested by the terms ‘violated’, and ‘not adhered to’, perceives a breach of security as a situation in 
which standard rules of information management within a given institution or information 
management protocol are not respected, and which could be purely of technical as well as human 
origin. However, they both importantly concur on a crucial element: the occurrence of a breach of 
security does not depend on actual damage caused to processed information: a breach occurs once a 
security rule or protocol is not complied with or in the event of a physical threat to a security 
infrastructure. It therefore could flow from this interpretation that a breach of security would mean 
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either of two aspects: the sheer non-respect of security rules and protocols (of a given information 
management process within an organisation) or the breakdown or bypass of a physical or technical 
security infrastructure. And both regardless of whether processed information was actually 
compromised. Both positions are apparently adopted into the rules of secure processing in EU data 
protection law. 
 1.3   ‘Breach of security’ in the EU data protection law 
As mentioned above, EU data protection laws do not define the term ‘breach of security’. However, 
they all contain provisions addressing secure rules of processing personal data, which could serve as 
a starting point to arrive at an interpretation of what would legally consist a breach of security. For 
example, Article 32 of the GDPR, titled ‘Security of Processing’, states as follows:  
‘1. Taking into account the state of the art, the costs of implementation and the nature, scope, context 
and purposes of processing… the controller and the processor shall implement appropriate technical 
and organisational measures to ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk, including inter alia as 
appropriate: 
(a) the pseudonymisation and encryption of personal data; 
(b) the ability to ensure the ongoing confidentiality, integrity, availability and resilience of processing 
systems and services; 
(c) the ability to restore the availability and access to personal data in a timely manner in the event of 
a physical or technical incident;  
(d) a process for regularly testing, assessing and evaluating the effectiveness of technical and 
organisational measures for ensuring the security of the processing.’72 
This provision appears to incorporate both approaches of a breach of security discussed above in 
Section 2: as a violation of determined security rules and as the occurrence of an actual adverse effect 
on processed personal information. The following subsections explain this further. 
1.3.1 Breach of security as non-compliance to EU data protection rules of secure processing 
As regards non-compliance with rules of secure processing, the above Article 32(1) requires data 
controllers and processors to implement, among others, “organisational measures” to ensure secure 
processing. These organisational measures refer to rules within the controller’s premises which should 
be followed to avoid incidents or situations which could be detrimental to secure processing, and 
                                                          
72 Also see Article 33 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725, Article 29 of Directive (EU) 2016/680 
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therefore regard the human factor of secure processing. As Wood observes, information security used 
to be a strictly technical issue, but as the use of computer networks evolved, measures to ensure their 
security also had to evolve and extend beyond the technical to include other organisational measures, 
like human input.73 It is also well documented that besides security software and hardware, a secure 
information system includes human staff with adequate security-awareness training to prevent them 
accidentally destroying or losing information, or falling for social engineering scams 74 . Data 
controllers are therefore expected to implement rules within their organisations to prevent conducts 
which could put the security of processed personal data at risk e.g. prohibiting employees from taking 
home laptops which contain sensitive personal data, confirming the integrity of employees through 
lawful background checks, training staff on confidentiality etc. The same rule applies for technical 
measures: controllers and processors are expected to use software, hardware or other available 
techniques to secure and ensure unperturbed processing as stated in subsections (a) to (d). In line with 
Krausz’s observations, non-compliance with these measures (either by their non-respect by staff or 
their non-implementation by the controller or processor) within an organisation will constitute a breach 
of security. 
It is worth mentioning here that in contemporary data protection law, security measures are essentially 
contextual and could be tricky to determine, with companies sometimes left with little or no guidance 
as to what types of security measures they should take in a given processing situation to be compliant.75 
This is similar in the EU, where the requirement for data controllers to take ‘technical and 
organisational measures…appropriate to the risk’ only spells out a rather vague standard of security 
to adhere to, hence could make uncertain the exact rules of security to comply with. However, the 
phrase ‘Taking into account the state of the art, the costs of implementation… scope, context and 
purposes of processing as well as the risk of varying likelihood and severity for the rights and freedoms 
of natural persons…’ sets the guidelines controllers should take to guarantee secure processing. The 
issue here, though, is that the burden lies on the controller and processor to translate the standard into 
context and determine what security measures to take. In other words, the controller is expected to use 
these provisions as a strict guide to determine the level or type of security applicable to a processing 
                                                          
73 Charles Wood, ‘Why information security is now multi-disciplinary, multi-departmental, and multi-organizational in 
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procedure, and then comply with them; like some sort of guided self-regulation. It has already been 
observed that in contemporary EU data protection law, the main responsibility to determine how to 
apply data protection principles is left to the controllers and processors. The Data Protection Authority 
(DPA) acts more like a subsidiary regulator; a position justified by the EU regulator’s intent to 
‘simplify the regulatory environment’ and ‘substantially reduce the administrative burden on data 
controllers and processors’.76  
 The rules of secure processing of personal data in the EU are therefore contextual and not fixed 
or permanent: they emerge in correlation with the particular risk involved in a particular processing 
situation. Discussing the GDPR, Gellert argues that the law could essentially be portrayed as a risk 
management legislation,77 with risk being ‘the chance (understood as a probabilistic notion) that a 
danger (i.e., an event with harmful consequences) will happen.78  The controller and processor are 
required take measures ‘appropriate to the risk [of processing]’i.e. take measures (depending on the 
cost, purpose, state of the art technology and nature of data collected) which ensure that the data 
subject is protected from any probable danger which could arise from a specific processing activity. 
So whether or not a rule of security exists in the first place depends on whether or not there exists any 
risks with regard to processing a specific type or category of data; a method of regulation referred to 
as the risk-based approach79. It is worth noting though that the WP29 has stressed that the risk-based 
approach should not be interpreted to mean no security measures should be taken where there is little 
or no processing risk80. 
 1.3.2   ‘Breach of security’ as an actual defeat of a security infrastructure in EU data 
protection law 
Considering the technical nature of this section, the discussion shall be based on the provisions of EU 
law on information security, specifically Directive (EU) 2016/114881, known as the Network and 
                                                          
76 Maria Eduarda Gonçalves. ‘The risk-based approach under the new EU data protection regulation: a critical 
perspective.’ Journal of Risk Research (2019): 1-14.3-4 
77 Raphaël Gellert, ‘Understanding data protection as risk regulation.’ J. Int. Law 18, no. 11 (2015): 3-16. 
78 Ibid, p.8 
79  For a discussion on the risk-based approach in EU data protection law, see Maria Eduarda Gonçalves. ‘The risk-based 
approach under the new EU data protection regulation: a critical perspective.’ (supra). 
80 It is worth noting though that the Article 29 Working Party has stressed that the risk-based approach should not be 
interpreted to mean no security measures should be taken where there is little or no processing risk (The Article 29 Working 
Party. ‘Statement on the role of a risk-based approach in data protection legal frameworks’. (WP218). 30th May 2014). The 
advisory body maintains that security measures must be equally strong when processing is relatively ‘low risk’. 
Accordingly, the risk-based approach should just be considered as demanding additional measures when risks are 
identified, not evading strict security compliance in some situations (See Maria Eduarda Gonçalves. (2019) ibid). Yet, it 
admitted that a data controller whose processing is relatively low-risk may not have to do as much to comply with its legal 
obligations as a data controller whose processing is high-risk. 
81 Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 concerning measures for a 
high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union (NIS Directive) 
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Information Security (NIS) Directive. This can be justified on grounds of the close interplay between 
EU data protection law and the NIS Directive. First, that Recital 49 of the GDPR adopts an almost 
identical word-for-word definition of ‘network and information security’ as defined in Article 4(2) of 
the NIS Directive. Also, Article 15(4) of the NIS Directive requires the Directive’s Competent 
Authority to ‘work in close cooperation with data protection authorities when addressing incidents 
resulting in personal data breaches.’ This is evidence that both instruments run parallel to (and hence 
could be expected to complement) each other in their respective network security and data processing 
regulation activities. 
 The NIS Directive defines network and information security as ‘the ability of network and 
information systems to resist, at a given level of confidence, any action that compromises the 
availability, authenticity, integrity or confidentiality of stored or transmitted or processed data or the 
related services offered by, or accessible via, those network and information systems82’, and an 
‘incident ’as ‘any event having an actual adverse effect on the security of network and information 
systems’83. A network or system’s security therefore, according to the NIS Directive, is its ability to 
resist an adverse effect on data processed within. No further guidance is given on the interpretation of 
an ‘actual adverse effect’ which could broadly be interpreted to range from minor events with 
insignificant consequences to serious and highly costly network damage. Because nothing in the 
Directive suggests this adverse effect must be serious enough to compromise data processed within a 
network or system, and with ‘security’ meaning ‘ability to resist’, an event could still therefore qualify 
as a security incident (and hence breach of security) if it as much as slightly and temporarily disrupts 
the ability of a system to resist an action which could compromise processed data. Or if the event 
temporarily but insignificantly disrupts the availability of a service provided over a network.  
Based on the above, and the documented relationship between the NIS Directive and EU data 
protection law, the slight or complete disruption of a system’s ability to resist an action which could 
compromise processed data would constitute a breach of security in EU data protection law. This is 
also in line with the observations by Skinner and Manro et al in Section 2 that a breach of security 
manifests in an actual defeat or weakening of the security infrastructure. 
The last two Sections jointly map out the scope of a breach of security in EU data protection law. From 
this analysis, and viewed with the definition of a personal data breach across EU data protection 
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39 
 
instruments, the principal difference between both concepts is much clearer: for an incident to qualify 
as a personal data breach in EU data protection law, it must have led to the compromise of personal 
data. While the objective of this requirement could understandably be to prevent over-reporting of 
personal data breaches to data protection authorities, it nevertheless may limit protection available to 
data subjects in the event of a breach of security which, without legally attaining the status of a 
personal data breach, poses significant risk to data subjects. 
1.4   Breach of security vs Personal data breach in the EU data breach notification: the 
problem 
One of the innovations of EU data protection reforms of the early 2010s was the introduction of the 
personal data breach notification requirement for data controllers and processors, requiring that they 
inform data protection authorities and data subjects of personal data breaches which are “likely to 
result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms” of data subjects. 84  In its Impact Assessment 
accompanying the proposed GDPR, the EU Commission identified three advantages of notification: 
they provide a systematic feedback about the actual risk and the actual weaknesses of existing security 
measures; enable authorities and consumers to assess the relative capabilities of data controllers with 
respect to data security; and force data controllers to assess and understand their own situation 
regarding security measures.”85 In essence, data subjects are required to be informed of personal data 
breaches which present high risks to their rights and freedoms (e.g. if the breach involved sensitive 
health or financial information) so they can take necessary measures to prevent further harms, like 
identity theft or falling for social engineering scams. While this requirement contributes to 
safeguarding online security and trust between data subjects and those handling their data, it features 
a setback which could impede on the high-level protection of data subjects: the law requires the 
notification and reporting of ‘personal data breaches’, and not ‘breaches of security’. 
There have always conceptual overlaps in information security literature between the terms ‘data 
breach’ and ‘security breach’86, as well as with terms like ‘data leakage’87 or ‘data spill’88, all being 
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used to refer to very similar occurrences. However, as discussed in the introduction, the EU legislator 
opted for a definition of a personal data breach as a breach of security which has caused or at least is 
ascertained to have caused a compromise of personal data. In other words, it involves the non-
compliance of a technical or organisational security measure of data processing or an actual defeat of 
a security infrastructure (X) accompanied by an adverse effect on personal data (Y). This implies that 
the presence of (X) and absence of (Y) legally disqualifies an incident as a personal data breach, hence 
that incident may not be reported in contemporary EU law. This is reiterated by the WP29 Guidelines 
on Personal Data Breach notification under the GDPR and European Data Supervisor (EDPS) 
Guidelines on personal data breach notification for the European Union Institutions and Bodies. Both 
Guidelines maintain that not all breaches of security are personal data breaches89, and emphasize on 
the establishment of a compromise to personal data (Y) for a breach of security to become a data 
breach in order to fall within the breach notification requirement90.  However, this may be problematic 
in the event where an incident (X) may present a real risk for data subjects, yet a corresponding 
compromise (Y) cannot be determined or ascertained in a timely manner, even with state of the art 
processing infrastructure in place. An example is the Whatsapp Ireland security breach of May 2019.  
On 13th May 2019, in a statement released by the Irish Data Protection Commissioner (DPC)91, 
Whatsapp Ireland informed the Irish DPC of the discovery of a security vulnerability on their platform, 
presupposing the installation of malware by a malicious attacker which could have led to the 
harvesting of personal data of WhatsApp users. However, WhatsApp Ireland could not officially notify 
the incident to the competent European data protection authorities under Article 33 of the GDPR 
because at that point they were “still investigating as to whether any WhatsApp EU user data has been 
affected as a result of this incident.” It should be pointed out that Article 33 is titled “Notification of a 
personal data breach to the supervisory authority” and not “Notification of a security incident…”, 
hence Whatsapp Ireland’s apparently compliant restraint from notifying EU data protection authorities 
To this can also be added Regulation No 611/2013 which states that a ‘detection of a personal data 
breach shall be deemed to have taken place when the provider has acquired sufficient awareness that 
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a security incident has occurred that led to personal data being compromised…’92, further indicating 
that a data breach is a two-factor event: security incident + determined compromise of data. Also, 
Whatsapp Ireland in this situation are not required by law to even record or document the incident 
under Article 33(5) GDPR, because the provision requires documentation of personal data breaches. 
Though Whatsapp Ireland nevertheless urged its EU users to update the application as a post-breach 
security measure as later indicated in the statement, this situation illustrates an important limitation in 
the definition of a personal data breach in EU data protection law. 
As discussed above, the WP29 reiterates the inseparability of a breach of security and compromise of 
data in its analysis of when a data controller should be considered as being aware of a personal data 
breach. The advisory body noted that a controller shall be deemed “aware” when that controller “has 
a reasonable degree of certainty that a security incident has occurred that has led to personal data being 
compromised.”93 While admitting that with some incidents it may take some time to establish whether 
a breach of security has led to a data breach, it goes further to state that the GDPR nevertheless requires 
data controllers to take prompt technical and organisational to immediately investigate and establish 
if a breach has occurred. However, it notes that during these investigations, the data controller shall 
not be considered “aware” of the breach.94 Worth noting in this analysis is the WP29 apparently 
focusing the awareness test on the “data breach” with not much focus on the “breach of security”. In 
other words, there is no responsibility on the controller towards the data subjects when the controller 
becomes “aware” of a breach of security. Such responsibility is triggered only when it finally 
establishes a resulting compromise of personal data (e.g. the 72-hour deadline to notify the supervisory 
authority (Article 33 GDPR) begins counting from the moment a resulting compromise of personal 
data is ascertained, apparently not when the initial breach of security is discovered). It would therefore 
appear the WP29 places little consideration on the eventuality of a breach of security in which, for 
example, a resulting data compromise takes a long time to ascertain even with state of the art 
infrastructure. 
In line with the risk-based approach, Article 24 GDPR requires data controllers to process data in 
general consideration of the likelihood and severity of risks of data subjects. Recital 76 GDPR states 
that such likelihood and severity of risk to the data subject should be determined by reference to the 
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nature, scope, context and purposes of the processing. Risk should be evaluated on the basis of an 
objective assessment, by which it is determined whether data processing operations involve a risk or 
high risk. These provisions portray the pivotal significance of risk in contemporary EU data protection 
law, and would customarily be the principal concern when identifying or reporting personal data 
breaches i.e. only data compromises which present a high risk to data subjects need to be notified to 
the latter. However, to comply with the notification requirement, it appears the law places importance 
on risks which an already determined data compromise may expose data subjects to, but not so much 
consideration of risks which a security incident in itself, regardless of whether or not there is a 
determined compromise of personal data, can cause data subjects. This appears to set aside, from the 
scope of data subject notification, breaches of security which by their nature present real risks of data 
compromise and danger to data subject rights, but without such compromise being ascertained. It is 
on this basis that this article seeks to discuss an alternative approach which address the above-
identified limitations of personal data breach reporting as a protective measure for data subjects. 
1.5 Breach of security vs personal data breach in EU law: an alternative approach 
As discussed above, EU data protection law places extreme importance on risk; the term “risk” even 
being mentioned up to 75 times in the GDPR. Organisations processing personal data have to build 
and implement compliance programs based on the “likelihood and severity” of risks and potential 
harms to the individuals. And as discussed in Section 2, the ability of data controllers and processors 
to anticipate and prevent or reduce risks to data subjects forms the basis of secure processing, as well 
as other notions like data protection by default or by design. In order to further consolidate the risk-
based approach in protecting individuals and fortify online trust, this article opines that a conditional 
risk of compromise factor could be incorporated in the normative definition of a personal data breach. 
Or otherwise, data subject notification can be extended from classic and risky personal data breaches 
to include breaches of security which by their nature present a real risk of data compromise. It should 
however be noted that both approaches are inextricably related, and the implementation of one may 
tend to render the other obsolete or unnecessary. Nevertheless, their separate examination appears 
necessary to better appreciate their respective impacts on the protection of data subjects. Also, in light 
of the constant evolution of information security, both approaches may need to co-exist and 
complement each other to solve future legal problems in the domain of personal data security. 
1.5.1   Including a ‘risk of data compromise’ factor in the definition of a personal data 
breach 
As examined above, the inseparability of a breach of security on the one hand and a resulting, 
determined compromise of processed personal data on the other hand within the definition of a 
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personal data breach in EU data protection law creates a sort of grey area as regards to regulating a 
breach of security in relation to data subject notification. Certainly, it can always be argued that failure 
to implement technical or organisational measures to ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk 
of processing would be a prima facie infringement of EU data protection rules and would likely fall 
under the investigating and sanctioning competence of a supervisory authority. However, the law is 
silent as to whether these infringements can also be notified to data subjects if they in themselves 
present a likelihood of risk to their rights and freedoms in the absence of an ascertained compromise 
of personal data. For example, where the security attack was so sophisticated even state of the art 
technology cannot ascertain the extent of the a compromise in a timely manner. And this mainly 
because contemporary EU data protection law does not provide for the notification to data subjects of 
“breaches of security”, but rather of “personal data breaches”. 
A solution to this could be to modify the definition of a personal data breach to include a risk, alongside 
the establishment, of a compromise to personal data. That is, an incident may be legally qualified as a 
personal data breach if there is reason to believe that it presents a risk or probability of a compromise 
to personal data. A personal data breach may therefore be defined as “a breach of security leading to 
or presenting a (high) risk of an accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorised 
disclosure of, or access to, personal data transmitted, stored or otherwise processed”. The essence of 
this definition in relation to data subject notification is that a prior risk factor is now placed between 
the breach of security and the compromise to personal data, and not just between the compromise and 
any eventual impact on data subjects. So once a breach of security is noticed, its eligibility for data 
subject notification may be considered at two levels: first, what are the odds, by its very nature, that it 
indeed can lead to a data compromise? And secondly, how harmful can this compromise be to data 
subjects?  
It is worth mentioning here that the inclusion of a (high) probability of data compromise in the 
technical definition of a data breach has been considered in information security literature. Krausz for 
example observes that a “breach” in information security means damage to confidentiality, availability 
or integrity of information has actually occurred, or is bound to occur, if mitigation of a risk does not 
set in immediately 95(emphasis mine). By incorporating the consideration of a (high) risk or probability 
of a data compromise in the substantive definition of a data breach (as opposed to its certainty or 
establishment in EU data protection law), this approach finds worthy of attention incidents which have 
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not yet led to a data compromise. An information security incident can thus be considered a ‘data 
breach’ in the absence of a data compromise, but undoubtedly with a reasonably strong certainty that 
the incident would eventually lead to a data compromise.  
The resulting effect of the above suggested definition would be that the breach of an organisational or 
technical security measure, or the breakdown or defeat of a security infrastructure would be legally 
considered a personal data breach once there is a probability that it may have led to the compromise 
of personal data. As such, once a controller processing highly sensitive data notices a breach of 
security, it may not need to carry out an investigation to ascertain the compromise of personal data in 
order to apply breach regulatory measures like notification or recording, as currently required across 
the EU data protection laws. All it needs is reasonable certainty that a compromise would have 
occurred following the incident. It should be pointed out here that while EU law, admittedly, does put 
an obligation on the controller and processor to gear up technically and organisationally to ensure that 
they are “aware” of any data compromises in a timely manner so that they can take appropriate 
action 96 , this may not always be feasible especially in light of the increasing sophistication of 
cyberattacks. The result could be considerable time taken by a controller, who discovers a breach of 
security, to investigate and ascertain a data compromise in order to be deemed “aware” of an incident 
and have it qualified as a personal data breach within the meaning of EU law and suitable for any 
further legal actions provided for such incidents; by which time much damage may have already been 
done to data subjects. The focus on a risk (rather than certainty) of a data compromise thus broadens 
the scope of a personal data breach, and implies additional protection for data subjects. 
1.5.2   Notification of risky breaches of security (rather than ‘personal data breaches’) to data 
subjects 
As an alternative to modifying the current definition of a personal data breach by EU data protection 
law, another means of optimizing the risk-based approach and ensure high-level protection could be 
the provision for the direct notification of risky breaches of security to data subjects in the absence of 
an ascertained data compromise. In essence, similar to the effect of a modified definition as discussed 
above, this inclusion would require controllers to notify data subjects of risky security incidents 
without the need to first ascertain whether personal data was actually compromised.  The test for 
notification, as opposed to the current approach, shall be the inclusion of a (high) risk or probability 
that personal data has compromised, in addition to the certainty or actual determination of a 
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compromise. It therefore could be the responsibility of controllers to take into account the context of 
processing, nature of a breach of security to immediately decide whether it is most certain that data 
was compromised. And considering the sensitive nature of the data, whether or not to notify the data 
subjects. It should however be noted that the implementation of encryption or other forms of protection 
on the compromised data, as listed in Article 34(3) GDPR for example, would mean low risk of harm 
of data subjects, hence there may be no need to notify data subjects.  
This is illustrated in the following tables: 
 




A significant aspect of this proposed approach is that basing the need to notify on risk rather than 
certainty of a data compromise tends to place the protection of data subjects as a priority over 
compliance with the requirement to ascertain the compromise of personal data. A controller for 
example who discovers a breach of security and launches an investigation to ascertain a data 
compromise before notifying will be in compliance with the Regulations (with regard to the definition 
of a data breach) which require that he investigates to ascertain a data compromise. However, this time 
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
Controller/processor 
discovers breach of 
security 
Investigates to establish a 
compromise of personal data (to 
fulfill the definition of a data 
breach) 
Notifies data subjects in case of a 
determined data breach of high risk 
(subject to the additional security 
exceptions of Article 34(3)) 
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
Controller/processor 
discovers breach of 
security 
Assesses whether there is a 
risk or probability that data 
may have been 
compromised 
Notifies data subjects in the event of a risk 
or probability of compromise, without need 
of certainty (subject to the additional 
security exceptions of Article 34(3)) 
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lapse for investigations may be detrimental to data subjects if sensitive data may already have been 
compromised, especially where the attack was highly sophisticated and makes it difficult to promptly 
confirm the data compromise. 
It is worth noting however that this approach not totally new and has actually been envisaged, albeit 
hypothetically to say the least, by data protection experts. The UK Information Commissioner (ICO), 
on its website, adopts a similar reasoning in one of its fictional examples of a personal data breach 
notification under the GDPR which would be considered appropriate by a data controller. 97  It 
examines the case of an employee who loses a briefcase containing a laptop and paper files. The 
employee tells his manager that he believed the laptop was encrypted and the paper files were redacted. 
The manager reports the incident to the IT department, which remotely wipes the laptop. The data 
controller did not report the breach as they believed there was little or no risk to data subjects. 
However, the IT department later discovers the employee was working on an old laptop, which was 
not encrypted or password protected. The employee also confirms that the paper files were for an 
upcoming criminal trial and the personal data, which related to criminal convictions and health 
information, had not been redacted. The controller then reports the breach to the ICO and informed 
the data subjects. In such a case, the ICO observed that once the controller discovered the laptop and 
papers were not secured, they made the right decision to notify the individuals concerned and the ICO, 
because there was a period of time within which somebody could have accessed sensitive data. There 
was no way for the controller to know what had happened to the data, so they cannot be certain that it 
was unlikely a risk to the data subjects would occur. Notification was therefore based on (high) risk 
rather than certainty of a compromise of personal data.  
This approach could be significant in cases where it is almost impossible or time-consuming for a 
controller to know or determine a compromise of personal data in order for an incident to fall within 
the definition of a personal data breach, and hence satisfy the notification requirement. In the above 
example, the loss of the unencrypted laptop and unredacted papers and the time lapse to discover that 
they were unprotected presents a breach of security which could be risky to the data subjects if data 
actually got compromised. No compromise could be ascertained at that point, so normatively there 
was no personal data breach as defined by EU data protection law. However, considering the sensitive 
nature of the personal data and high risk to which the data subjects would be exposed if the data was 
compromised, it seemed only reasonable to notify the data subjects so they can take protective 
                                                          
97 Information Commissioner’s Office. Personal data breach examples. Retrieved from https://ico.org.uk/for-
organisations/report-a-breach/personal-data-breach/personal-data-breach-examples/. Accessed 6th June 2020. 
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measures. Thus there was no ascertained compromise of personal data (hence no ‘data breach’ as 
defined by Article 4(12), yet the ICO recommends that the data subjects nevertheless to be notified 
due to (high) risks of a compromise to their fundamental rights and freedoms.  
Despite the apparent higher level of protection to data subjects it offers, this approach could 
nevertheless be exposed to some criticism. An obvious one would be that it may direct data controllers 
to report incidents which do not end up in the compromise of personal data or provoke just a trivial 
compromise with no substantive impact. This could lead to the over-reporting of incidents and 
unnecessary alerts to data subjects which may cause unfounded and unnecessary panic and distress.  
Another issue would be the determining an appropriate level of probability of exposure of personal 
data to warrant notification, i.e. in what situations should a breach of security be considered to be 
bound to lead or cause a compromise of personal data, so data subjects may be informed? As already 
discussed, the risk-based approach of EU data protection law requires controllers and processors to 
adopt stricter security measures for processing which involve higher risks to the rights and freedoms 
of data subjects. This implies that breaches of security which only affect part of a security system or 
are too weak to have led to any compromise of personal data would not need to be reported. However, 
it appears determining whether or not a breach of security was in itself serious enough to have exposed 
personal data to certain compromise will require an investigation by the controller; which could also 
be time consuming or technically difficult to conclude depending on the sophistication of the attack. 
It is however opined here that just as the European Union Agency for Network and Information 
Security (ENISA) developed a methodology framework for the assessment of the risk which a 
compromise of personal data could present to data subjects98, a similar framework could also be 
developed to estimate, in the first place, the probability and/or risk of exposure of personal data 
following a breach of security. Despite these criticisms however, informing data subjects of risky 
security breaches so they stay alert and take appropriate measures before determining if there has been 
a compromise of personal data could arguably be a more preventive approach to securing their rights 
and freedoms. 
6   Conclusion 
It would appear the risk component in personal data security enforcement in the EU is triggered on 
personal data breaches, rather than on breaches of security. In other words, EU data protection law 
currently focuses on the risks presented by an ascertained or determined compromise of personal data 
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Document, v1.0, December 2013 
48 
 
to data subjects, rather than on whether the initial security breach itself could be risky to data subjects 
where an actual compromise of personal data is uncertain. As seen with Recital 87 of the GDPR, the 
law only requires data controllers to adopt technical measures to be able to quickly ascertain the 
compromise of data, without much substantive consideration on cases where such compromise could 
be difficult to establish even with state of the art threat-detection measures. While the current regime 
helps prevent over-reporting or notification of trivial incidents, the need to determine or ascertain the 
compromise of personal data in a security incident may limit the protective options available for data 
subjects in EU data protection law. 
 It is on this assertion that this article set out to examine another alternative approach to personal 
data breach enforcement to address this limitation. It begins by determining what would constitute a 
breach of security under EU law data protection law. In the absence of a definition of the term in EU 
data protection texts, this necessitated a review of information security literature before relating the 
main findings to EU data protection rules on secure processing and the provisions of the NIS Directive 
relating to information systems and network security.  This analysis concludes that a breach of security 
in EU data protection law would mean either non-compliance to the rules of secure processing, or an 
actual breakdown or defeat of a security infrastructure protecting processed data. The article then 
moves to discuss the relationship between a personal data breach and a breach of security in light of 
the personal data breach notification and recording requirements across EU data protection texts. In 
doing so, it highlights the law’s requirement for the presence of a compromise of personal data for an 
incident to qualify as a personal data breach, a fact which, the article argues, could limit the protection 
of data subjects especially where the circumstances are such that the data compromise cannot be 
promptly determined. And this even with state of the art security or threat-detection measures 
compliantly put in place by the data controller in accordance with the data protection rules of secure 
processing. It is also pointed out that this observation has already been made by the ICO of the UK in 
one of its hypothetical personal data breach notification examples on its website. 
 To address this limitation, the article envisages the modification of the definition of a personal 
data breach in EU law to also include, in addition to the establishment of a data compromise, a (high) 
or risk or probability of a data compromise. As such, data controllers (and/or processors) would not 
be expected to investigate a breach of security to ascertain a compromise of personal data before 
informing data subjects; the only test being that they reasonably believe, based on the nature of the 
security incident, that personal data is bound to or is most likely to have been compromised, as well 
as the sensitive nature of the data. This approach however is not void of criticisms however, one being 
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the risk of over-reporting or notification of security incidents which end up not leading to or provoking 
an insignificant compromise of personal data to the data subjects. Another issue concerns determining 
a test of being reasonably certain that an incident is risky enough or would be bound to cause a data 
breach. In light of the risk-based approach, it may be a tricky task to determine situations in which 
data controllers and processors should be expected to consider that a breach of security is bound to 
lead to a personal data compromise, so they may notify data subjects. It is opined here that some 
guidance could be developed to help controllers and processors pre-determine if a security incident is 
reasonably bound to cause, or if there is a high probability that it will lead or has led to a compromise 
of personal data. Similar to the methodology framework developed by ENISA to help data controllers 
and processors determine the severity of an ascertained personal data breach on data subjects.  
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Abstract.  
As the African continent continues to embrace technological innovations and corresponding 
infrastructures like the Internet of Things, certain concerns have been raised as regards the security 
risks related to critical ICT network infrastructures in the continent, as well as the safeguarding of the 
fundamental rights of Africans through the protection of their personal data, especially those shared 
online.  One of such concerns is personal data security, which becomes more crucial as huge amounts 
of sensitive personal data are increasingly generated across the continent, especially with the 
proliferation of mobile banking. In response to these developments, African intergovernmental 
organizations have developed legal frameworks on personal data protection: the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has adopted a Supplementary Data Protection Act, 
while the African Union (AU) has adopted a Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data 
Protection. However, while other aspects of data protection law are more or less addressed in these 
instruments, relatively very little focus is put on managing and safeguarding personal data security. 
This paper, in an attempt to present a critique of the state of affairs as regards personal data 
security regulation and online trustworthiness in Africa, strives to show that compared to the EU data 
protection regime, the above African instruments do not provide a satisfactory response to current 
personal data security challenges Africa faces. Both instruments can hardly be said to ensure a 
trustworthy environment for data sharing, as they lack essential pre-breach and post-breach regulation 
mechanisms, including breach reporting, liability for mismanagement of personal data and available 
remedies for affected data subjects. The paper concludes by recommending that these deficiencies be 
addressed in additional protocols to these instruments or in relevant future texts. 
 





Ever since the beginning of the 21st Century, Africa has had its fair share of ICT penetration, especially in terms 
of internet and mobile telephony usage. The continent hosted about 453 million internet users by the end of 2017 
as opposed to about 4 million by 2000, and the Information Technology Union (ITU) estimates 781 million 
mobile phone subscriptions in the continent in 201899. Africans are increasingly using the Internet for information 
society goods and services, ranging from online banking to social networking100.  Besides being a primary means 
of communication for most Africans, mobile phones have become a source of significant economic growth and 
a platform for innovation, especially with the rise of mobile money services: the use of mobile phones to purchase 
goods or services through funds connected to the user's account.101 Mobile banking has also been on the rise in 
the continent for close to a decade now,102 and in 2017, mobile technologies and services generated 7.1% of GDP 
across Sub-Saharan Africa, a contribution that amounted to $110 billion of economic value added103. Mobile 
application usage for urban transportation is also fairly advanced in some African countries, with, for example, 
US-based urban transport giants Uber operating in South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda, Ghana and 
Egypt. The so-called Internet of Things104 is also on the rise, with an estimated 29 billion connected objects by 
2022 105; objects being reliably connected to each other with the ability ‘to auto-organize, share information, data 
and resources, reacting and acting in face of situations and changes in the environment’106. The emergence of 
‘information ambient environments’, is also anticipated, characterised by invisible (i.e., embedded) computational 
power in everyday appliances and other common physical objects, including mobile and wearable devices where, 
                                                          
99 ITU GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ICT DATA, retrieved from 
https://www.itu.int/en/ITUD/Statistics/Documents/statistics/2018/ITU_Key_2005-
2018_ICT_data_with%20LDCs_rev27Nov2018.xls. Accessed 5/5/2019 
100 Adesugba Adesoji. "Mobile technology, social media and 180 million people." J Bus Adm Manag Sci 6 (2017): 82-
5.83. Also David Kayisire & Jiuchang Wei. "ICT adoption and usage in Africa: Towards an efficiency 
assessment." Information Technology for Development 22, no. 4 (2016): 630-653. 641 
101 Andrew Harris, Seymour Goodman & Patrick Traynor. “Privacy and security concerns associated with mobile money 
applications in Africa.” Wash. JL Tech. & Arts, 8, (2012). 245. 246 
102 Gérard Tchouassi. “Can Mobile Phones Really Work to Extend Banking Services to the Unbanked? Empirical 
Lessons from Selected Sub-Saharan Africa Countries.” International Journal of Developing Societies Vol. 1, No. 2, 
(2012) 70-81.71 
103 GSMA, The Mobile Economy Report 2013 (A.T. Kearney: London, United Kingdom, 2013) p.3 
104 Defined by Peter Stuckmann, & Rainer Zimmermann in: “European research on future internet design.” IEEE 
Wireless Communications 16, no. 5 (2009): 14-22, 15 as a ‘world-wide network of uniquely addressable and 
interconnected objects, based on standard communication protocols". This enables applications involving real-world 
objects, but also business applications based on network-assisted machine-to-machine interaction 
105 Ericson Mobility Report, June 2017. Retrieved from https://www.ericsson.com/en/mobility-report/internet-of-things-
outlook. Accessed 26th June 2019. 
106 Madakam Somayya, R. Ramaswamy, and Siddharth Tripathi. ‘Internet of Things (IoT): A literature review.’ Journal 
of Computer and Communications 3, no. 05 (2015): 164.165 
53 
 
in essence, people are surrounded with intelligent and intuitive objects capable of recognizing and responding to 
our presence in a seamless, unobtrusive and even invisible way107. 
As it keeps on embracing ICT usage and internet penetration, and also consequently generating huge 
amounts of (personal and non-personal) data, the African continent will soon  get caught up in this forecasted 
digital hurricane. This has raised concerns at regional and sub-regional governance forums not only about the 
safety and security of critical ICT infrastructure and systems which are always vulnerable to cyber-attacks108 but 
also about protecting the privacy of Africans as regards the personal information which they share over these 
platforms. The rapid growth of mobile telephony in Africa, for example, has barely been accompanied by 
appropriate consideration for privacy and security concerns, opening the door for abuse and erosion of the 
application's utility109.  Just as was the case in Europe with the advent of computer processing in the 1970s 
culminating in the adoption of the Council of Europe’s Convention 108110 and later the EU Directive 95/46/EC111 
on October 24, 1995 112, African leaders, by the end of the first decade of the 21st Century, began identifying the 
need to protect the privacy and security of personal data of users being processed by service providers using ICTs. 
The first African multilateral legal framework to directly address personal data privacy protection was the 
ECOWAS113 Supplementary Act A/SA./1/01/10 on Personal Data Protection within ECOWAS (hereinafter 
ECOWAS Data Protection Act), adopted in Abuja on February 16, 2010. This was followed by the African Union 
Convention on Cybersecurity and Personal Data Protection, adopted in Malabo on June 27, 2014. It should be 
pointed out that these instruments were being adopted at a time when some African states were also adopting or 
had already adopted national legislations focused on personal data protection114and personal data security. 
However, national personal data security initiatives are beyond the scope of this paper, which seeks to examine 
Africa’s multilareral legal frameworks on personal data protection with a view of assessing whether they provide 
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a solid basis for efficient personal data security in the face of current technological developments gradually 
engulfing the continent, and based on which national instruments can conceive adequate laws and policies. 
The paper will point out that both the ECOWAS Data Protection Act and the AU Convention on Cyber 
Security and Personal Data Protection, in relation to contemporary realities of the digital environment or as 
compared to what obtains in Europe, do not provide a satisfactory legal springboard to guarantee an adequate 
level of personal information security for African citizens in the face of current data security risks posed by the 
continent’s wide adoption of new technologies. These instruments, however, especially the AU Convention, 
should nevertheless be lauded for at least providing a commendable basis which could serve as a beginning for 
those African states which continue to embrace digital and mobile technologies without safeguarding their 
citizens’ fundamental rights with any national framework at all bearing on personal data protection or security.  
This introduction shall be followed by a first section briefly discussing the concepts of personal data, 
personal data protection and personal data security, and a second section briefly discussing the current dangers to 
personal data security in Africa. A third section shall briefly introduce the ECOWAS and AU Data Protection 
Conventions, and briefly discuss how they address personal data security. A fourth section identifies and discusses 
the aspects of personal data security absent from the Act in comparison with the European data protection model, 
and the fifth and final section features the author’s conclusive remarks. 
2.2  Personal Data, Data Protection and Data Security 
This section briefly introduces the concepts of personal data protection and personal data security. It 
shall basically be a rundown of current literature on both concepts. 
 
2.2.1   Personal data 
Personal data is the yolk of personal data protection law; the latter is triggered only if personal data is 
processed. It is therefore crucial for individuals, their representatives and data processing entities to 
understand what personal data is exactly, in order to know whether a particular operation or situation 
falls under the regulatory scope of data protection law. 
Personal data, as it is used in Europe and (adopted in) Africa, is also known as personal information 
or, in the United States, personally identifiable information115. The first internationally-established 
conceptualisation of the term ‘personal data’ was enshrined in the OECD 116  Guidelines on the 
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data adopted on 23 September 1980. 
                                                          
115 For a discussion on the interchangeability between ‘personal data’ and ‘personally identifiable information’, see Paul 
Schwartz & Daniel Solove. ‘The PII problem: Privacy and a new concept of personally identifiable information.’ NYUL 
rev. 86 (2011): 1814-1894 
116 The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
55 
 
Paragraph 1(b) of the Guidelines defines personal data as ‘any information relating to an identified or 
identifiable individual (data subject)’. The Council of Europe followed suit, adopting the very same 
definition in its Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of 
Personal Data adopted in Strasbourg on 28 January 1981. In the European Union, the General Data 
Protection Regulation adopts the very same definition, with further clarifications. It states that personal 
data is ‘any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an 
identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by 
reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier 
or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural 
or social identity of that natural person.’117 This covers a broad range of data, from the name, date of 
birth, address, health records, social security numbers, driver’s licence data and even the real time 
location of a person, and beyond. In essence, all data through which an individual is or can be 
identified. This definition, which also featured almost word-for-word in the repealed 1995 EU Data 
Protection Directive, has already been criticised for being too broad and could include virtually sort 
of information. The terms ‘any information’ and ‘relating to’ suggest that all sorts of information 
leading even slightly to a person could be ‘personal’, especially considering that current and 
anticipated computer technologies with unprecedented analytical capacities could make use of 
virtually any piece of information to identify a natural person, hence the risk of making every 
information personal data118. But it has also been defended on grounds that the EU legislator had as 
mission to provide a high standard of protection for individuals with regard to the processing of their 
personal information by adopting a definition which calls for a very wide interpretation of what could 
constitute personal data, in order to cover all “shadow zones” within its scope.119 
A very identical definition to the above EU definitions on personal data has been taken up by both 
the ECOWAS and AU data protection instruments. The ECOWAS Act defines personal data as ‘any 
information relating to an identified individual or who may be directly or indirectly identifiable by 
reference to an identification number or one or several elements related to their physical, 
physiological, genetic, psychological, cultural, social, or economic identity (Article 1), while the AU 
Convention refers to it as ‘any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person by 
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which this person can be identified, directly or indirectly in particular by reference to an identification 
number or to one or more factors specific to his/her physical, physiological, mental, economic, 
cultural or social identity.’ (Article 1). From the terms ‘any information’ and ‘relating to’, it appears 
both instruments appear to reinforce the EU model of covering a broad range of information under the 
category of personal data which should be protected under the legal mechanism of personal data 
protection. 
 
2.2.2 Personal Data Protection 
 
Hustinx maintains that personal data protection (in light of the objective of the Council of Europe’s 
Convention 108) refers to that set of policies and rules which aim to protect individuals (citizens, 
consumers, workers, etc.) against unjustified collection, recording, use and dissemination of their 
personal details.120 The concept has been particularly trendy in the US and in Europe over the last 
decades, following the (global) realisation that personal data plays increasingly important role in our 
economies and is being generated, gathered and processed at alarming rates due to wide range of 
analytics that can provide comprehensive insights into individuals’ movements, interests, and 
activities121. Such use of personal data, if not regulated, could expose individuals to a number of risks 
ranging from privacy violations to serious injuries like identity theft.122 In Europe, with the human 
right to private life (of the home and correspondences)123 proving increasingly difficult to guarantee 
with the advent and increased use of ICTs to process personal information, there was the need for a 
novel regime to introduce safeguards which should be observed by organisations and institutions when 
processing personal information within the context of an information society. 124  One of such 
safeguards is the requirement to ensure the security of personal data which these companies or 
institutions are processing. 
In addition to Hustinx’s definition above, it should equally be pointed out that contemporary data 
protection law also seeks to reinforce online trust i.e. making individuals feel confident and safe to 
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share their personal data. Prior to the post-2010 data protection law reforms in the EU and US, the 
‘notice and consent’ model, which consisted of purpose specification, use limitation and ‘informed, 
freely-given’ consent was relied on to protect individuals’ personal data125. After 2010, following 
established shortcomings of this model like, inter alia, the processing of data by third parties who were 
not in any direct relationship with individuals, decision or notice fatigue126or the unrealism to always 
expect data controllers to request consent to process data for purposes other than the original purpose 
for which it was collected, there was a shift towards equally ensuring responsible and trustworthy use 
of personal data.127  Considering that data sharing is essential for the exchange of goods and services 
and economic functioning of any society, data protection is therefore not just about protecting 
individuals but also about ensuring economic growth. The European Commission, for example, stated 
that contemporary EU data protection law is poised to ‘help stimulate the Digital Single Market in the 
EU by fostering trust in online services by consumers…’128 while Lynskey points out that EU data 
protection law simultaneously pursues dual objectives: economic—to facilitate the establishment of 
the internal market—and rights-based—to protect fundamental rights when personal data is 
processed129 [13]. In this light, and in line with the OECD Guidelines, the following principles were 
formulated by EU data protection law:  
-  Principle of lawfulness, fairness, and transparency: personal data shall be processed lawfully, 
fairly, and in a transparent manner.  
- Principle of purpose limitation: personal data shall be collected for specified, explicit, and 
legitimate purposes. 
- Principle of data minimization: Processing of personal data must also be adequate, relevant, 
and limited to what is necessary.  
- Principle of accuracy: Personal data being processed must be accurate and kept up to date. 
- Principle of storage limitation: Personal data is to be kept in a form that hinders identification 
of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the originated purpose. 
- Principle of integrity and confidentiality: Processing should appropriate security personal data. 
                                                          
125 Alessandro Mantelero, “The future of consumer data protection in the EU Re-thinking the “notice and consent” 
paradigm in the new era of predictive analytics.” Computer Law & Security Review 30, no. 6 (2014): 643-660. 644 
126 See Malin Olivia Soeder. “Privacy Challenges and Approaches to the Consent Dilemma.” (Masters thesis). Available 
at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3442612 Retrieved 7/11/2019).pp 25 et seq 
127 See the White House, “Executive Office of the President. Big Data: Seizing Opportunities, Preserving Values” 
(2014). 55 -56. http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/big_data_privacy_report_may_1_2014.pdf. Accessed 
2/11/2019 
128 European Commission Joint Statement on the final adoption of the new EU rules for personal data protection. 
(Brussels, 14 April 2016). Available at https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-16-1403_de.htm. Accessed 
on 3/6/2019. Also see Recital 7 of the GDPR 
129  Orla Lynskey. The foundations of EU data protection law. 2015. supra. 46. 
58 
 
- Principle of accountability: The data controller (person in charge of processing personal data) 
should always be ready to demonstrate compliance with all the above principles.130 
 
2.2.3   Personal Data Security 
Paragraph 11 of the OECD Privacy Guidelines, titled the Security Safeguards Principle, requires 
personal data to be ‘protected by reasonable security safeguards against such risks as loss or 
unauthorised access, destruction, use, modification or disclosure of data.’ Personal data security 
hence refers to the mechanisms undertaken to safeguard of personal information under processing by 
service-providing companies or institutions from unauthorised access, loss, destruction, alteration or 
any other circumstance which could negatively affect the processed data.  
With personal data being, prima facie, information in the first place, consists a subset of the 
broader concept of information security. The International Standardisation Organisation defines 
information security as the preservation of the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information, 
noting that information can take on many forms: it can be printed or written on paper, stored 
electronically, transmitted by post or electronic means, shown on films, even conveyed in conversation 
(ISO/IEC 27002, 2005). Arguing that this definition was limited to industry standards and do not 
consider contemporary information security challenges, Whitman & Mattord add Accuracy, 
Authenticity, Utility and Possession to the list of data security features.131 
Personal data security thus incorporates the above processed vis-à-vis information which relates 
to or identifies an individual. This is reflected in the European Commission’s definition of personal 
data security breach as “a breach of security leading to the accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, 
alteration, unauthorized disclosure of, or access to, personal data transmitted, stored or otherwise 
processed…” 132 . Conceptually, the term incorporates the procedural engagements taken by 
organisations to prevent these mishaps from befalling the personal data they process.   Such 
engagement is crucial in any contemporary society, as compromised personal data could be used for 
a broad range of malpractices including impersonating the individual (identity theft) and making 
fraudulent transactions, or for abusive marketing, phishing or spying, which could lead to financial 
loss and emotional distress suffered by the concerned individual133 [18].  
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Compared to Europe and the US, personal data protection, though not really a new concept 
considering the existence of data protection laws in about a score of African countries today134 is still 
to receive substantial media attention and legal interpretation in Africa, which may raise concern 
considering the continent’s adoption of ICTs especially mobile telephony, and hence massive 
generation of personal data. The continent has generally been slow in adopting a continental privacy 
policy or culture, which contributes not only to the current lack of national personal data protection 
initiatives, but could hinder the practical enforcement of national data security legislations based on 
these instruments. In this light, following section discusses some inherent contextual challenges which 
could hinder the adequate enforcement of a personal data security framework in Africa. 
2.3 Personal Data security in Africa: Potential challenges 
This section briefly discusses a number of factors characterizing the African information security 
context, making a case for the prevalence of an informationally risky environment for African 
residents. 
2.3.1  Inadequate cybersecurity response 
The AU Convention, in its third section bearing on cybersecurity, urges Member States to, inter alia, 
‘elaborate and implement programmes and initiatives for sensitization on security for systems and 
networks users’ (Article 26(1)(b)). However, many African states suffer from inadequate structures 
and organs to fight equipment to fight cybercrime and guarantee cybersecurity. By June 2018, though 
40 out of 55 African states have adopted comprehensive cybercrime laws, only 20 States had 
established national cybersecurity policies, and 18 States had national CERT frameworks135. This 
inadequate cybersecurity response has eased the infection of a huge number of computers in Africa 
with malware: reportedly over 80% by 2010136.  Also, just as had been predicted almost a decade ago, 
a huge number of Africans now use mobile phones for mobile banking, accessing the Internet, 
facilitating commerce, and general communication137.  
Coupled with the inability to guarantee ICT network security, this development implies that there 
are huge amounts of personal data generated every day in Africa and susceptible to unauthorised 
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access and/or misuse. Securing personal data also involves ensuring information service providers 
have adequate technical measures in place to safeguard the security of the network or system 
processing or transmitting such data. As Wayne et al argue, key steps towards building cyber resilience 
in Africa should begin with implementation (of the AU Convention) and education,138 but the snail 
pace of ratifying the Convention so far (only five states by September 2019, since its adoption in 2014) 
is evidence of the apathy with which African states apparently approach cybersecurity threats and 
dangers. 
2.3.2   Relatively weak privacy culture in Africa 
Privacy as a philosophical or even legal phenomenon has not yet received mainstream attention in 
Africa. 139  Some commentators even advocating that privacy is of little value in the continent, 
overshadowed by the collectivist lifestyle which is dominant in local African communities 140 , 
advocated as one of the principal features of the traditional African philosophy generally referred to 
as Ubuntu141. Interestingly, it is not even formally recognised by the continent’s most fundamental 
human rights instrument: the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR) of 1981 does 
not mention a right to privacy in its catalogue of basic human rights. In an effort to justify this omission 
of the right to privacy in the ACHPR, Olinger et al purport that ‘privacy was simply not seen as a 
necessary right for Africans to live freely and peaceably’142. Bakibinga also advances the argument 
that Africans may generally be said to suffer from ‘privacy myopia’ i.e. the tendency to undervalue 
the bits of information about themselves so that it does not seem worth it to go to the trouble of 
protecting such information143. It should be pointed out however that this view is not predominant 
among scholars: Makulilo for example argues that Western influence and globalization has wrought 
individualism in African urban areas, and privacy is becoming an evolving concept in the continent.144 
Nevertheless, on the other hand, strong notions of privacy arose in Europe since the end of the Second 
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World War. And while this, since the 1970s, led to advocacy for even stronger personal data protection 
requirements for companies processing personal data in Europe, the absence of a strong notion of 
privacy in Africa weakens the grounds for any advocacy for personal data protection.145  
This situation is not so static though: most African national constitutions do guarantee a right to 
privacy146, and as discussed above, African governments have begun considering privacy protection 
through personal data protection laws. So far African states have been progressively adopting 
comprehensive data protection laws which also require security safeguards when processing personal 
data. These laws in question, however, are fragmented among states, portraying different standards of 
personal data security safeguards required of data processing organisations147. There is also a gaping 
absence of public interest groups in monitor government behaviour, propose public policy, and 
promote privacy awareness in relation to privacy.148  
2.3.3   Potential for unaccountability by African governments 
One of the core principles of data protection is accountability: personal data processing organisations 
or companies should always be ready to demonstrate compliance with data protection regulations.149 
Adejumobi observes that accountability towards their citizens, unfortunately, is generally not a very 
popular governance option among African governments150, and Goodman & Harris observe that many 
of them demonstrate a willingness to operate outside the rule of law and with little accountability151.  
The absence of accountability provides favourable grounds for privacy violations. Contemporary 
literature has raised these concerns in relation to African governments. A case in point is the ongoing 
process of African governments in implementing comprehensive electronic ID card schemes (an 
example being the current ‘Uduma Number’ scheme by the Kenyan government). Though such 
initiatives may ease identification and maintain law and order, a worrying factor is that it leads to 
extensive databases of individuals’ personal data, including sensitive and biometric data being kept by 
governments with virtually no national or regionally-binding personal data privacy obligations of 
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accountability towards their citizens152. In the same light, Banisar points out that most common ICT 
privacy issue currently facing African nations is the development of new citizen identification systems, 
including identity cards and passports 153 . Even more concerning is the fact that the technical 
development and operation of these ID card schemes are franchised to foreign companies154 which 
could make claims against privacy violations difficult in terms of jurisdictional conflict 
Mass surveillance is equally another issue: Sutherland posits that African governments are 
extremely reticent to have any accountability or transparency of their interception and surveillance 
activities.155 Some of them have even passed laws mandating telecommunication providers to integrate 
surveillance systems capable of interception of communications. For example, South Africa’s 
Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-related Information 
Act 2002 requires service providers to incorporate surveillance machinery before they can offer 
services to the public. Section 9 of Zimbabwe’s 2007 Interception of Communications Act similarly 
requires providers to assist with interception, while Namibia’s 2009 Communications Act orders 
communication companies to build interceptor centres while providing little control as to who can 
order wiretaps [35]. A point worth noting here is that these legislations were passed to regulate 
traditional telecommunication systems, which are principally landline and mobile communications, 
and may not be compatible with the realities of the contemporary ubiquitous digital data processing. 
The steady advent of the IoT and even information ambient environment where all sorts of data like 
health, transportation or electricity consumption details can be processed by any object with censors, 
if not countered by strong data protection legislation, the mass surveillance capacities of African states 
(and their partner processor companies) on their civilians could grow to alarming levels. 
 This section illustrates that personal data processing in Africa presents a variety of risks to 
individuals ranging from unsatisfactory levels of cybersecurity, cultural privacy deficiencies or 
potential abuse by government or private entities. It was on this basis that African multilateral 
organisations (in this case ECOWAS and AU) came up with legal responses to introduce, within their 
respective scopes of competence, guidelines which aim to protect Africans with regard to the 
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processing of their personal information and, in the process, ensure a trustworthy and secure online 
environment for the flow of personal data. 
2.4 African multilateral personal data security instruments 
This section presents the selected multilateral instruments addressing personal data protection in 
Africa: the ECOWAS Data Protection Act and the African Union Convention on Cyber Security and 
Data Protection. It shall focus briefly on their background, scope and applicability, before discussing 
their provisions on personal data security.  
2.4.1   The ECOWAS156 Data Protection Act 
ECOWAS is the main interstate organization of Western Africa with fifteen members,157 established 
by the Treaty of Lagos on 28th May 1975158. Article 3 (2) (a) of the Treaty states that Member states 
shall ensure the ‘the harmonization and coordination of national policies and the promotion of 
integration programmes in areas including communications, trade, information, science, technology, 
services, and legal matters’. It was based on the above provision and the Supplementary Act 
A/SA.1/01/10 Personal Data Protection within the ECOWAS (ECOWAS Data Protection Act) was 
adopted during the 37th session of the Authority of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government in 
Abuja on 16 February 2010. 
 With this Supplementary Act, ECOWAS is the first and only sub-regional grouping in Africa to 
develop a concrete framework of personal data protection law; a framework strongly influenced by 
the 1995 EU Data Protection Directive. It should also be noted that Article 48 of the Act makes it an 
integral part of the ECOWAS Treaty, thereby making violations of the Act actionable before the 
ECOWAS Court of Justice. The Act has a dual objective: the protection of privacy and promotion of 
free movement of information159 . It equally recognizes that technology advancements greatly ease 
personal data processing and hence bring about unprecedented problems of personal data protection, 
and seeks to address the problem through a harmonized legal framework for data protection within the 
ECOWAS sub-region.160 
                                                          
156 Established by the Treaty of Lagos on 28 May 1975, ECOWAS is the main intergovernmental organization of West 
Africa currently comprising of 15 sovereign West African States namely: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote 
d’Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mail, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. 
(www.ecowas.int) 
157 Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo 
158 Treaty of ECOWAS (28 May 1975) 14 ILM 1200; revised 24 July 1993, 35 ILM 660, (1996). 
159 Paragraph 10, Preamble, ECOWAS Data Protection Act. 
160 Paragraphs 8-11, Preamble, ECOWAS Data Protection Act 
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2.4.2   The African Union Convention on Cybersecurity and Personal Data Protection 
Adopted by the 23rd Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State of the African Union in 
Malabo on 27 June 2014, the African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data 
Protection (the AU Data Protection Convention) provides a legal framework regulating electronic 
commerce, data Protection and cybersecurity. Its overall objective is to harmonise national legislation 
in Africa on a number of ICT-related issues; an objective materialising the three main AU declarations 
on harmonisation of ICT and related laws: the Oliver Tambo Declaration Johannesburg 2009, the 
Abuja Declaration 2010 and the Addis Ababa Declaration 2012. 161  As regards personal data 
protection, it seeks to establish a legal framework ‘aimed at strengthening fundamental rights and 
public freedoms, particularly the protection of [personal] data, and punish any violation of privacy 
without prejudice to the principle of free flow of personal data (Article 8(1) AU Convention) It is set 
to come into force upon ratification by 15 member states (Article 38). So far (June 2019) though, only 
four member states (Senegal, Namibia, Guinea and Mauritius) have ratified the Convention. After 
coming into force, it applies to Member states (which are mostly dualist), however, only upon the 
individual domestication (by Member states) into the internal law of the state.162 
 The Convention applies rationae loci to any automated or non-automated processing of personal 
data carried out in a territory of an AU Member State (Article 9(1)). However, just like Article 3(2) of 
the 1995 EU Directive, the Convention does not apply to data processing carried out by an individual 
in the exclusive framework of their personal or domestic activities (Article 9(2)(a)). The Convention 
also covers processing of personal data for in cases of public security, defence, investigation and 
prosecution of criminal offences, but subject to the provisions of other existing laws (suggestively 
regional or national texts operating lex specialis) (Article 9(1)(d)).  
 
2.4.3    Personal data security guarantees under both instruments 
Both the ECOWAS Data Protection Act and AU Data Protection Convention provide for means aimed 
at ensuring that processed personal data is handled securely by data controllers and processors.  
2.4.3.1   Confidentiality and Security of processing 
Firstly, both instruments contain a Principle of confidentiality and security when processing personal 
data (Article 28 ECOWAS Data Protection Act, Article 13 AU Convention), requiring data to be 
processed confidentially, and protected in particular when processing includes transmission of the data 
over a [computer] network. This principle is not very explicit under the African data protection 
                                                          
161 Alex Makulilo, "Myth and reality of harmonisation of data privacy policies in Africa." Computer Law & Security 
Review31, no. 1 (2015): 78-89. 81 
162 See for example Section 12 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
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regimes, and reference can be made to Convention 108 for a more explicit version of the principle. 
Article 7 of Convention 108 demands that state parties ‘provide that the controller, and, where 
applicable the processor, takes appropriate security measures against risks such as accidental or 
unauthorised access to, destruction, loss, use, modification or disclosure of personal data’. Similar 
obligations are demanded of the data controller and processor under the GDPR. 
 In Africa, similar to the position of Convention 108, the onus of compliance to this principle 
falls generally on the data controller, whom the ECOWAS regime expressly puts in charge of ensuring 
the confidentiality of processing (Article 42) and obliges to “take all necessary precautions in relation 
to the nature of data, and in particular to ensure that it is not deformed, damaged or accessible to 
unauthorised third parties.” (Article 43). The data controller has got identical responsibilities under 
the AU Convention (Articles 20 and 21). Both instruments also make the data controller remains the 
sole responsible entity to guarantee data security, as it is up to the latter, when recruiting a processor, 
to ensure that the latter is equipped with sufficient guarantees for data security (Article 29 ECOWAS 
Data Protection Act, Article 13 (b) AU Convention). This, position, it should be noted, is slightly 
different from what presently obtains in Europe under the GDPR, which provides for the possibility 
of the processor being individually responsible for processing in the event where it acted outside the 
processing instructions of the controller (Article 82 GDPR). 
 
2.4.3.2   The Data Protection Authority 
Another data security guarantee finds expression in the wide powers granted by both instruments to 
the Data Protection Authority (DPA) to promote security compliance and deter non-compliance. 
Hustinx underlines the importance and uniqueness of the DPA by stating that data protection ‘is special 
in the sense that it is considered to be in need of ‘structural support’ through the establishment of an 
independent authority with adequate powers and resources’, while pointing out that ‘no other 
fundamental right – except the right to a fair trial – is structurally associated with the role of an 
independent body to ensure its respect and further development [i.e. Courts]’163. In Europe, data 
protection supervisory authorities have been viewed as ‘an element of effective protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of their personal information.164 
                                                          
163 Peter Hustinx. "The role of data protection authorities." In Reinventing Data Protection?, pp. 131-137. Springer, 
Dordrecht, 2009. 133 
164 Preamble, Additional Protocol to the Council of European Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to 




Under the African data protection regimes, the DPA is entitled to receive claims and petitions 
relating to processing of personal data and advice petitioners on the relevant course of action to take 
(Article 19 (1)(f) ECOWAS Data Protection Act, Article 12(2)(e) AU Convention). He/she can hear 
claims of data security violations after which, in case of an emergency, he/she may suspend, block or 
permanently suspend proceedings (Article 19(3) ECOWAS Data Protection Act). He/she can also 
impose fines on a data controller who is found to be in violation of its personal data security (and, 
generally, data protection) responsibilities Article 20(3) ECOWAS Data Protection Act, Article 
14(4)(c) AU Convention). Supervisory and enforcement institutions like the DPA will could be 
particularly useful in terms of creating a trustworthy online environment for data exchange in and 
among African countries both in terms of sanctioning defaulting data controllers who breach security 
principles or undermine online trust and ethics and, by virtue of their expertise in data protection law, 
educating data subjects on their rights towards achieving a trustworthy and secure digital environment 
for data sharing. 
2.4.3.3  Right of Access and Rectification 
Both instruments also provide for a right of access to data processing for individuals (Article 38 (6) 
and Article 39 ECOWAS Data Protection Act, Article 17 AU Convention) which is basically a right 
of the individual to request the data controller to present him with his data being processed by the 
latter as well as any information about the recipients to whom the data has been disclosed. This, at 
least in theory, gives individuals a chance to ensure their personal data has not been altered, providing 
them with some level of supervisory powers alongside the data controller. Data alteration being a data 
security issue in terms of data integrity165, the right of access actually acts as a complementary security 
measure. 
 
 The above are the main personal data security guarantees under both the ECOWAS Data 
Protection Act and the AU Data Protection Convention. They admittedly cover some salient aspects 
in the domain, but these guarantees are quite limited in relation to the contemporary privacy demands 
of a data-driven society which Africa is slowly but surely becoming. 
 
2.5 Some data security mechanisms missing from the above instruments 
This section reviews the data security weaknesses of the above African multilateral data protection 
instruments. It shall identify and briefly discuss significant personal data security mechanisms missing 
from their provisions. 
                                                          
165 See the EU Article 29 Working Party Opinion 03/2014 on Personal Data Breach Notification (WP213), p.3  
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2.5.1   Absence of a security breach notification requirement. 
Breach notification as a measure of personal data security management has been around for quite a 
while in data protection legislations, and constitutes an essential tool in ensuring responsible data 
processing on the part of data controllers. In essence, it requires personal data controllers or processors 
to inform either the competent Data Protection Authority or data subjects of a security incident which 
affects or is likely to have affected the personal data being processed. It was first passed into law in 
the US state of California in 2002166, and has been taken up by other states and jurisdictions, including 
the European Union (first by the e-Privacy Directive167 in 2002, and later the EU GDPR168 in 2016), 
and is even embodied in Paragraph 15(c) of the OECD Revised Recommendation of the Council 
governing the Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, 
adopted on 11 July 2013.  
Security breach notification rules have been established to serve three main advantages: ‘they 
provide a systematic feedback about the actual risk and the actual weaknesses of existing security 
measures; they enable authorities and consumers to assess the relative capabilities of data controllers 
with respect to data security; they force data controllers to assess and understand their own situation 
regarding security measures’169. In other words, personal data breach reporting serves ex ante (shaping 
the future behaviour of data controllers via deterrence) and ex post (mitigating the harm of the breach) 
objectives170. Such mitigation could be very crucial in event of the compromise of highly sensitive 
data; for example, informing individuals there has been a breach so they can quickly change 
information like passwords or passcodes to prevent identity theft or other related criminal activity171 . 
It also ensures accountability of the data controller in data processing, which requires controllers to be 
able to actively demonstrate compliance to personal data protection rules at any time, and typically 
without waiting on data subjects or supervisory authorities to point out shortcomings.172 
This measure is absent from both the ECOWAS and AU data protection instruments: they do 
not provide for an obligation for data controllers to inform the DPA or individual data subjects about 
                                                          
166 Gina Marie Stevens. “Data security breach notification laws.” Congressional Research Service (2012). 
167 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of 
personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic 
communications) 
168 Article 33 
169 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Paper SEC (2012) 72 final. Impact Assessment Accompanying 
the General Data Protection Regulation (2012)) p.100 
170 Samson Esayas. "Breach Notification Requirements under the European Union Legal Framework: Convergence, 
Conflicts, and Complexity in Compliance,." J. Marshall J. Info. Tech. & Privacy L. (2014) 317. 322-323 
171 See generally Paul Schwartz & Edward J. Janger. “Notification of data security breaches.” Mich. L. Rev., 105, 
(2006).913. 
172 Philippe Boillat & Morten Kjaerum. "Handbook on European data protection law." Luxembourg: Publications Office 
of the European Union (2014).77 
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security incidents which may have led to a loss or unauthorised access by an external body to the 
personal data they are processing. Though out of the scope of this paper, it should be mentioned here 
however that among those which have currently adopted personal data protection legislations, data 
security breach notification requirements currently exist some African states including Chad, Ghana, 
Lesotho, South Africa and Uganda. Nevertheless, its absence in the main continental instrument on 
personal data protection remains significant. 
 2.5.2   No ‘data protection by design’ requirements 
Contemporary trends in data protection law, especially as regards data processing using ICT systems, 
and in order to ensure trustworthy processing, demand that such protection to be considered at the 
moment of designing the system or product 173 . In the same light, the OECD Revised 
Recommendations demand that personal data controllers should have in place a ‘privacy management 
program’ in charge of ensuring adherence to all the requirements of the Recommendations (Paragraph 
15(b)). The EU also has similar provisions, which were in force before the adoption of the ECOWAS 
and AU data protection instruments.174  
As Cunningham notes, regulations protecting privacy and personal information could 
simultaneously encourage data security – as well as incentivise those entities that provide data 
security175. And over the years, a number of  privacy enhancing technologies (PETs) have been 
developed in order to achieve information privacy goals especially alongside new technologies such 
as cloud computing and IoT, and include services like virtual private networks, transport layer security, 
DNS security extension, or onion routing 176 .  These also include techniques like encryption, 
anonymisation or pseudonymisation 177 . These technologies aim at ensuring the security of 
communications as well as the preservation of the identity of a user in instances when such information 
is not required by another party, hence playing an important part in increasing the privacy and security 
of users and the data transmitted or processed. 
 Contemporary data protection law, like the EU GDPR (Article 25) for example requires 
processing systems which process personal information to be conceived around these PETs to 
                                                          
173 See for example Paragraph 44, EU Article 29 Working Party. “The future of privacy”, WP 168, at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2009/wp168_en.pdf, adopted 1 December 2009 
174 Recital 46 of EU Directive 95/46/EC adopted in 24th October 1995 requires data security measures be taken at the 
time of designing the processing system as well as during processing itself. 
175 McKay Cunningham. "Privacy in the age of the hacker: balancing global privacy and data security Law." Geo. Wash. 
Int'l L. Rev. (2012) 45. Retrieved from https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2138307. Accessed 
5/10/2019. 
176 Rolf H. Weber. “Internet of things: Privacy issues revisited.” Computer Law & Security Review 31, no. 5 (2015): 618-
627. 621 
177 See Europa, Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs) available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_MEMO-07-
159_en.htm, dated 2 May 2007. Accessed 24/2/2019 
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guarantee ‘automatic’ data protection. The ECOWAS and AU data protection instruments are both 
silent on this aspect, apparently leaving it entirely up to data controllers to determine whether or not 
to employ the usage of privacy enhancing technologies when processing personal data using ICTs. 
Nevertheless, this mechanism is provided for by some African national legislations.178  
2.5.3   Relatively vague general security standard of data processing 
Similar to the above point on PETs, the wordings of the ECOWAS and AU data protection instruments 
set relatively weak data security standards in safeguarding personal data processing, compared to what 
obtains in Europe, for example. Vaguely requiring that personal data be “processed confidentially and 
protected”, (Article 28 ECOWAS Data Protection Act, Article 13 AU Convention) they appear to 
leave the methods and level of protection to be determined entirely by the data controllers, giving no 
guidance as to what technical or administrative measures to take to guarantee security. It could be 
argued though that, by interpretation, determining whether or not personal data is adequately protected 
depends on the type of data and the threats such data is likely to be exposed to, hence there could be 
no further need to stress on the measures to take, as the data controller is expected to know the kind 
of protection appropriate for protecting the data being collected and processed. In other words, how 
‘secure’ a particular processing activity is shall depend on the type of data and risks involved with 
such processing, data protection having been portrayed by some scholars as a risk-management kind 
of legal regime179. 
 However, this appears to put too much trust in the data controllers, which is risky business 
because most data processing bodies are privately-owned businesses, and hence are inherently inclined 
on maximizing profit which could be at the expense of implementing state of the art privacy protection 
mechanisms. The EU, for example, adopts the same risk-management standard to securing personal 
data, but goes ahead to lay further guidance as to how a data controller or processor determines if it 
has put in place adequate security measures. Article 17 of the 1995 Data Protection Directive states 
that data controllers must “ensure a level of security appropriate to the risks represented by the 
processing and the nature of the data to be protected…taking into account the state of the art and the 
costs of their implementation in relation to the risks inherent in the processing and the nature of the 
data to be protected.”180 Similar to the principle of confidentiality and security of processing discussed 
in Section 3 above, the European approach is much more explicit and lays down guidelines to prove 
                                                          
178 See for example Article 25 of the Ghanaian Data Protection Act 2012 and Article 41 of the Kenyan Data Protection 
Bill 2019. 
179 For a discussion of risk management in data protection law, see generally Raphael Gellert. “We Have Always 
Managed Risks in Data Protection Law: Understanding the Similarities and Differences Between the Rights-Based and 
the Risk-Based Approaches to Data Protection.” Eur. Data Prot. L. Rev. 2 (2016): 481. 
180 Also see Article 32 GDPR 
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secure processing: state of the art of the security component available on the market, and the cost of 
its implementation (consideration whether the cost of implementing the security measure is not too 
superfluous). This provides more explicit guidance to data controllers in knowing what types of 
security measures to adopt to show compliance. 
2.5.4   No reference to certification schemes 
Both African international instruments do not provide for certification schemes through privacy seals. 
In brief, a privacy seal is a certification mark or a guarantee issued by a certifying entity verifying an 
organisation’s adherence to certain specified privacy standards that aim to promote consumer trust and 
confidence181. Already functional in Europe, privacy certification seals are issued by organisations 
(known as certification bodies) accredited for such purposes by the competent privacy or data 
protection authorities. Personal data processing companies wishing to demonstrate compliance to data 
protection rules can apply to these organisations to be certified under such seals, which could be 
granted following due review and relevant inspections of their privacy policies in place. Privacy seals 
permit individuals to quickly assess the privacy or data security levels of the goods and services they 
subscribe to, as they cannot independently determine the data protection or privacy behaviour of the 
data controller.  
Voluntary privacy or data protection certification could aid compliance, as they rapidly 
demonstrate that certified entity’s data protection (and, in parallel, data security) practices meet certain 
standards to the satisfaction of the certification body182.  Benefits of privacy seals may also include: 
generation of privacy and data protection accountability and oversight; enhancement of trust and 
confidence, reputational, competitive and market advantages to entities using them; generation of 
privacy awareness; assistance in proving fulfilment of privacy and data protection obligations183.  
2.5.5   No direct data controller-data subject liability 
Another significant setback of the African multilateral response to data security problems is the 
absence of an established, direct liability relationship between the data controller and the data subject. 
The provisions of the ECOWAS and AU instruments position the data controller to be answerable 
solely to the DPA with respect to its data processing obligations; only the DPA can impose sanctions 
in event of a breach of security obligations. It appears both instruments create a direct liability 
                                                          
181 See generally Rowena Rodrigues, David Wright & Kush Wadhwa. "Developing a privacy seal scheme (that 
works)." International Data Privacy Law 3, no. 2 (2013): 100-116. 
182 See for example Recital 100 GDPR, which encourages the establishment of personal data protection certification seals 
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183 Rowena Rodrigues, David Barnard-Wills, Paul De Hert, and Vagelis Papakonstantinou. "The future of privacy 
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relationship only between the data controller and DPA, leaving out the individuals whose data is 
processed and who risk direct harm in event of the compromise of his personal data. Under both 
instruments, the DPA is charged with receiving data protection violation claims (from individuals) 
and advising them on the course of action to follow (Article 19 ECOWAS Data Protection Act, Article 
12 AU Convention). He appears therefore as an unwavering intermediary who decides a victim’s 
course of action on his behalf. Considering that the very essence of data protection law is the protection 
of individuals regarding the misuse of their personal information, it appears only rational that data 
controllers be made directly liable towards them as regards protecting their personal data, so they feel 
protected during the processing. Leaving individuals out of a liability relationship with the data 
controller therefore appears a data security omission on the part of the African legislator. 
2.5.6   Lack of a compensation scheme for data breach victims 
The above-mentioned absence of a direct liability relationship between the data controller and data 
subject leads to another grey area under African multilateral data protection law: compensation for 
victims of data security violations. Both the ECOWAS and AU data protection legislations fail to set 
a legal basis for Member states to enact laws which guarantee compensation for data subjects who are 
victims of personal data breaches. In the same light as data breach notification, such provisions would 
serve as an incentive for data controllers and processors to comply with standard security measures of 
data processing in order to at least ensure compliance. As discussed above, and unlike what obtains in 
other jurisdictions184, victims are not provided with a right of direct claim against the data controller.  
Also, the only monetary sanction available against the data controller under both data protection 
instruments is a fine, imposed by the DPA. By nature, fines are generally paid into the state treasury, 
or could be paid to the office of the DPA, but not to individuals. However, both instruments are silent 
as to any compensation mechanisms available for victims directly harmed by these security violations, 
which puts victims in a precarious situation: they cannot bring an action in data protection against the 
data controller, and they cannot lay a claim on a fine paid for a violation in which they suffered injury. 
It should be pointed out though that nothing appears to prevent victims directly claiming against the 
data controller on the basis of tort law. 
2.6   Conclusive remarks 
This paper set out to provide an assessment of Africa’s multilateral response, as contained in the 
ECOWAS Data Protection Act and African Union Data Protection Convention, to personal data 
security threats to which are (or would be) exposed African data subjects as Africa embraces ICTs and 
other tech-related innovations, occasionally comparing their provisions to European data protection 
                                                          
184 See for example Recital 55 of the 1995 European Data Protection Directive  
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frameworks in the process. Discussions centred in the first place on the notions of personal data, 
personal data protection and personal data security. Then an overview of the current fertility of African 
grounds for the adoption and implementation of standard personal data security norms was discussed, 
illustrating concerns revolving around the continent’s weak cybersecurity institutions and fragile 
privacy culture and unaccountability of its governments in terms of enforcing human rights norms. 
This was followed by an appraisal of the current AU and ECOWAS data protection instruments, which 
led to the discovery that these instruments do feature some provisions which contribute towards 
ensuring a secure and trustworthy digital African environment like the embodiment of a Security of 
Processing Principle, existence of a right of access and provision of Data Protection Authorities. 
However, they lack other crucial safeguards to guarantee, at their respective continental and regional 
levels, an adequately secure and trustworthy environment which seriously limits data processing 
abuses from public or private entities. The safeguards identified as lacking, which include rules 
relating to data breach notification or data protection by design, are well guaranteed in European data 
protection law (the 1995 Directive and the 2016 GDPR), and some are embodied as data processing 
principles in the OECD Privacy Protection Guidelines. 
 It can therefore be concluded that the adoption of both ECOWAS and AU instruments is an 
unequivocal indication of the continent’s willingness and progress in protecting the personal 
information of its citizens from security risks related to data processing by public or private entities, 
and implement online trust. Both instruments do contain a principle of confidentiality and security of 
data processing, requiring Member States to ensure data controllers implement appropriate security 
safeguards when processing personal data. However, compared to the EU response, some significant 
security mechanisms are missing from both instruments, including provisions for data breach 
notification, Data Protection by Design, use of privacy certification schemes or the establishment of a 
direct liability relationship between the data controller and data subjects. These omissions, it is 
suggested, could be addressed by the adoption of additional protocols modifying these instruments, or 
in future multilateral texts to ensure relatively strong data security standards for African citizens, and 
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Abstract 
European personal data protection standards as set by the Data Protection Directive and recently the 
General Data Protection Regulation have and are still being copied by African jurisdictions. Under 
these standards, a broad definition is accorded to personal data, enabling it to cover a wide range of 
information. The 2017 Nowak decision by the European Court of Justice held the scope of personal 
data to include an examination candidate’s evaluated examination script, which by analogy, would 
include their examination results. Considering European influence on African law, and especially the 
latter’s adoption of almost identical definitions of personal data in its international data protection 
instruments, examination results would most likely acquire a status of personal data in African case 
law. 
This article argues that while privacy over examination results is fairly respected across 
African states, a personal data status will further protect Africans by reinforcing their right to 
information self-determination, and also help shield them from unwanted profiling through Big Data 
analytics. However, exercising some data protection rights could face some difficulties: the absence 
of a strong sense of privacy on personal information in Africa, uncertainty of obtaining informed 
consent for (further) processing of examination results in rural areas, and the difficulty to prove injury 
in the event of a data breach involving unauthorised access to stored but already published 
examination results before African courts 
 








3.1   Introduction 
This article adopts a general standpoint that the adoption by Africa of the European concept of personal 
data under the Data Protection Directive (DPD) 185  of 1995 and its successor the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR), 186  while promoting information privacy 187  and personal data 
protection across the continent, could also be faced with some societal and legal hindrances in 
enforcing the data protection rights of Africans. Focusing on the domain of education, the article aims 
to illustrate, firstly, that EU influence on African data protection law leads to the interpretative 
inclusion of academic examination results as personal data under African data protection instruments. 
Secondly, it argues that while a personal data status on examination results would improve personal 
data protection in Africa, enforcing its corresponding rights could prove considerably difficult due to 
socio-cultural and infrastructural realities. In the course of this analysis, the Article also makes a 
further distinction between privacy rights and personal data protection rights over examination results. 
In essence, it points out that though African societies have been predominantly described as collectivist 
with less value on privacy as compared to European societies founded on individualism, a lot has been 
done across the continent to ensure the confidentiality of examination results. However, a personal 
data protection status on examination results will raise the latter beyond the mere scope of privacy 
law, to include further and broader protections essential for guaranteeing the fundamental rights of 
Africans as the continent continues embracing the Information Society. 
European data protection law has been referred to as a hybrid body of laws offering 
fundamental rights-based protection of personal data while simultaneously favouring aspects of 
economic regulation188. As an instrument of economic regulation, it seeks to harmonize the protection 
of personal data within regional and (with regard to trans-border data flows) beyond continental 
borders, thereby removing barriers to the free flow of personal data to international markets for 
operators who comply with data protection requirements.  It has also been hailed as the legal system 
which currently offers the highest protection for individuals with regard to the processing of their 
                                                          
185 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals 
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, Official Journal L 281, 23/11/1995, 
0031–0050 (repealed by the General Data Protection Regulation 2016). 
186 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural 
persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), published in Official Journal of the European Union, L 119, 4 May 2016. 
187 This article adopts Westin’s definition of Information privacy, which is “the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions 
to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others.” Alan 
Westin, Privacy and Freedom, Atheneum: New York, 1967.p.7  
188 Orla Lynskey, The foundations of EU data protection law. Oxford University Press. (2015) 76 – 78. Also see Article 
1(3) GDPR which states that “the free movement of personal data within the Union shall be neither restricted nor prohibited 
for reasons connected with the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data.” 
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digital personal information by private companies or public institutions189. And one of the means the 
European legislators have chosen to attain such protection is, first and foremost, to adopt a very broad 
material scope of data protection law: personal data190. 
Africa has also been manifesting concerns about the safety and security of online information 
of its residents, which has culminated in the adoption of the ECOWAS Data Protection Act191 in 2010 
and the African Union Convention on Cybersecurity and Data Protection in 2014. These instruments, 
with regard to data protection and especially their definition of personal data, are almost wholly copied 
from EU data protection instruments; which could be commendable, given the esteem in which EU 
data protection standards are globally held, having been credited with “creating one of the world’s 
leading paradigms for privacy protection, which has served as an inspiration to legal regimes outside 
Europe”192. It should be stressed here that while there has been national responses by many African 
states over the last decade to personal data protection concerns, with over 25 African states having 
comprehensive data protection laws to date, this article focuses solely on the ECOWAS and AU 
instruments, in order to have a widest possible spectrum of the data protection standards in the 
continent.193 It is also worth mentioning that academic examination data has also come under the 
scrutiny of national data protection legislation in Africa. The Ghanaian Data Protection Act of 2012 
expressly excludes, from the scope of personal data, marks recorded on an academic or professional 
examination script for the purpose of determining the examination results.194 The Act, however, is 
silent as to whether the ensuing examination results are personal data per se. 
The tendency of copying or getting legal inspiration from Europe by African lawmakers to 
regulate internal affairs, as will be discussed later in this article, is not a new phenomenon. As a matter 
of fact, a significant section of African literature on data protection so far has been dedicated to a call 
for the application of EU-inspired data protection legal frameworks within African territories. To cite 
                                                          
189  See Ameesh Divatia.”GDPR and the 'Security by Compliance' Mistake”, 22nd July 2018. Retrieved from 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2018/07/02/gdpr-and-the-security-by-compliance-
mistake/#1ca90fb5ecc4 Accessed 29 October 2018 
190 For a discussion on the broad nature of the notion of personal data in European data protection law, see Nadezhda 
Purtova. “The law of everything. Broad concept of personal data and future of EU data protection law.” Law, Innovation 
and Technology 10, no. 1, (2018) 40-81 
191 Supplementary Act A/SA.1/01/10 on Personal Data Protection within ECOWAS, adopted at the 37th Session of the 
Authority of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government, (Abuja, 16 February, 2010). 
192 Neil Robinson, Hans Graux, Maarten Botterman, Lorenzo Valeri. Review of the European Data Protection Directive. 
(Rand Europe, 2009). xiii. Available at 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2009/RAND_TR710.pdf Accessed 3/2/2019 
193 The AU Data Protection Convention is not yet effective, and will enter into force upon the deposit of the 15 th member 
state ratification instrument by the Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union, as per the Convention’s Article 
36. So far (March 2020), there have been only 5 corresponding ratifications and deposits. 
194 Article 72, Ghana Data Protection Act 2012. 
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a few authors arguing to this effect, Ubena,195 Kusamotu196 and Izougu197 use the 1995 Data Protection 
Directive as a measuring rod to assess the level of information privacy in Tanzania and Nigeria 
respectively. What appears to be overlooked by these commentators however is the fact that the 
material scope of European personal data protection law, through its definition of personal data, could 
be problematic due to its broad, complex nature which allows for a very vast range of information to 
fall under personal data protection law, an issue already highlighted by European legal scholars198. 
Such complexity, which has already been the object of litigations at the level of the European Court 
of Justice199, could equally be faced by African courts in enforcing due personal data protection rights.  
This article accordingly contends that endorsing a status of personal data on examination 
results as is the case in Europe upholds general personal data protection in Africa, but could encounter 
applicability and enforceability hindrances within an African context. This introduction shall be 
followed by a second section which, based on existing literature, shall examine the EU data protection 
notion of personal data with particular focus on its extensive scope, and how its interpretation points 
to the inclusion of examination results. This will be followed by a third section which shall present the 
two main African multinational data protection instruments, discuss their EU-inspired definition of 
the concept of personal data, and briefly examine the odds of an interpretation of personal data 
protection standards in African courts similar to their interpretation by the European judiciary. The 
fourth section discusses the protective advantages of a personal data status on examination results, as 
well as some setbacks which could be encountered in the enforcement of some these rights in an 
African context. A fifth section concludes the article. 
   3.2   The (broad) concept of personal data under EU law 
Being the centre of the data protection legal machinery, personal data determines the material scope 
of data protection law as well as, consequently, the scope of two main texts of reference of European 
                                                          
195  John Ubena. “Tanzania lag on privacy law.” Tanzania Legal News, published online on 8th June 2010, 
https://tanlex.wordpress.com/2010/06/08/tanzania-lag-on-privacy-law/ Accessed 28 October 2018 
196 Ayo Kusamotu. “Privacy law and technology in Nigeria: The legal framework will not meet the test of adequacy as 
mandated by article 25 of European Union Directive 95/46.” Information & Communications Technology Law 16.2 (2007) 
149-159. 
197 Chukwuyere Izuogu. Data protection and other implications in the ongoing SIM card registration process. (2010). 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1597665  
198 For a general critique of the broad material scope of EU data protection law, see Nadheza Purtrova, The Law of 
Everything, supra. 
199 The European Court of Justice has entertained a number of cases with the objective of determining whether a given type 
of dataset is ‘personal data’ under the 1995 Directive e.g. Joint cases C-141/12 and C- 372/12 YS and M. and S. v Minister 
of Immigration, Integration and Asylum [2016], ECLI:EU:C:2014:2081, Case C-434/16 Peter Nowak v Data Protection 




data protection law, the 1995 Data Protection Directive (DPD, now repealed) and the GDPR200. The 
data protection process is engaged only when personal data is processed (Article 3(1) DPD and Article 
2(1) GDPR), hence its major significance. 
Under the GDPR, closely similar to the DPD ‘personal data’ is defined as: 
‘any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data 
subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly 
or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an 
identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more 
factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, 
cultural or social identity of that natural person.’201 
 
The broad scope of what could be termed personal data is well expressed in this definition. A 
very vast range of data categories could fall under this definition, especially in these times 
characterised by fast-paced, incalculable data processing to meet the demands of today’s data-driven 
society and economy. According to Purtrova: “it has become widely accepted among scholars that as 
the data processing technologies advance, and the pool of data which can be combined grows, and as 
combining databases becomes daily practice of intelligence agencies, ‘smart city’ municipalities, and 
advertising, so does the reasonable likelihood of somebody being able to link any piece of information 
to a person.”202 In its quest to offer the best possible protection to information society service users, 
the EU legislator chose to adopt a definition of personal data which could be stretched, it has been 
argued, to include virtually everything203. As noted by Solove and Schwartz, one benefit of this 
approach of adopting a broad definition to personal data is that it recognizes the expanding ability of 
technology to re-identify information and to link scattered crumbs of information to a specific 
individual204. As noted by the Article 29 Working Party205, the European Commission's original 
proposal stated that “as in Convention 108, a broad definition is adopted in order to cover all 
                                                          
200 It should be pointed out that although the Data Protection Directive has now been repealed by the General Data 
Protection Regulation, this does not affect the concept of personal data as it was under the Directive. See the Opinion of 
Advocate General Kokott [3] in Nowak, ibid. 
201 Article 4(1) GDPR. 
202 Nadezhda Purtova. "The law of everything. Broad concept of personal data and future of EU data protection law."(2018) 
supra.47 
203 Ibid, Note 49, 66 
204 Paul M Schwartz and Daniel J. Solove. “Reconciling personal information in the United States and European Union.” 
Cal. L. Rev. 102 (2014). 877.892 
205 The former EU advisory authority on the matters of data protection, composed of national data protection authorities 
and headed by a European Data Protection Supervisor. Under the GDPR, in force since May 2018, it has been replaced by 
the European Data Protection Board (EDPB).   
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information which may be linked to an individual", and the Commission's modified proposal noted 
that "the amended proposal meets Parliament's wish that the definition of "personal data" should be 
as general as possible, so as to include all information concerning an identifiable individual”206. With 
the EU approach, it therefore appears any information ‘concerning’ or ‘relating to’ an individual 
should be treated as personal data.  
3.2.1    Information ‘relating to’ 
This aspect of the definition of personal data has been described by the WP29 as ‘crucial as it is very 
important to precisely find out which are the relations/links that matter and how to distinguish them.’207 
In general, information can be considered to “relate” to an individual when it is about that 
individual208. 
 In a 2005 Opinion on RFID tags, the WP29 stated that “data relates to an individual if it refers to 
the identity, characteristics or behaviour of an individual or if such information is used to determine 
or influence the way in which that person is treated or evaluated.”209  It further establishes that 
information could “relate to” a person in terms of ‘content’, ‘purpose’ or ‘result’210. ‘Content’ is 
satisfied when information is clearly about the person e.g. a patient’s medical analysis; ‘purpose’ ‘can 
be considered to exist when the data are used or are likely to be used, taking into account all the 
circumstances surrounding the precise case, with the purpose to evaluate, treat in a certain way or 
influence the status or behaviour of an individual; and ‘result ’is satisfied if the data is likely to have 
an impact on a certain his/her rights and interests211. It was on similar grounds that the European Court 
of Justice, in 2017, rules examination scripts to be personal data because they ‘relate to’ a candidate. 
 
3.2.2    Nowak v. Data Protection Commissioner212: Examination scripts (and results?) as 
personal data 
In 2017, a landmark decision was reached in the case of Peter Nowak v. Data Protection 
Commissioner. In 2009, Peter Nowak, a registered student with the Institute of Chartered Accountants 
of Ireland (CAI) asked to view his scripts for an accounting exam after failing it for the fourth time, 
with a view to challenging the result. The CAI declined releasing, saying it did not constitute personal 
data under data protection legislation. Mr. Nowak took his complaint to the Data Protection 
                                                          
206 Article 29 Working Party Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal data, 20 June 2007 (‘WP 136’).4 
207 WP 136 (Ibid). 9. 
208 Ibid. 
209 WP 136 (Ibid), 10. 
210 Ibid 
211 Ibid, 10-11 
212 Case C-434/16 Peter Nowak v Data Protection Commissioner [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:994 
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Commissioner, but was rejected on the same grounds as with the CAI. After appealing to the Circuit 
Court, then the High Court, the case got to the Supreme Court which decided to ask the European 
Court of Justice for guidance. In its reference for a preliminary ruling, the Irish Supreme Court 
essentially asked whether the exam script containing the candidate’s answers and the examiner’s 
comments regarding those answers might constitute personal data213. Both the response by Advocate 
General of the European Court of Justice (in her Opinion) and the Court were in the affirmative. 
The Advocate General’s reasoning was consistent with the WP29 approach to consider 
information as personal data when it is processed with a purpose of evaluating the status or behaviour 
of an individual. Even though the examination exercises are ‘formulated in abstract terms or relate to 
hypothetical situations’,214 ‘the script is a documentary record that that individual has taken part in a 
given examination and how he performed’215. She further states that ‘in every case, the aim of an 
examination […] is to identify and record the performance of a particular individual, i.e. the 
examination candidate. Every examination aims to determine the strictly personal and individual 
performance of an examination candidate’216.  
The Court followed the reasoning of the Attorney General. It reaffirmed the notion ‘personal data’ 
as potentially encompassing any information, as long as it ‘relates’ to the data subject217, stating that 
the condition is met where the information is linked to a particular person ‘by reason of its content, 
purpose or effect’218. Most significant, the Court found that the link between the information and the 
individual relevant because both the candidate’s answers and the examiner’s comments relate to the 
data subject in all three aspects: they reflect the information about the candidate (his knowledge, 
thought process and, in the case of a handwritten answer, information about his handwriting, as well 
as the examiner’s opinion regarding the candidate’s performance)219; the purpose of their processing 
is to evaluate the candidate in terms of his professional abilities; and the use of this information is 
‘liable to have an effect on his or her interests’220. 
                                                          
213 Nowak, Opinion of Advocate General Kokott [2]. 
214 Ibid [19] 
215 Ibid [21] 
216 Ibid [24] 
217 Nowak, [34]. 
218 Ibid [35] 
219 Purtova (2018) Ibid, 71 
220 Nowak, [39]. But see YS and others (17th July 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2081) [Paragraph 46] where the ECJ created a 
precedent to the effect that the right to access a document affecting one’s interest is not absolute and may be denied in 
certain circumstances (in this case, if it will lead to granting access to administrative documents). The Courts usually 
balance the right of against other fundamental rights and interests, to determine its enforcement. See Antonella Galetta and 
Paul de Hert. “A European Perspective on Data Protection and the Right of Access.” In The Unaccountable State of 
Surveillance, pp. 21-43. Springer, Cham, 2017. p 35. 
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The above decision lays a European precedent of evaluated examination scripts being considered 
students’ personal data by reason of its purpose and effect. Closely related to evaluated examination 
scripts are examination results, which are a produce of the evaluated script, are a display of a 
candidate’s skill and abilities in a given area of study, and also have an effect on a candidate’s interests 
(these results will determine whether or not the candidate gets further admission, jobs, and could serve 
as guide for his career path). By interpretation therefore, examination results, at least within the WP29 
interpretation of purpose and result, most certainly fall under personal data under EU law. This view 
is shared, for example, by the University of Reading in the United Kingdom, which expressly considers 
examination results as personal data on its Information Management and Policy Services221. 
 The following section presents African intergovernmental data protection instruments and their 
material scope of application which, by interpretation, would include examination scripts and/or 
examination results. 
 
3.3  African intergovernmental data protection legislations 
A number of African countries222, intergovernmental organisations and the African Union as a 
continental whole have been adopting legal frameworks on personal data protection. The current 
intergovernmental legal frameworks in Africa with focus on personal data protection are the EAC 
(East African Community) Framework for Cyberlaws (2008), SADC (Southern Africa Development 
Community) Model Law on Data Protection (2010), ECOWAS (Economic Community of West 
African States) Supplementary Act A/SA.1/01/10 on Personal Data Protection (2010) and the African 
Union Convention on Cybersecurity and Personal Data Protection (2014). With the SADC and EAC 
legal frameworks being only model laws with no binding legal effect on their member states, this paper 
shall focus on the ECOWAS and AU legal frameworks which were adopted with the intention of 
(prospectively) creating legal obligations among member states. 
 
3.3.1   ECOWAS Supplementary Act A/SA.1/01/10 on Personal Data Protection 
The Supplementary Act A/SA.1/01/10 on Personal Data Protection within the ECOWAS (hereinafter 
the ECOWAS Data Protection Act) was adopted during the 37th session of the Authority of ECOWAS 
Heads of State and Government in Abuja on16 February 2010. In its Preamble, the Act recognizes that 
                                                          
221 https://www.reading.ac.uk/internal/imps/DataProtection/DataProtectionRequirements/imps-d-p-examinations.aspx 
(accessed 21st April 2019) 
222 By 2015, 17 African countries had adopted comprehensive personal data protection legislation. See Cynthia Rich. 
“Privacy laws in Africa and the Middle East.” The Bureau of National Affairs, editor. Privacy and Security law report. 
Bloomberg: BNA, (2014).1 
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technology advancements greatly ease personal data processing and hence bring about unprecedented 
problems of personal data protection. It also seeks to address problems relating to personal data 
protection through a harmonized legal framework for data protection within the ECOWAS sub-region. 
 
3.3.2   The African Union Convention on Cybersecurity and Personal Data Protection 
Adopted by the 23rd Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State of the African Union in 
Malabo on 27 June 2014, the African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data 
Protection (hereinafter the AU Data Protection Convention) provides a legal framework regulating 
three distinct domains and divided in as many corresponding sections: Electronic commerce, Data 
Protection and Cybercrime/cybersecurity. Similar to its ECOWAS predecessor but with a continental 
scope, it has as objective, as regards personal data protection, the establishment of a legal framework 
‘aimed at strengthening fundamental rights and public freedoms, particularly the protection of personal 
data, and punish any violation of privacy without prejudice to the principle of free flow of personal 
data223. It is not yet binding on member states, and will attain this status upon ratification by 15 member 
states224. So far (March 2020) though, only five member states (Ghana, Guinea, Mauritius, Namibia 
and Senegal) have ratified the Convention. 
 
3.3.3    Defining personal data under both instruments. 
Both the above ECOWAS Data Protection Act and African Union Data Protection Convention, like 
other instruments addressing personal data protection everywhere else, are applicable only when 
personal data is being processed. In delimiting the material scope, both instruments provide for a 
definition of personal data. The ECOWAS Data Protection Act states:  
‘Personal data means any information relating to an identified individual or who 
may be directly or indirectly identifiable by reference to an identification number 
or one or several elements related to their physical, physiological, genetic, 
psychological, cultural, social, or economic identity’225. 
 
The AU Data Protection Convention, closely following this approach, states as follows:  
‘Personal data means any information relating to an identified or identifiable 
natural person by which this person can be identified, directly or indirectly in 
                                                          
223 Article 8(1), African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection 
224 Article 38, ibid 
225 Article 1 Para.5, ECOWAS Data Protection Act 
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particular by African Union Legal Instrument reference to an identification 
number or to one or more factors specific to his/her physical, physiological, 
mental, economic, cultural or social identity’226. 
  
 The closeness to the definition of the notion of personal data by European instruments like the 
1995 Data Protection Directive is quite obvious in these definitions, with the (vague) terms ‘any 
information’, ‘relating to’, ‘identified’ and ‘identifiable’ appearing in all three definitions. As has 
already been discussed in the preceding section of this paper, these terms allow for a very broad range 
of data to fall under data protection law, and as such, require protection and processing restrictions in 
accordance with the said legal framework. And considering that so far there have been no official 
guidelines produced by these intergovernmental organisations or case law from any intergovernmental 
African court providing a detailed legal and contextual interpretation of the above definitions of 
personal data, it is only logical that in applying (and hence interpreting) the above instruments in 
African courts, reference would most probably be made to European legal opinions and case law to 
reach a decision as regards the material scope of personal data in Africa. 
 
3.3.3 Similar interpretation of personal data in Africa as in the EU: what odds? 
It is important to recall here that the prospect of an EU-interpretation of data protection concepts 
by national African courts is not very unlikely, and this could be attributed to two main reasons 
advanced by Alex Makulilo227. First, not only are African countries steadily adopting data protection 
laws inspired by EU legislations, most African countries inherited their current legal systems from 
European countries imposed on them during the colonial era, and are thus no strangers to European 
legal systems. Actually, most of these countries still rely on case law of their former colonial rulers to 
address issues which may not have been addressed by national law.228 Cameroon courts in the common 
law jurisdiction of the country, for example, still refer to English law in to address areas not covered 
by national law229, and still rely on English case law as persuasive authority during court pleadings. 
                                                          
226 Article 1 Para.36, AU Data Protection Convention. 
227 Alex B. Makulilo, “One size fits all: Does Europe impose its data protection regime on Africa?” Datenschutz und 
Datensicherheit-DuD 37.7, (2013) 447-451.451 
228 For example, Kenya being a former English colonial territory and inheriting English common law, Kenyan legal 
practitioners, still refer to English case law as persuasive authority in Kenyan court. See generally Michael Nyongesa 
Wabwile. "The Place of English Law in Kenya." Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal 3, no. 1 (2003): 51-80. 
Similarly, English case law still has persuasive authority in Nigerian courts. See Matthew Enya Nwocha. "Customary 
law, social development and administration of justice in Nigeria." Beijing L. Rev. 7 (2016): 430.433 
229 Ephraim Ngwafor. "Cameroon: The Law Across the Bridge: Twenty Years (1972-1992) of Confusion." Revue générale 
de droit 26, no. 1 (1995): 69-77. 71 
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Secondly, there is an economic motivation; African data protection legislations are mostly 
modelled upon the EU Data Protection Directive following the aspiration of African countries to meet 
the ‘adequacy’ standard of the European law so as to remain attractive for foreign investments230, a 
consequence of the so-called “Brussels Effect”231. Interpreting personal data protection and standards 
in similar lines as in European courts is therefore not very far-fetched for African legislators. 
 
3.3.4    Principles and rights related to the processing of personal data (and hence examination 
results) 
The above African instruments, like their European counterparts, list a number of principles 
regulating the processing232 of personal data, while according a number of corresponding rights to data 
subjects to protect their fundamental interests in relation to such processing. The principles are listed 
in Article 13 of the AU Data Protection Convention and Articles 23 to 28 of the ECOWAS Data 
Protection Act. They include consent (personal data shall be processed only if data subject gives their 
consent233, fairness of processing (personal data should not be processed if such processing would not 
be fair to the data subject), purpose, relevance and storage (personal data should be processed for a 
specific purpose and should not be further processed for another purpose incompatible with the 
original purpose, and should not be stored for longer after that purpose has been attained234), accuracy, 
transparency, confidentiality and security of processing. It follows therefore that upon attaining a 
status of personal data, examination results shall have to be processed in accordance with all the above 
principles in most African jurisdictions, especially upon the entry into force of the AU Data Protection 
Convention.  
 
                                                          
230 Article 25 of the DPD and now Article 45 of the GDPR restrict data transfers of EU residents to countries which do not 
have an ‘adequate’ standard of personal data protection. 
231 Term coined in 2012 by Professor Anu Bradford referring to the persuasive force wielded by EU regulations worldwide, 
attributed to the size of its consumer base and strength of its regulatory institutions. See generally Anu Bradford. "The 
Brussels effect." Nw. UL Rev. 107 (2012): 1.11 
232 Processing of personal data is defined under the AU Data Protection Convention as “any operation or set of 
operations which is performed upon personal data, whether or not by automatic means such as the collection, recording, 
organization, storage, adaptation, alteration, retrieval, backup, copy, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, 
dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination and locking, encryption, erasure or destruction 
of personal data”. Any of these actions carried out on examination results should therefore be in accordance with the 
Convention’s established data processing principles. 
233 This is however subject to a number of exceptions: where processing is in compliance with a legal obligation, for the 
performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority, performance of a contract 
to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a 
contract, or to protect the vital interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject (Article 13, AU Dara 
Protection Convention) 
234 As an exception, personal data may be stored for longer periods for historical, statistics or research purposes (Article 
13, Principle 3 (d) AU Data Protection Convention) 
88 
 
3.4   Examination results as personal data in Africa: potential pros and applicability hitches 
It could be fair to assert that before the emergence of data protection law, if examination results were 
part of mainstream litigations anywhere, it will probably be as regards their integrity, fairness or 
authenticity; and hardly about the rights individuals have towards them due to their ‘personal’ nature. 
But after the DPD and Nowak, EU law now accords a personal data status on examination results, 
subjecting the latter to data protection law. And this legal novelty may well have been transported into 
the African legal system with the ECOWAS and AU data protection instruments taking up largely 
identical definitions of personal data and hence identical material scope of personal data protection 
law. 
 The ECJ decision in Nowak was groundbreaking in that it granted a data protection right of 
access to and verification of examination scripts by the candidate on grounds that these evaluations, 
similar to the test previously laid down in WP 136, ‘related to’ the candidate in terms of content 
(content of those answers reflects the extent of the candidate’s knowledge), purpose (purpose of 
collecting those answers is to evaluate the candidate’s professional abilities) and result (the chance of 
entering the profession)235. Though the case did not concern examination results stricto sensu, it could 
be safe to assert that the Court’s ruling would not be different if this were the case. This is because, 
just as examination script evaluations, examination results do relate to candidates in terms of content 
(they contain the candidate’s name or student ID number), content (the grades, which are only the end 
result of the evaluation of his conduct)236 and result (grades will have an impact on future employment 
chances, or on how his/her peers and family regard and treat him). In the absence of another test 
provided within the ECOWAS and AU on how African legal practitioners should interpret and apply 
the ‘relating to’ phraseology which features on the definitions of the notion of personal data by both 
instruments, or any related case law, examination results could therefore be considered as personal 
data on African soil. While this development could, in theory, endorse new grounds for personal data 
protection, applying such a right in practice could prove considerably difficult in an African, third 
world context. 
3.4.1  Examination results as personal data: protecting fundamental rights of Africans 
 This subsection discusses how attributing a personal data status to examination results could 
help protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of Africans. 
                                                          
235 Nowak, supra [Paragraphs 37-39] 
236 Ibid [Paragraph 38] 
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3.4.1.1  Endorsing a right to information self-determination of African residents 
 One of the founding pillars of personal data protection law is the right to information self-
determination, popularised by the reasoning by the German Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassungsgerichsthof) in its milestone decision of 15th December 1983237, also referred to as 
the Population Census Decision.238 The Court recognized a right of every citizen to ‘information self-
determination’, founded on the right to the ‘free development of one’s personality’ (otherwise referred 
to as a personality right), protected by Article 2.1 of the German Constitution. In the same light of the 
internationally recognized right to self-determination which protects an individual’s right to plan or 
decide freely without being subject to pressure or influence, the right to information self-determination 
aims to ‘preclude a social order in which citizens no longer can know who knows what, when, and on 
what occasion about them.’239 The Court was of the opinion that if citizens cannot oversee and control 
which or even what kind of information about them is openly accessible in their social environment, 
or know who may have access to this information, or unsure of whether their dissenting behaviour is 
noticed or stored, they may be inhibited in exercising their fundamental human rights like freedom of 
speech or choice.240  
This reasoning forms the basis and essence of the right to personal data protection, and helps 
differentiate it with the right to information privacy. The latter is a right enabling an individual choose 
who is privy to a given piece of information concerning them, which in essence applies only to that 
piece of information. This means any further information inferred from that original information is 
apparently not covered by the right to information privacy; though such derived information still 
relates to the individual and may still significantly affect them.241 Personal data protection comes in 
therefore to protect the individual through providing principles, rights and obligations which govern 
the entire life cycle of the information including inferred information i.e. from the time the information 
is created, given out, further processed, how further information may be inferred from it, and how this 
new inferred information is used. In other words, it applies to the individual’s information in all its 
forms. This illustrates that personal data protection includes, but is by no means limited to information 
                                                          
237 Judgment of 15 December 1983, 1 BvR 209/83, BVerfG 65, 1 
238 Orla Lynskey. The foundations of EU data protection law (2015) supra. 94 
239 Antoinette Rouvroy & Yves Poullet. "The right to informational self-determination and the value of self-development: 
Reassessing the importance of privacy for democracy." In Reinventing data protection?, pp. 45-76. Springer, Dordrecht, 
2009. 49 
240 Gerrit Hornung & Christoph Schnabel. "Data protection in Germany I: The population census decision and the right to 
informational self-determination." Computer Law & Security Review 25, no. 1 (2009): 84-88. 85 
241 For a general discussion on how inferences from personal information affect individuals, see Sandra Wachter & Brent 
Mittelstadt. "A right to reasonable inferences: re-thinking data protection law in the age of big data and AI." Colum. Bus. 




privacy. Consent and confidentiality of processing are among the principles of processing listed in the 
above African data protection instruments which reinforce information privacy, while other principles 
like fairness, storage and further processing extend individual protections beyond privacy.  
Following up on the reasoning in the Nowak case, if examination results are representative of the 
cognitive abilities of an individual in a given area of knowledge (as opposed to another), then such 
information will be likely to affect them especially in terms of how society judges their intelligence 
levels. Therefore, giving examination candidates the choice of choosing who views their examination 
results or limiting the processing of examination results to strictly necessary purposes would ensure 
that candidates remain reassured against any unfavourable future uses of their results. It should be 
highlighted here that, in practice, examination candidates already enjoy privacy rights vis-à-vis their 
examination results. Most West African countries like Nigeria, Ghana, Gambia and Sierra Leone, 
through the policy of the West African Examinations Council (WAEC), make public examination 
results privy only to examination candidates, accessible online after relevant identification242. Other 
African countries which make examination results private and confidential include Kenya, Uganda, 
Zimbabwe, Congo (Brazzaville). In South Africa, university entrance exams (popularly known Matric 
exams) are published in newspapers but only with the candidates’ exam numbers, to maintain 
anonymity.243 This is however not the case in all African countries. In Cameroon for example, results 
of the nationwide secondary school leaving examinations in the country are made available to the 
general public with no little or no efforts in terms of privacy or anonymity for candidates. The results 
of Anglophone General Certificate of Education (GCE, organised by the GCE Board) with the full 
names and grades of candidates, are still made available in some national newspapers the Board’s 
website (www.cameroongceboard.com) with no indicated availability limit, while the results of the 
Francophone Baccalauréat de l’enseignement sécondaire (organised by the Office du Baccalauréat) 
are made read over the radio. Though this eases communication of results, it raises data protection 
concerns in terms of confidentiality of personal information, for it can never be certain who gets and 
stores these results. Also, the country’s oldest and most popular university, the University of Yaounde, 
makes some semester examination results (with the full name of candidates, registration number and 
course examination score) available online on the university’s website (www.univ-yaounde2.org) for 
public consultation and for an undeterminable period of time. Moreover, the trend in recent years has 
                                                          
242 For example, WAEC offers an online results-checker on www.warcdirect.org, accessible by candidates after inserting 
their unique registration number 
243 See Tom Head. “Matric results: What time they get released, and when you can collect them” (News Article. 
Published 7th January 2020) Available at https://www.thesouthafrican.com/lifestyle/when-matric-results-released-
what-time-tuesday-7-january-2020/ Accessed 18th March 2020. 
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been the franchising of the results to foreign-owned private telecom companies, like the French-owned 
telecom company Orange Cameroon for the Baccalauréat results and the South African-owned 
telecom company MTN Cameroon, so candidates can directly consult their results on their mobile 
phones against a fee. While this further eases results accessibility for candidates, it should be pointed 
out that at no point during the examination registration process are the candidates requested to indicate 
whether or not they consent to the transfer or processing of their results by these private enterprises. 
Also, with currently no functional personal data protection law in the country, there is no clear legal 
regime preventing any unfair further processing of these results (in terms of purpose specification, use 
or storage limitation, transfer of inferred information) by these enterprises for their own profits. 
Considering that examination results are directly representative of the cognitive abilities of an 
individual, it can be argued, as in Nowak, that they could have considerable impact on the individual 
and deserve some appropriate level of regulatory protection. And though a good number of African 
countries ensure the information privacy of examination results, this right protects only consent and 
confidentiality of processing (divulgation being part of processing244), and does not cover other aspects 
like purpose specification, storage limitation or fairness of processing. Raising examination results to 
the status of personal data in African countries shall therefore not only trigger the need for 
confidentiality in publishing results as is the case in Cameroon, but shall also prompt an all-round and 
more complete protection of examination results in African countries, limit unfair exploitation by 
public authorities or private enterprises and further guarantee a right to information self-determination 
of Africans 
3.4.1.2   Curbing Big Data concerns 
Examination results, like all pieces of information, form part of the huge universe of (big) data, 
and could also be part of the data mined by companies and other institutions to classify people under 
certain profiles of particular skillsets, characteristics or preferences. As Hilderbrandt notes, because 
this profiling is usually paid for by companies and other data processing institutions, these 
classifications will be done in line with their interests as opposed to individuals’ interests245. Such 
classifications have been documented to pose serious privacy risks, especially in terms of 
discrimination based on automated-decision making246. Wachter and Mittelstadt also observe that Big 
Data analytics and artificial intelligence draw on highly diverse data of currently unpredictable value, 
                                                          
244 See note 50 
245 Mireille Hildebrandt. "Defining profiling: a new type of knowledge?." In Profiling the European citizen, pp. 17-45. 
Springer, Dordrecht, 2008. 18 
246 Laura Carmichael, Sophie Stalla-Bourdillon & Steffen Staab. "Data mining and automated discrimination: a mixed 
legal/technical perspective." IEEE Intelligent Systems 31, no. 6 (2016): 51-55. 
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and correlate them in order to create new value in terms of inferences and predictions about the 
behaviours, preferences, and private lives of individuals; a trend which could create new opportunities 
for discriminatory, biased, privacy-invasive profiling and decision-making 247 . Algorithms could 
misclassify or misjudge an individual following an automated-decision making process, and such 
errors may disproportionately affect certain groups of people248. Because there is no limit to what data 
could be mined for profiling purposes, nothing eliminates published examination results from the pool 
of raw, big data which data mining entities dive in to collect elements from which to filter new 
information to satisfy their interests.  
This will imply, for example, that an algorithm tasked by a health institution to fish for persons 
with potential skills in the field of health will, without prejudice to other combined datasets, place in 
a favourable position individuals who had better scores in healthcare-related subjects in a public 
examination. And without any human intervention in such a process, this could be highly 
discriminatory for individuals who may have healthcare-related skills but for some reason did not 
perform well in those examinations. Or there could arise situations where people who perform better 
in management-related courses in university are automatically favoured by data mining algorithms to 
get loans than those who performed poorly. Attaching a personal data status to examination results 
could help prevent such outcomes by permitting individuals to decide who to share their examination 
results with, or whether or not they want their results to be part of the big data universe at all, hence 
limiting their access or availability, and generally contributing to protection against harms which may 
befall them through any eventual misuse of these results. This could take the form of exercising 
relevant data protection rights on examination results like consent before publication in newspapers 
(as is the case with Cameroon) invoking the storage limitation obligation of the data controller (Article 
13, AU Data Protection Convention) or exercising a right to erasure (Article 19 AU Data Protection 
Convention) to have examination results erased from publicly accessible databases like online portals. 
 
3.4.2    Examination results as personal data in Africa: applicability limitations 
This subsection discusses the practical difficulties in enforcing data protection rights on examination 
results upon the latter attaining a status of personal data in Africa.  
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3.4.2.1   Absence of a privacy awareness in Africa 
Faced with constant political conflicts and economic problems, privacy hardly makes top 
priority on the agenda of African national or regional governments. Even as a legal phenomenon, not 
much has been written on the right to privacy by African scholars249. This has been said to be due to 
the dominant collectivist and communal lifestyle in local African communities 250  referred to as 
Ubuntu251. As a matter of fact, the right to privacy is absent among the basic human rights listed under 
the 1981 African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR). Olinger et al suggest that this 
omission could be due to the fact that privacy was simply not regarded as a necessary right for Africans 
to live freely and peaceably’ 252  Makulilo, however, argues the contrary, observing that Western 
influence and globalization gradually promotes individualism in urban areas in Africa, and privacy is 
gradually surfacing as a concept in the continent.253 Also, most African constitutions today do provide 
for a right to privacy254, and as discussed above, African governments have been promoting privacy 
protection through personal data protection laws. This notwithstanding, there still is a significant lack 
of privacy awareness among the average population, which weakens grounds for any cultural 
awareness to support the promotion for personal data protection rights,255 especially considering the 
relationship between information privacy and personal data protection (i.e. both aim to protect 
personal information). It may even be argued that African states employed the use of online resources 
to communicate examination results to candidates not because there was any wave of a sense of 
privacy sweeping through the continent, but rather to take advantage of the advent of the Internet to 
ease access the results for candidates.256 
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The lack of a privacy culture influences the lack of awareness for the protection of individuals 
vis-à-vis their examination results in Africa. This is similar to what Bakibinga terms ‘privacy myopia’ 
in Africa i.e. the tendency for Africans to undervalue the bits of information about themselves so that 
it does not seem worth it to go through the trouble of protecting such information257. After their 
divulgation to various candidates, examination results are generally hardly subject to much public or 
legal interest any longer. Once results are known, no one seems to care about any further rights which 
may accrue to them, the only estimated use of their further storage being for the verification of the 
authenticity of certificates.  
3.4.2.2   Getting informed consent for further processing. 
As discussed in Section 3.5, personal data protection law generally prohibits the further processing of 
personal data if such processing is incompatible with the original purpose of processing. However, 
further processing may be allowed if, among other exceptions listed in the AU and ECOWAS data 
protection instruments 258 , the data subject gives their express consent to the processing. So if 
examination results do constitute personal data, then any further processing should apparently be 
subject to the express consent of the candidate or, if he/she is a minor, the consent of their parents. An 
example of such further processing could be the forwarding of examination results to third parties for 
prospections of further educational opportunities (e.g. by universities or professional schools searching 
for new students), scholarship considerations or inclusion into talent pools. 
The principal issue here would be determining whether or not such consent is valid or 
informed259. This is because in the first place, the great majority of candidates of public examination 
results are minors below 21 years of age, and who therefore cannot give valid consent as regards the 
publication of their examination results. Also, seeking such consent from parents will prove very 
difficult for two reasons: in the first place, the parents will have to be contacted in person, because to 
date, most public examination registration procedures in many African countries are done manually 
and not online. And because these education boards are usually located in urban cities, requiring 
parents to travel from the far and wide to grant consent for the publication of their children’s results 
just seem too cumbersome and very complex to realise; nor for the Boards to have to recruit and send 
agents to each candidate’s parents to get such consent. Also, a reported 38% of the African adult 
                                                          
257 Cited by Alex Makulilo. "“One size fits all”: Does Europe impose its data protection regime on Africa?." Datenschutz 
und Datensicherheit-DuD 37, no. 7 (2013): 447-451.450 
258 See Article 31 ECOWAS Data Protection Act, Article 13 AU Data Protection Convention 
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population is uneducated260 which means even if the parents or guardians are contacted, obtaining 
clear, unequivocal consent might not be evident because it could be difficult to prove that they clearly 
understand what they are signing up for on behalf of their children. 
 
3.4.2.3   Breach of examination results: grounds for private/class action in damages? 
Security of processing is one of the core principles of personal data processing, with data controllers 
and processors are generally required to take appropriate measures to protect personal data against, 
among others, accidental destruction and unauthorized disclosure or access261. These obligations 
equally manifest in the AU and ECOWAS data legislation instruments262. It therefore follows that 
upon examination results attaining the status of personal data in Africa (which they apparently are, as 
has been illustrated above) their processing must be protected from unauthorised access or destruction, 
and failure to provide such protection amounts to a breach of the controller’s legal obligations. This 
would help ensure data confidentiality and promote much required online trust in a continent 
progressively enjoying internet penetration and embracing information society trends. However, it 
also provokes the question as to whether an academic institution or examination board may be 
sanctioned by a data protection officer or held liable towards a through a private individual or class 
action for damages by students or examination candidates following a leak of or unauthorised access 
to academic examination results. 
  Unauthorised access to a school’s database, in the absence of evidence of the contrary, would 
imply security system in place was not appropriate, which would be a breach of security of processing 
obligations and could lead to the imposition of a fine among other sanctions by the national Data 
Protection Authority263. However, the question may be asked whether a breach involving unauthorised 
access to examination results is serious enough to warrant any form of liability in personal damages 
towards students or examination candidates. Unlike social security numbers which could well be used 
for identity theft264, or usernames, passwords or bank account details, breaches of examination results 
have not been documented as potential data which misuse could harm concerned candidates. However, 
it should also be mentioned that leaks of personal information have been pointed out to be ‘harmful’ 
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even without a tangible loss to those whose information was leaked: Solove and Keats for example 
opine that unauthorized access to personal data could cause emotional distress, exposes individuals to 
a risk of future injury, and causes them to experience anxiety as a result of data breaches compromising 
their personal data265. Nevertheless, in an African context where there is hardly any manifest interest 
in the use of examination results, especially after divulgation, it may be difficult convincing a judge 
that a leak of processed examination results could harm or cause distress to an identified or identifiable 
student or candidate. A candidate may have a case, it can be argued, if the breach involves a complete 
loss of their results, as this implies the loss of any means to verify the authenticity of their results, 
which may cost them employment or other academic opportunities for which certificate verifications 
are mandatory. Such an argument would found a stronger case for harm than mere unauthorized access 
of the results. 
 It should be noted that the ECOWAS and AU data protection instruments are currently silent as to 
any form of direct compensation available to individuals against data controllers and processors for 
violations of their provisions. Also, apart from South Africa, Kenya and more recently Uganda, there 
is a significant lack of African case law on privacy266 which could help determine the scope and 
relevance of harms related to unauthorised disclosure of personal information like examination results. 
But considering that the ECOWAS and AU instruments have not classified ‘harmless’ types of 
personal data whose leaks are deemed of too trivial consequences, nor have their respective organs 
produced any guidelines to this effect, unauthorised access to examination results would remain 
unauthorised access to personal data which, at least from a legal perspective, leaves open the 
possibility of direct liability and the award of personal damages. Nevertheless, taking cue from 
Bakibinga’s “privacy myopia” which suggestively dominates African societies, lack of privacy case 
law and little interest shown towards any further use of processing of examination results after 
publication, it remains very likely that an action for harm due to unauthorized access to stored but 
already published examination results before an African court may be struck out as irrelevant or trivial. 
 
3.5   Conclusion 
This article presents a discussion regarding the potential attachment of a personal data status on 
examination results under African data protection law, inspired by EU case law. In general, it tries to 
explore how such a development would further consolidate personal data protection rights in Africa 
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through protecting examination results, and also discusses some difficulties which could be 
encountered with the exercise of data protection rights over examination results in an African context. 
It engages the discussion first by highlighting the broad material scope of personal data protection law 
(i.e. personal data), pointing out that its definition by the EU legislator implies that it covers a vast 
range of information including evaluated examination scripts as was decided by the ECJ in the 2017 
Nowak case, and which would equally examination results following the reasoning of the judgment. 
This inclusion of examination results as personal data, it is opined, could also be the case in African 
case law considering the almost identical definition of personal data in the continent’s most popular 
data protection instruments (the AU Data Protection Convention and ECOWAS Data Protection Act), 
its adoption of European legal systems introduced in the continent during colonial times, as well as 
the continual reference, by African legal practitioners, to the case law of European countries to address 
legal problems. 
 Based on the above premise, the article then argues that attaching data protection rights to 
examination results would contribute to consolidating a right to information self-determination of 
examination candidates. Also, the data protection rights of erasure or storage limitation, if exercised 
on examination results, would contribute to limiting their availability to a vast number of unknown 
entities and shield them from any unwanted or discriminatory profiling through Big Data analytics. 
However, the lack of a strong privacy culture and awareness in Africa, coupled with little manifested 
interest in the outcome of examination results after their publication could hamper the development of 
appropriate protection policies. Also, acquiring informed consent from candidates or their parents 
further processing of their examination results, especially in rural areas, could be challenging since 
many parents are illiterate and may not fully understand the nature of what they are signing up to. And 
finally, while a data protection status on examination results would imply the possible liability of the 
data controller and hence a theoretically possible action for private or class actions by candidates for 
injury, proving such injury before African courts could be challenging considering the lack of privacy 
case law in the continent to determine whether unauthorised access to or loss of stored but already 
disclosed examination could be considered injurious. 
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against teacher-student abuses in Cameroon universities 
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Abstract 
Global legal trends are increasingly focused on giving individuals some level of protection of their 
information, especially information about their personal lives held in online servers of public and 
private institutions. These trends are particularly concentrated in Europe, and reflected in the Data 
Protection Directive (DPD) of 1995 and its 2016 successor the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR), and the 2014 African Union (AU) Convention on Cybersecurity and Data Protection. A right 
of access to personal data to verify and rectify their accuracy, among other rights, is guaranteed to 
individuals under these international instruments. With personal data comprising evaluated 
examination scripts as illustrated in the Nowak case, this right of access consequently involves the 
right to access, verify and rectify the accuracy of an examiner’s evaluations on examination scripts.  
In this light, this paper advocates that an EU approach to interpreting the AU Data Protection 
Convention and granting personal data protection rights on examination scripts could yield positive 
regulatory impacts on African countries in general and Cameroon in particular, in terms of tackling 
professor-student abuses in university campuses. Granting Cameroonian citizens (and thus university 
students) an EU-interpreted data protection right to access and rectify the accuracy of their personal 
data  (evaluated examination scripts) could provoke transparency and accountability, and consequently 
encourage more responsible behaviour from power-abusing staff in institutions of higher learning in 
the country.  
 







4.1   Introduction 
Access to information, considered a basic human right, is guaranteed in a number of international 
instruments267 , and is a primordial factor of economic development and democratic governance 
especially in view of meeting up with the challenges of an information society, and has always 
occupied top positions in development agendas for developing countries. 268  However, while the 
literature and development programs in most developing countries focuses much more on promoting 
access to and verification of public information through measures like open data initiatives269, not so 
much effort has or is being directed towards access to and verifying the accuracy of personal 
information. Taking cue from the European approach to personal data protection law, specifically its 
material scope under the Data Protection Directive (DPD) and its successor the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR)270, this paper generally intends to show that the right to access and 
rectification of personal data processed by public or private institutions could be a source of 
empowerment and could provoke consequential auto-regulation within certain sectors with specific 
regulatory needs. In particular, the paper argues that an interpretation of the notion of personal data 
under the African Union Convention on Cybersecurity and Data Protection similar to the EU approach 
to personal data protection, coupled with a corresponding right of access to personal data, could help 
curb teacher-student abuses in institutions of higher learning in Cameroon. 
Such interpretation is not so far-fetched: while the AU Data Protection Convention adopts an 
identical, almost word-for-word definition of personal data as the DPD and GDPR, and also 
incorporates a right of access to personal data, Cameroon legal practitioners, like in many other former 
European colonies, in some areas of law, still rely on European (that is, English and French) case law 
and instruments to render justice in national courts. And the EU notion of personal data protection law 
appears to be an extension of the EU legislator’s objective to provide individuals with a high standard 
of protection as regards their online information, including vesting in them the widest possible rights 
                                                          
267 Article 9 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human   
Rights, Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 19 of International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. 
268 See for example Section 72(b) of the African Union’s Agenda 2063, published April 2015. Also see the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). “Harnessing ICT, Science and Technology for Development 
in Africa” UNECA Report. November 2007 
269 See for example the United Nations Development Program, “The Africa Data Revolution Report”, May 2016. Also 
see generally Manyika et al. “Big data: The next frontier for innovation, competition, and productivity.” McKinsey 
Global Institute (2011). 
270 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), published in Official Journal of the European Union, L 
119, 4 May 2016. 
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to control and decide what happens to their data after it is collected from them, who has access to its 
exploitation, to whom it is transferred, even who as much as sees it. These rights, as shall be discussed 
later, also include access to their data at any time, to verify that they accurate and up to date. 
The intention by the EU legislator to offer a high standard of protection to individuals as regards 
information they share about their online lives has led the former to adopt a very broad interpretation 
of what constitutes ‘personal data’. Some authors think this already broad interpretation is bound to 
expand even further as we increasingly approach what has been referred to as an onlife271 experience, 
where our daily existence is mediated by information technology, and everything around us– weather, 
waste water, transportation– is being increasingly ‘datified’, and literally any data can be plausibly 
argued to be personal.272 Despite criticism by some authors that the concept of personal data is getting 
too broad because current available technology can be used to trace just about any information back 
to an identified individual273, the fact remains that this approach is leading to the development of new 
rights which were hardly addressed before, or may been difficult to enforce under other branches of 
law. This is particularly evidenced in the judgment of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the case 
of Peter Nowak v Data Protection Commissioner274 where the court ruled that the examiner’s notes 
on an evaluated examination script consisted the examination candidate’s personal data within the 
context of European data protection law. One would imagine that prior to this decision or the 
emergence of data protection law, the legal regime bearing on determining whether or not examination 
candidates can request to view their evaluated examination script was limited solely to their contract 
with the examining institution, or to specific sectoral rules regulating the higher education sector. Now 
EU case law has established such access to personal data (operating alongside the right to personal 
data protection) as constituting a fundamental right for every EU resident, which automatically enables 
enforcement, by a student, of the right to verify his/her script and confirm the accuracy of the 
examiner’s corrections. Also worth noting is the fact that the development of European data protection 
law, though currently a fundamental right on its own275, was prompted as a result of the limitations of 
                                                          
271 The ‘onlife’ coined by Luciano Floridi to denote ‘the new experience of a hyperconnected reality within which it is no 
longer sensible to ask whether one may be online or offline’ (Luciano Floridi, ‘Introduction’ in Luciano Floridi (ed), 
The Online Manifesto. Being Human in a Hyperconnected Era (Springer, 2015), 1). 
272 Nadezhda Purtova. “The law of everything. Broad concept of personal data and future of EU data protection law.” 
Law, Innovation and Technology 10, no. 1 (2018): 40-81.41 
273 See Paul Ohm. “Broken promises of privacy: Responding to the surprising failure of anonymization.” Ucla L. Rev. 57 
(2009): 1701-1777. 1756 – 1758. Also see Paul Schwartz and Daniel Solove. “The PII problem: Privacy and a new 
concept of personally identifiable information."”NYUL rev. 86 (2011): 1814. 1877. 
274 Case C-434/16 Peter Nowak v Data Protection Commissioner [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:994 
275 Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7th December 2000 expressly provides for 
the right to “The Protection of personal data”. This right was further reiterated in Article 16 of the Lisbon Treaty 
103 
 
the right to privacy guaranteed under Article 8 of the 1950 Convention on Human Rights in the wake 
of new developments especially in the area of information technology276. But this broad interpretation, 
in terms of protecting individuals, appears to extend the material scope of EU law back in time, to 
protect elements which existed before the digital era, are not affected by technology and yet at that 
time appeared to be out of the reach of the right to privacy.  
The ECJ decision in the Nowak case, with regard to the education sector in developing countries, 
could be groundbreaking from an educational point of view, as it introduces a new dimension to the 
rights which an examination candidate or student may have vis-à-vis their examining institution or 
university respectively. This could not only empower examination candidates and students in public 
and private institutions of higher learning, but could also automatically oblige these institutions and 
their staff, as data controllers and processors, to adopt more responsible behaviour vis-à-vis their 
students. Such an approach, if followed by African judges in their interpretation of the AU Data 
Protection Convention, could play a significant role in regulating teacher-student abuses in universities 
of developing countries, which include sexual favours for grades, ‘sorting’ or failing students for non-
academic or personal reasons. It is in this light that this paper investigates the potential regulatory role 
which an EU-based interpretation of the AU Data Protection Convention’s right of access to personal 
data could play in limiting teacher-student abuses on Cameroon university campuses. With no 
comprehensive legislation in the country specifically governing personal data processing, no related 
caselaw yet and the AU Data Protection Convention not yet in effect, this paper aims to demonstrate 
that offering and enforcing EU-inspired data protection rights of access to students in Cameroon vis-
à-vis their evaluated examination scripts as personal data could be a major incentive in promoting 
desired conduct from potentially offending professors and lecturers. In doing so, it also engages the 
argument that personal data protection law, in particular the right of access, could complement 
government effort and other areas of law where these may be inadequate in dealing with teacher-
student abuses in a third world setting. 
The paper shall, in the following chapter, identify some instances of teacher-student abuse in 
Cameroon universities and discuss the current national efforts and related inadequacies in addressing 
the issue. The third chapter shall feature a brief synopsis of the notion of personal data in EU data 
protection law, a discussion on the right of access to personal data under EU law and an overview of 
                                                          
signed on 13th December 2007, which entered into force on 1st December 2009. See also Orla Lynskey. The 
foundations of EU data protection law. Oxford University Press, 2015. pp  91-93  
276 Paul de Hert, and Serge Gutwirth. "Data protection in the case law of Strasbourg and Luxemburg: 
Constitutionalisation in action." In Reinventing data protection?, pp. 3-44. Springer, Dordrecht, 2009. pp 5-6 
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the Nowak case, while the fourth chapter shall focus on the concept of personal data and right to access 
to evaluated examination scripts as personal data under the AU Data Protection Convention. The fifth 
chapter shall first examine the state of the art of the right of access to evaluated examination scripts in 
Cameroon universities before discussing the regulatory effects which a potential EU-inspired 
interpretation of the notion of personal data and right to access under the AU Data Protection 
Convention could have in deterring teacher-student abuses in institutions of higher learning in 
Cameroon. It equally identifies and discusses a few hindrances which could be encountered in the 
practical enforcement of a right of access on university professors and staff. A sixth and final chapter 
shall then present the final conclusions. 
4.2   Teacher-Student Abuses in Cameroon Universities: An Overview 
This Chapter examines the phenomenon of teacher-student abuses in Cameroon universities. It shall 
briefly identify some known examples of teacher-student abuses which affect the sector, before 
discussing available (though limited) means of protection for affected students. 
4.2.1   Some Forms of Teacher-Student Abuse in Cameroon Universities 
Here, the paper will identify some of the teacher-student mistreatments which plague universities and 
other institutions of higher learning in Cameroon. The abuses identified here are not exhaustive, and 
in view of the objective of this paper, are selected on the basis of how the enforcement of a right of 
access to personal data could significantly reduce their prospective occurrences and incentivise more 
responsible behaviour on the part of unruly professors or lecturers. 
  4.2.1.1   Sexual Abuse for Grades 
Sexual abuse for grades in institutions of higher learning is not peculiar to Cameroon alone277; it is 
also a systematic occurrence in other African states278. Within a lecturer-student relationship, it is not 
uncommon for some lecturers to demand sexual favours from students in exchange for better grades, 
whether or not these grades are properly deserved.279 Cameroon universities do play host to this 
phenomenon, but as these forms of sexual violence are not often reported280, data for quality research 
                                                          
277 For a general overview of the state of sexual abuse in Cameroon, see Mbassa D. Menick. “Sexual abuse at schools in 
Cameroon: results of a survey-action program in Yaounde.” Médecine tropicale: Revue du Corps de Santé colonial 62, 
no. 1 (2002): 58-62. 
278 See generally Louise Morley. “Sex, grades and power: gender violence in African higher education.” In CHEER 
Symposium, Annual SRHE Conference, 14-16 December, Newport, Wales. (2009). 
279 See Bukola Adebayo and Stephanie Busari “Lecturer demanded sex in return for better grades, Nigerian student 
says”, CNN news article, published online on May 23, 2018. Retrieved from 
https://edition.cnn.com/2018/05/23/africa/sex-for-grades-university-nigeria-intl/index.html Accessed 23/09/2018 
280 See Francis Ajumane. “Cameroon: female journalists rise up against sexual assault” Published online on 15/08/2018. 




on the issue is rare. But the incidents are not: a guidance counselor for the Faculty of Social and 
Management Sciences of the University of Buea, in a 2012 interview, stated that a majority of female 
students have experienced one or two forms of sexual abuse from male academic staff on campus. 
These assaults often happen in the office and in lecture halls, when students are requesting make-up 
tests or extra lectures, submission of overdue assignments, and making other pleas to male academic 
staff.281 In her 2011 article on sexual violence on university campuses, Zoneziwoh notes that research 
studies on sexual violence in the University of Buea were highly underexplored. Victims preferred to 
report their sexual victimisation to friends, families, colleagues and peers – instead of seeking formal 
counseling. She blamed this on the fact that there are no established bodies on campus created 
specifically to handle cases of sexual violence on university campuses.282  
  4.2.1.2   ‘Sorting’ 
‘Sorting’ refers to the negotiation of examination scores with course instructors and school authorities 
using incentives. 283  This dimension of examination malpractice is currently gaining grounds in 
universities of some developed countries, and is one of the practices which academic staff who seek 
personal enrichment involve themselves in.284 There is a high manifestation of sorting in examinations 
in Cameroon universities.285 In the University of Buea, a study shows that sorting is also initiated by 
lecturers who compel students to purchase their handouts (photocopies of lecture notes). To ensure 
that students get these handouts, they take down the names of the students who have paid for them. 
Students who then have their names on the list are compensated through marks, while those who did 
not buy the handouts are penalised by poor grades.286 Because exam scripts are usually marked only 
by the professor and with virtually no direct oversite and feedback, he/she remains in total control of 
the grading; thereby making it extremely difficult for affected students to prove (or even be aware) 
that they had been cheated of their marks.  
                                                          
281 Wondieh M. Zoneziwoh. Sexual Violence on University Campuses: The Case of University of Buea. No. 2. ALC 
Working Paper, 2011.7 
282 Ibid, 6 
283Peter Tambi Agborbechem. “‘Sorting’ in examinations: Evaluating the quality of assessment in Universities in 
Cameroon.” International Research Journal of Arts and Social Science Vol. 4(5) pp. 093-097, June, 2015. 93 
284 Chris Willott. "Factionalism and Staff Success in a Nigerian University: A Departmental Case Study." States at Work: 
Dynamics of African Bureaucracies (2014): 91-112. 95 
285 Peter Tambi. “’Sorting’ in examinations” 2015. Ibid. 97 
286 Ibid. 95 
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4.2.1.3   Failing Students for Personal Reasons 
There has been considerable literature on the unequal power relations between professors and students 
in institutions of higher learning287. Within the educational context, there often is a struggle between 
asymmetrically positioned individuals [professors and students, in this case], which renders one 
individual as powerful and the other as powerless288. The teacher-student relationship has also been 
described in terms of a transactional process, whereby teachers are in control of curriculum links and 
teaching styles, and students are oppressed receivers of selected information289. 
This power imbalance is quite glaring in institutions of higher learning in Cameroon, where the 
lecturer or professor dictates the rules of his/her course and reigns supreme thereon. Due to this 
somewhat unrivaled status, some professors sometimes tend to abuse their power, even, and not 
unusually, for selfish or personal reasons. In Cameroon universities, as well as in other African 
universities, reports about lecturers giving undeserved grades to students because of personal 
disagreements, off-campus rivalries or for other purely non-academic reasons are not totally unheard 
of.290  
The above state of affairs generally favours the victimisation of students by unruly university 
members of staff, contributing to the bulk of educational troubles in the country. There have been 
attempts by the state towards establishing a legal framework to sanction abusive lecturers, but these 
are currently inadequate and reflect a lack of vehemence in state action to address the issue. 
4.2.2   Regulating Teacher-student Abuse in Cameroon: Inadequacies in National Efforts 
Rather unfortunately, very little has been done so far by government agencies and lawmakers in 
Cameroon to directly and actively address teacher-student abuses in the country. Action so far has 
been limited to the adoption of legal texts bearing generally on education in the country which provide 
general protection for students on school campuses and, to a lesser extent, general criminal law.  
4.2.2.1   Higher Education Regulatory Texts 
For higher education i.e. universities, Law No.005 of 16 April 2001 prohibits ‘any violation of human 
dignity’ in state and private institutions of higher learning291, while Law No.98/04 of 14th April 1998 
                                                          
287 For a general literature review on power relations between teacher and student, see Sharnae Ladkin. "Exploring 
Unequal Power Relations within Schools: The Authenticity of the Student Voice." Journal of Initial Teacher Inquiry 
3 (2017): 37. 
288 Sharnae Ladkin. “Exploring Unequal Power Relations within Schools”. Ibid. 38 
289 ibid 
290This phenomenon also occurs in Western societies. See for example Kaitlyn Schallhorn. “Professor fails student for 
refusing to condemn her Christian faith.” Published 5/5/2015. Retrieved from 
https://www.campusreform.org/?ID=6490 Accessed 26/9/2018 
291  Article 29(3) of Law No. 005 of 16 April 2001 laying down Guidelines for Higher Education in Cameroon 
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guarantees the physical integrity of the secondary school student, and prohibits ‘any form of abuse’ 
on  secondary school campuses.292 There is currently no national law or decree which clearly defines 
and directly addresses teacher-student abuse with clearly laid down enforcement mechanisms against 
the phenomenon, and most university student guidelines and administrative texts in the country are 
practically silent as regards available means of redress which students may have against abusive 
members of staff or university authorities. 
Admittedly, however, Decree 93/035 of 19th January 1993 on the Special Status of Higher 
Education Staff contains some provisions in this direction. Article 48 of the Decree sparsely mentions 
the obligation by university professors and staff to ensure the smooth functioning of the teaching 
activity and safeguard academic dignity. The Decree does not specifically address teacher-student 
abuse, though Article 51 provides for unspecified disciplinary sanctions on university staff for, inter 
alia, ‘violations of the general rules listed in Article 48’, for ‘professional misconduct’ and for 
‘participating in any activity incompatible with academic dignity and ethics.’ The Decree also provides 
for the creation of a Disciplinary Council in each state university with the powers to sanction generally 
unruly personnel293. Though it is not expressly mentioned that this Council can entertain cases of 
student abuse, it can be inferred by analogy that an abused student can, in theory, report their dilemma 
to the university Rector who, as per Article 55, has the power to seize the Disciplinary Council and 
summon the concerned lecturer for a hearing, which takes place in camera.294 However, in cases of 
abuse involving examination scripts, as shall be discussed later, the lack of a right of access to 
evaluated examination scripts prevents students from being absolutely certain they have been 
discriminated against. They would generally therefore prefer silence than risk having a Disciplinary 
Council seized for an unfounded claim. 
4.2.2.2    National Criminal Law 
Situations of student-teacher abuse, being purely educational issues, are generally less likely to fall 
within the ambit of criminal law. However, criminal law could be triggered when it comes to student 
abuse of a sexual nature. Cameroon criminal law punishes the use of one’s position of power to obtain 
sexual favours from a vulnerable individual,295 a provision which can be invoked by students who face 
similar situations with a professor. But in a Cameroon university setting, as has been mentioned above, 
                                                          
292Article 35 of Law No.98/04 of 14th April 1998 laying down Guidelines for Education in Cameroon. 
293 Article 54 
294 Article 56 
295 Article 302, Law No. 2016/007 of 12th July 2016 establishing the Cameroon Penal Code 
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these cases are hardly reported296 not only because they are difficult to prove, but also because of the 
dominant psychological position professors enjoy vis-à-vis their students. Also, criminal law requires 
inquiries, investigations, interviews and convocations which may lead to unwanted publicity. And in 
a third world country like Cameroon, such processes are almost always plagued by bureaucracy 
bottlenecks, are very slow or lack the input of qualified staff and trained judicial investigators to carry 
them out efficiently297. 
4.2.2.3  Absence of an Official Code of Ethics for University Professors 
Unlike other sectors of activity like the medical and legal professions in the country, the higher 
education sector of Cameroon is yet to adopt an official code of ethics for university professors and 
lecturers. The rules in force closest to regulating this sector of activity in terms of professional conduct 
are those cited above in the Decree of 19th January 1993 sanctioning general misconduct by university 
staff. Though acts of abuse like sexual harassment or grading discrimination are normally generally 
frowned at in university settings, the lack of an official code of conduct guiding the higher learning 
profession only reflects the current apathy of the government and its competent agencies in vehemently 
addressing teacher-student abuse in university campuses in the country. Nonetheless, this state of 
affairs could change soon: the Ministry of Higher Education officially launched discussions on 30th 
May 2019 towards the elaboration of an official code of ethics for university professors and staff 
members in the country298. 
This Chapter identified some instances of teacher-student abuse as well as the current 
inadequacies in national efforts to seriously address the phenomenon. This paper argues that providing 
individuals with a right to access and verify the accuracy of their personal data (in this case, evaluated 
examination scripts to verify the accuracy of the examiner’s evaluation) would, besides 
complementing the current efforts, significantly contribute to checking the prevalence of these 
malpractices in the country’s universities. This right of access, inherently offered and successfully 
applied under European data protection law as shall be discussed in the next Chapter, is also offered 
in the main regional text on African data protection law. However, there is yet to be a legal 
interpretation or caselaw applying this right to examination scripts on Cameroonian or anywhere in 
Africa. It is the view of this paper that a legal interpretation, in Cameroon and by Cameroon legal 
                                                          
296 See note 14 
297 See generally Transparency International. Global Corruption Report 2007: Corruption in Judicial Systems. 
Cambridge. 
298 Jeanine Fankam, ‘Enseignement supérieur: un code éthique pour les enseignants en gestation.’ Published 7th June 
2019. Available at https://www.cameroon-tribune.cm/article.html/26118/fr.html/enseignement-superieur-un-code-
ethique-pour-les-enseignants-en-gestation. Accessed 20th June 2019. 
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practitioners, first of what constitutes personal data and subsequently the right of access to personal 
data as it has been so interpreted and applied in Europe, could help regulate these misconducts and 
foster responsible behaviour by unruly university staff. The following Chapter, in the first place, 
briefly examines the notion of personal data and the right of access to personal data (and consequently 
evaluated examination scripts) as it applies within the European legal system. 
4.3 Personal Data and the Right of Access in EU Data Protection Law  
European data protection law has been hailed as the legal system which currently offers the highest 
protection for individuals with regard to the processing of their digital personal information by private 
companies or public institutions.299The regional legal regime does not only aim to protect the privacy 
of online users with regard to how their information is collected and with whom it is shared, but also 
extends to giving them the a high level of control over how the information is used, and who gets to 
use it. As described by De Hert et al, while privacy law protects the opacity of the individual by 
prohibitive measures (non-interference), data protection calls for transparency of the processor of 
personal data enabling its control by the concerned individuals, states and special authorities. It puts 
the activity of the processor in the spotlight, gives the individual subjective rights to control the 
processing of his/her personal data and enforces the processor’s accountability.300 In other words, the 
European legislator has adopted a sort of ‘defence by attack’ strategy of protection: protecting 
individuals not only by imposing processing restrictions on the data controller, but also by enabling 
them to leave the shell of their ‘privacy’ and oversee the activity of the data controller over their data 
by providing them with a right of access to (the processing of) their personal data. Or generally, by 
granting control to individuals over data processing activities which might affect them301. In this light, 
this Chapter shall, in the first place, examine the concept of personal data, before focusing on the right 
of access (to personal data) under European data protection law. 
4.3.1   The Concept of Personal Data 
Perhaps the most fundamental notion of data protection, personal data determines the material scope 
of the two main texts of reference of European data protection law, the 1995 Data Protection Directive 
                                                          
299 Ameesh Divatia. “GDPR and the 'Security By Compliance' Mistake”, 22nd July 2018. Retrieved from 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2018/07/02/gdpr-and-the-security-by-compliance-
mistake/#1ca90fb5ecc4 Accessed 29/9/2018 
300 Sjaak Nouwt, Reinventing data protection? Edited by Serge Gutwirth, Yves Poullet, Paul de Hert, and Cécile de 
Terwangne. (Preface) Dordrecht: Springer, 2009.x  
301 Peter Hustinx. EU data protection law: The review of directive 95/46/EC and the proposed general data protection 
regulation. Collected courses of the European University Institute’s Academy of European Law, 24th Session on 
European Union Law (2013): 1-12. 2 
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(DPD now repealed) and the GDPR302. The data protection mechanism is triggered only when personal 
data is processed (Article 3(1) DPD and Article 2(1) GDPR), hence its major significance. 
Under the GDPR, which closely follows the DPD ‘personal data’ is defined as: 
‘any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); 
an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in 
particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location 
data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, 
genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person.’303 
If there is one striking thing about the concept of personal data under European law, it certainly 
is its very broad scope. In its quest to offer a high standard of protection to information society service 
users, the EU legislator chose to adopt a definition of personal data which could be stretched, it has 
been argued, to include virtually every type of information.304 As noted by the Article 29 Working 
Party305, the European Commission's original proposal explained that “as in Convention 108, a broad 
definition is adopted in order to cover all information which may be linked to an individual”, and the 
Commission’s modified proposal noted that “the amended proposal meets Parliament's wish that the 
definition of “personal data” should be as general as possible, so as to include all information 
concerning an identifiable individual.” 306  The EU approach is therefore clear: any information 
‘concerning’ an individual should be treated as personal data, which further makes a case for evaluated 
examination scripts to consist personal data. In this light, and to further elucidate this point, the terms 
‘any information’ and ‘relating to’ should be paid close attention to. 
  4.3.1.1   ‘Any information’ 
The term ‘any information’ contained in the Directive clearly signals the willingness of the legislator 
to design a broad concept of personal data, and calls for a wide interpretation of the concept.307 It 
should be pointed that while explaining the meaning of ‘any information’ within the meaning of the 
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1995 Data Protection Directive, the Working Party does not define or elucidate on the concept of 
information itself, but rather goes on to explain what kinds of information would be considered ‘any 
information’ in EU data protection law. This only leaves the definition of information in personal data 
protection context open to interpretation and tends to further expand the scope of what may constitute 
personal data, stretching the limits of the material scope of EU data protection law. The Working Party 
noted that personal data could be information not limited strictu sensu to private or family life, but 
information ‘regarding whatever types of activity is undertaken by the individual, like that concerning 
working…the economic or social behaviour of the individual.’ 308  Considering that an evaluated 
examination script contains data showing an individual’s behaviour when confronted with a given set 
of problems (even hypothetical or imaginary problems), it should still be regarded as personal data in 
EU data protection law. 
Another interesting interpretation advanced by WP136 is that information could be personal data 
whether processed by non-electronic means309, and regardless of the format or medium in which the 
information is contained. It could be numerical or, ideally, information kept on paper. 310  An 
examiner’s written evaluation on an examination script perfectly fits these criteria. 
4.3.1.2  ‘Relating to’ 
The WP29 referred to this building block of the definition of personal data as ‘crucial as it is very 
important to precisely find out which are the relations/links that matter and how to distinguish them.’311 
It advances, in general terms that information can be considered to “relate” to an individual when it is 
about that individual.312 In a prior Opinion, in 2005, on data protection issues raised by RFID tags, the 
WP29 had established that “data relates to an individual if it refers to the identity, characteristics or 
behaviour of an individual or if such information is used to determine or influence the way in which 
that person is treated or evaluated.”313 Seen in this light, evaluating examination scripts serves one 
main purpose: that of evaluating the student, the result of which will determine his/her future within 
and out of an institution. 
WP29 further establishes that information could “relate to” a person in terms of ‘content’, 
‘purpose’ or ‘result’.314 The ‘content’ element is fulfilled when the information is clearly about the 
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person e.g. medical examination results under a person’s name; the ‘purpose’ element ‘can be 
considered to exist when the data are used or are likely to be used, taking into account all the 
circumstances surrounding the precise case, with the purpose to evaluate, treat in a certain way or 
influence the status or behaviour of an individual (emphasis added); and as regards the ‘result’ element, 
data can be considered to “relate to” an individual because their use is likely to have an impact on a 
certain his/her rights and interests.315 This European Court of Justice concurred with this reasoning as 
regards an examiner’s evaluative information on an examination script in the case of Peter Nowak v. 
Data Protection Commissioner316. 
4.3.1.3   Evaluated Examination Scripts as Personal Data in EU Data Protection Law (Peter 
Nowak v. Data Protection Commissioner) 
In 2017, a landmark decision was reached in the case of Peter Nowak v. Data Protection 
Commissioner, with regard to data protection law in the education sector. In 2009, Peter Nowak, a 
registered student with the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Ireland (CAI) asked to view his 
scripts for an accounting exam after failing it for the fourth time, with a view to challenging the result. 
The CAI declined releasing the exam script, saying it did not constitute personal data under data 
protection legislation. Mr Nowak sought assistance from the Data Protection Commissioner, but was 
rejected on the same grounds as with the CAI. After appealing to the Circuit Court, then the High 
Court, the case got to the Supreme Court which decided to ask the European Court of Justice for 
guidance. In its reference for a preliminary ruling, the Irish Supreme Court essentially asked whether 
the exam script containing the candidate’s answers and the examiner’s comments regarding those 
answers might constitute personal data.317 Both the response by Advocate General of the European 
Court of Justice (in her Opinion) and the Court were in the affirmative. 
The Advocate General’s reasoning was consistent with the WP29 approach to consider 
information as personal data when it is processed with a purpose of evaluating the status or behaviour 
of an individual. Even though the examination exercises are ‘formulated in abstract terms or relate to 
hypothetical situations’,318 ‘the script is a documentary record that that individual has taken part in a 
given examination and how he performed’319. She further states that ‘in every case, the aim of an 
examination […] is to identify and record the performance of a particular individual, ie the 
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examination candidate. Every examination aims to determine the strictly personal and individual 
performance of an examination candidate’.320  
The Court followed the reasoning of the Attorney General. It reaffirmed the notion ‘personal 
data’ as potentially encompassing any information, as long as it ‘relates’ to the data subject321, stating 
that the condition is met where the information is linked to a particular person ‘by reason of its content, 
purpose or effect’.322 Most significant, the Court found that the link between the information and the 
individual relevant because both the candidate’s answers and the examiner’s comments relate to the 
data subject in all three aspects: they reflect the information about the candidate (his knowledge, 
thought process and, in the case of a handwritten answer, information about his handwriting, as well 
as the examiner’s opinion regarding the candidate’s performance)323; the purpose of their processing 
is to evaluate the candidate in terms of his professional abilities; and the use of this information is 
‘liable to have an effect on his or her interests’324. 
4.3.2   Right of Access to (and Rectification of) Evaluated Exam Scripts in EU Data Protection 
Law 
European data protection law has, from the outset, pursued dual objectives. One of these objectives is 
economic—to facilitate the establishment of the internal market—while the other is rights-based—to 
protect fundamental rights when personal data is processed.325 The right of personal data protection as 
well as a right of access to personal data are well established in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(CFR) of 18th December 2000. Captioned ‘protection of personal data’, Article 8 of the Convention 
states:  
éé“Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her. 
Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the 
consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. 
Everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected concerning him or 
her, and the right to have it rectified.” 
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 This Article not only explicitly mentions a right to data protection, but also explicitly creates 
a concurrent right of access to personal data, as well as the right to have it rectified, to ensure accuracy. 
The right of access to personal data is therefore expressly guaranteed as a functional tool of the right 
to data protection in EU law. The Data Protection Directive states that the principle of data protection 
should be reflected both in the obligations imposed on data controllers for responsible processing as 
regards quality and technical security, and also in the right conferred on individuals “to consult the 
data, to request corrections and even to object to processing in certain circumstances”.326 The right of 
access under the Article 12 of the Directive is a four-fold: the data subject may ask confirmation as to 
whether or not his data are being processed; he has the right to obtain communication of these data i.e. 
have copies of the data being made available to him; he can have the data rectified, erased or blocked 
if they do not conform to the Directive, in particular if they are incomplete or inaccurate; and the right 
to be informed about the logic used in case of automated decisions. The right of access to personal 
data under the 1995 Directive, it can be concluded, incorporates two important components in relation 
to this paper: the right of data subjects to be presented with their personal data, and their right to have 
that data rectified.327 
The GDPR closely follows this approach, recommending that a data subject should have “the 
right of access to personal data which have been collected concerning him or her, and to exercise that 
right easily and at reasonable intervals, in order to be aware of, and verify, the lawfulness of the 
processing.”328 However, and moving slightly away from the approach of the CFR, it provides for the 
right of access (Article 15) and the right of rectification (Article 16) in two separate Articles, which 
suggests that these rights are two separate rights under the GDPR. Nevertheless, the enforcement of a 
right of access, in event of established data inaccuracy, will most likely involve the right to rectification 
by ricochet. In other words, the former is necessary for the realisation of the latter329.  It follows that 
if examination scripts are personal data under European law, then a student is apparently well within 
his/her data protection rights if they request access to their evaluated examination script being 
processed by an examining institution in order to verify the accuracy of the evaluation, and demand 
its rectification if need be. 
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This was apparently the view of AG Kokott in the Nowak case. In response to the question as to 
whether the examination candidate had a right to access his data, her opinion was in the affirmative, 
stating that he ‘has a legitimate interest, based on the protection of his private life’ to be able to object 
to the processing of his or her examination script outside the examination procedure.330 The ECJ 
upheld this view331, ruling further that the rights of access and rectification provided for in Article 
12(a) and (b) of the Directive “may also be asserted in relation to the written answers submitted by a 
candidate at a professional examination and to any comments made by an examiner with respect to 
those answers.”332 The above show that EU data protection law does not only qualify examination 
scripts as personal data, but also guarantees a right of access to verify that these scripts have been 
fairly evaluated. As was seen in Nowak, this enabled the examination candidate (plaintiff) to at least 
see how his script was evaluated and, if he so desired, demand that the grades be made accurate if they 
are inaccurate within the meaning of Article 6(1)(d) of the 1995 Directive. 
It should be noted however that the right of access to (and rectification of) personal data is not 
an absolute right, and may be limited in some instances in EU law.333 As a matter of fact, it has been 
rejected by the ECJ in a case which, if granted, would have laid a precedence for access to 
administrative documents of a country’s immigration office334. Wachter & Mittelstadt are also of the 
opinion that the ECJ does not intend to use data protection law as a tool to ensure accuracy or total 
transparency in decision-making processes involving personal data, leaving that to specific sectoral 
laws.335  However, as noted by the Article 29 Working Party, data protection law envisages the 
possibility of personal data being incorrect, and provides for a right for data subjects to access their 
personal data in order to rectify it.336 And a careful analysis of the ECJ’s interpretation of inaccuracy 
of examination results in Nowak within the meaning of Article 6(1)(d) would lead to the understanding 
that an examiner’s unfair comments which do not reflect the answers on the script could be regarded 
as inaccurate data337, especially considering the premise that the candidate’s answers themselves, with 
or without any grades, are personal data, because they relate to the candidate’s intellectual level338. 
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And if processing (checking the correctness, hence evaluation, and which itself is supposed to be fair, 
reflecting the data protection principle of fair processing339) carried out on this set of personal data 
yields inaccurate results which will impact a data subject’s career, then right to rectification and prior 
right of access are likely to (or should) be triggered. It should nevertheless be pointed out here that the 
essence of this paper is not to present data protection and particularly the right of access and 
rectification as a silver bullet solution for ensuring fair grading of examination answers. Rather, these 
rights are presented as a tool for reducing the power imbalance between students and professors by 
making it possible for a graded script to be accessed and even made public (by the candidate) for 
everyone to see and have an opinion; which could discourage unfair grading by abusive professors as 
a means to force students do their bidding. 
Across the Mediterranean, the AU Convention on Cybersecurity and Data Protection adopts 
definitions and rights attached to personal data inspired by, and strikingly similar to those of the EU. 
It therefore is not too far-fetched for African judges and lawyers to interpret these notions and rights 
similarly to their interpretation by the ECJ. The following chapter presents a brief synopsis of the AU 
Convention, as well as its adopted notion of personal data. 
4.4   Personal Data under the AU Data Protection Convention 
This chapter shall be an overview of the AU Data Protection Convention, which is inspired from 
Europe’s DPD model. It shall first of all present a brief background of the Convention before 
examining the similarities between its notion of personal data and that of the DPD and GDPR. After 
which it shall feature a discussion on its right of access to personal data and, by interpretation, to 
evaluated examination scripts. 
4.4.1   The African Union Convention on Cybersecurity and Personal Data Protection  
The AU was established in 2001 to replace the Organization of African Unity, and has its headquarters 
in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Its aims include, inter alia, to ‘accelerate the political and socio-economic 
integration’ of the African continent and to “coordinate and harmonize the policies between the 
existing and future regional economic communities for the gradual attainment of the objectives of the 
Union’340 These mandates create a broad legal basis for the AU to establish regional policy and 
regulatory regimes on issues that affect Africa's economic integration and development, such as 
telecommunications/ICTs and personal data protection. From 2008, a series of high profile meetings 
were held between ICT policy makers and economic stakeholders of AU Member States, culminating 
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in the adoption, by AU Member State ministers in charge of ICTs, of a set of declarations known as 
the Oliver Tambo Declaration on 5th November 2009 in Johannesburg, South Africa. 341  The 
Declaration directed the AU to ‘jointly develop with the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Africa (UNECA), under the framework of the African Information Society Initiative, a Convention on 
cyber legislation based on the continent's needs and which adheres to the legal and regulatory 
requirements on electronic transactions, cybersecurity, and personal data protection.’342 Five years 
later, at the 23rd Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State of the African Union in Malabo 
on 27 June 2014, the Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection (hereinafter the AU 
Data Protection Convention) was adopted. 
The Convention provides a legal framework regulating three distinct domains and divided in as 
many corresponding sections: Electronic Commerce, Data Protection and Cybercrime/cybersecurity. 
It has as objective, as regards personal data protection, the establishment of a legal framework ‘aimed 
at strengthening fundamental rights and public freedoms, particularly the protection of [personal] data, 
and punish any violation of privacy without prejudice to the principle of free flow of personal data.’343 
It should be pointed out that unlike the EU, legal integration within the AU is hardly a reality;344  the 
Union has been likened to an interstate organisation (with focus on the nation state and regarding 
regionalism simply as an arena for international politics) rather than a supranational organisation, 
hence the inability to adopt enforceable decisions which prevents the establishment of a regional legal 
system through institutional action.345 As a result, Conventions adopted by the General Assembly of 
the African Union, when they become effective, are not directly binding on Member States. Only a 
further Act by a Member States incorporating a Convention into its national legislation renders the 
Convention applicable in the said state.  
The AU Data Protection Convention in question, as of the time of writing this paper, is not yet 
effective, and will attain this status only upon ratification by 15 member states.346 Once this quorum 
is attained, the Convention will serve more like a model law for national data protection purposes. It 
should be pointed out that the provisions of the Convention are not very detailed, provoking an 
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interpretation that they serve rather as a basis for national data protection in legislation in African 
countries, but nevertheless requiring only a modest amount of detail to be added347. So far (June 2019), 
only fourteen Member States have signed the Convention, among whom only four (Senegal, Namibia, 
Guinea and Mauritius) have ratified it.  
4.4.2   Evaluated Exam Scripts as Personal Data: A Prospective AU Interpretation 
In delimiting its material scope, the AU Data Protection Convention defines personal data, as follows:  
‘Personal data means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural 
person by which this person can be identified, directly or indirectly in particular by 
African Union Legal Instrument reference to an identification number or to one or more 
factors specific to his/her physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social 
identity’.348 
The closeness to the definition of the notion of personal data by the European DPD and GDPR 
is quite obvious in these definitions, with the terms ‘any information’ and ‘relating to’, appearing in 
all three definitions. As has already been discussed in the preceding section of this paper, these terms 
allow for a very broad range of data to fall under data protection law, and data determined to be 
personal data automatically requires protection and processing restrictions in accordance with the said 
legal framework. And considering that so far there have been no official guidelines produced by the 
AU or case law from any intergovernmental African court providing a detailed, succinct, legal and 
African interpretation of the above definitions of personal data, it seems fairly logical that in applying 
(and hence interpreting) the above instruments in African courts, reference shall still be made to 
European legal opinions and case law to reach a decision as regards what should or should not 
constitute personal data. It therefore can be comfortably concluded that evaluated examination scripts, 
as was decided in Nowak, will most likely be equally interpreted as personal data in an African court. 
This tendency of African legislators to follow and apply existing European approaches to solve 
legal disputes is not at all new. Makulilo has advanced two reasons for this trend in relation to data 
protection law: first, major legal systems in Africa namely common and civil law legal systems which 
are Western in origin, create fertile grounds for adaptability of European law. Though these systems 
were forcibly imposed on Africa by European countries during colonial rule as part of the colonial 
superstructure and an instrument of coercing Africans to participate in the colonial economy, they 
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were inherited by African countries upon independence. African countries, arguably, are therefore no 
strangers to the adaptation of ‘foreign law’.349 The second reason is economic motivation: Makulilo 
purports that African data protection legislations are modelled upon the EU Data Protection Directive 
following the desire of African countries to meet the ‘adequacy’ standard of the European law in order 
to attract foreign investments 350 , a consequence of the so-called “Brussels Effect”. 351  Europe 
represents the world’s largest community of consumers352, and is accompanied by powerful regulatory 
institutions capable of directly imposing decisions and sanctions on member states, making it one 
solid, lucrative economic bloc. Given its economic weight, it remains a very attractive market for any 
ambitious business operator anywhere, rendering its regulations the benchmark to comply with even 
at global level. 
 It should also be pointed out that eventuality of an EU-interpretation, of personal data to include 
evaluated examination scripts as personal data on Cameroon soil is not very unlikely, if not certain. 
Not only are African countries (slowly but surely) adopting data protection laws353 inspired by related 
EU legislations, Cameroon, like most formerly colonised African countries, is by no means a stranger 
to European statutory or case law. The country is actually bijurial, with the common law and civil law 
operating simultaneously on the territory, inherited from pre-independence British and French 
administration. To date, based on Sections 11 and 15 of the 1955 Southern Cameroons High Court 
Law, common law courts in the English-speaking regions of the country still rely on British 
jurisdiction and caselaw in litigations on matrimony, probate, tort and contracts between 
individuals354, while the French-oriented civil law courts still rely on legal reasoning from French 
judicial courts in rendering judgments in a range of civil litigations, especially on aspects not yet 
addressed by national law. Cameroon legal grounds therefore appear fertile enough for the adaptation 
of EU-inspired interpretation of data protection law within its national territory. This further favours 
the likely interpretation, upon an incorporation of the AU Data Protection Convention into the 
                                                          
349Alex B. Makulilo, ‘One size fits all: Does Europe impose its data protection regime on Africa?’, Datenschutz und 
Datensicherheit-DuD 37.7, (2013) 447-451.451 
350 Article 25 of the DPD and now Article 45 of the GDPR restrict data transfers of EU residents to countries which do 
not have an ‘adequate’ standard of personal data protection. Also see Makulilo, Ibid, 450. 
351 Term coined in 2012 by Professor Anu Bradford to denote the soft power which EU regulations have worldwide, due 
to the size of its consumer base and strength of its regulatory institutions. 
352 Anu Bradford. "The Brussels effect." Nw. UL Rev. 107 (2012): 1.11 
353 By 2015, 17 African countries had adopted comprehensive personal data protection legislation, namely Angola, 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gabon, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius, Morocco, 
Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Tunisia and Western Sahara. See Cynthia Rich, “Privacy laws in Africa and the 
Middle East.” The Bureau of National Affairs, editor. Privacy and security law report. Bloomberg: BNA (2014).1 
354 Ephraim Ngwafor. "Cameroon: The Law Across the Bridge: Twenty Years (1972-1992) of Confusion." Revue 
générale de droit 26, no. 1 (1995): 69-77. 71 
120 
 
country’s national law, of evaluated examination scripts as personal data in Cameroon, including a 
corresponding right of access and verification. 
4.4.3   Right of Access to Evaluated Exam Scripts as Personal Data under the AU Data 
Protection Convention 
The AU Data Protection Convention also grants a right of access to individuals whose personal data 
are undergoing processing in the possession of the data controller. Without expressly using the term 
“access”, it states: 
‘Any natural person whose personal data are to be processed may request from the 
controller, in the form of questions, the following: 
a) Such information as would enable him/her to evaluate and object to the 
processing…’355 
Paragraph (a), by obliging the data controller to provide the data subject with information which 
will enable him/her evaluate and object to the processing, creates an implied right of direct access to 
the processing, especially considering that the term ‘information’ is not defined under the Convention, 
and could include anything: from meaningless data356 to a tangible, evaluated information script. Also, 
the phrase ‘such information as would’ and not ‘such information about’ widens the scope of what the 
data subject can actually request from the data controller, as information ‘about’ a data source could 
be made available to an individual without making available the data source itself. So under this 
provision, the data subject is not constrained to ask only for information about how his/her data is 
being processed, but can also ask to be provided with the data source itself, in so far as his/her 
evaluation and possible objection to the processing can be effectively done only by (directly) 
examining the data source. Just as in the DPD and GDPR therefore, there also is a right of access to 
personal data and hence evaluated examination scripts guaranteed under mainstream international 
African data protection law. The AU Convention also provides for a right of rectification in Article 
17, which could be very useful in terms of requesting the re-evaluation of a marked examination script. 
Worthy of note is the fact that unlike the DPD and GDPR, the AU Convention does not specify 
any limits to the right of access to processed personal information. With the Convention not yet in 
force and, to the best of the author’s knowledge, the absence of case law or published African DPA 
decisions on the right of access to personal data, it is not clear to which exceptions they may be subject 
to in practice. Nevertheless, considering the relatively low level of privacy awareness in 
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Africa357(which, interestingly, is not even listed in the catalogue of rights of the African Charter on 
Human and People’s Rights of 1981), it can be expected that the right will be trimmed with a 
significant amount of restrictions in its practical enforcement. Current lack of case law in African 
courts on the subject, however, prevents the formulation of an informed decision on the issue in this 
paper. 
4.4.4   Right of Access to Personal Data under the AU Data Protection Convention: 
Enforcement Mechanisms 
Compared to Europe, data protection is pretty new in Africa, with the first concrete steps taken jointly 
by African ICT ministers to protect online information privacy across the continent being in 2009358. 
This novelty is also reflected in its enforcement mechanisms, with the Data Protection Authority 
(DPA) appearing to be the sole entity with powers to ensure compliance with data protection rules; it 
is responsible for “entertaining claims, petitions and complaints regarding the processing of personal 
data and informing the authors of the results thereto”.359 Interestingly (and rather unfortunately), the 
AU Data Protection convention does not provide for direct action against data controllers in the courts 
by individuals who feel their data protection rights have been violated, neither does it specifically 
create a liability relationship between the data controller and data subjects. This suggestively leaves 
all forms of redress to be addressed solely to the DPA, who is prescribed to be an independent national 
data protection authority with immunity from lawsuits (Art.11). The DPA is attributed broad powers 
in terms of data protection enforcement, including to investigate, issue opinions and warnings, inform 
judicial authorities of offences, impose monetary fines, or discontinue processing where fundamental 
rights are threatened (Art.12). The details and limits of these powers appear to be left to the discretion 
of Member States. The DPA’s decisions, however, are subject to appeal before national courts.360 
This Chapter illustrates that an EU-inspired interpretation of AU data protection law by African 
legal practitioners would not only lead to evaluated examination scripts being considered personal 
data on African soil, but would also institute a right of access to these scripts for verification and 
possible re-correction. This would arguably play a significant role in deterring teacher-student abuses 
hinged on examination evaluations within the university and higher education in an African and third 
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world setting. The following Chapter examines some potential impacts which such a development 
would have on the fight against this phenomenon in Cameroon, and also identifies and discusses some 
difficulties which could obstruct the practical enforcement of the right on university staff in the country 
4.5   Right of Access to Evaluated Exam Scripts as Personal Data in Cameroon: Potential 
Impacts on Teacher-Student Abuses 
One of the objectives of the EU data protection reform of 2012 was ‘reinforcing the right to 
information so that individuals fully understand how their personal data is handled’361 An objective 
upheld by the ECJ held in Nowak, granting a right of access to information (albeit personal 
information) to enable an individual appreciate the processing of data which shall have an impact on 
him. The literature already portrays the right to (public) information as a promotor of transparency 
and good governance,362 but so too could be a right to private (personal) information in terms of 
ensuring control by individuals over the processing of their personal data. Access to data processing 
implies control over data, empowers the data subject363 and indirectly imposes a duty of transparency 
on the data controller, which acts as a regulatory tool. Moreover, such access also gives the data subject 
the necessary tools to defend himself/herself (in this case, the marked examination script) as required 
by law in the event of a dispute or criminal proceeding. 
This final Chapter shall first of all present a brief review of the current situation of the right of 
access to examination scripts in Cameroon universities. This shall be followed by a discussion on 
some potential regulatory effects which could result from an EU-inspired interpretation and 
application of students’ data protection right of access to their examination scripts, as regards deterring 
teacher-student abuses, and subsequently an examination as to how this right complements current 
criminal law in combatting this societal ill. This shall be then be followed by a brief identification and 
discussion of some hindrances which may be encountered in the practical enforcement of a right of 
access to evaluated examination scripts as a data protection right in Cameroon universities. 
4.5.1   Right of Access to Evaluated Exam Scripts in Cameroon: A Brief State of the Art 
Cameroon is yet to enact and adopt a comprehensive national data protection law, and there currently 
is no legal mechanism explicitly providing students with a right to access their examination scripts 
after they have been corrected. The above mentioned Decree No. 93/035 of 19th January 1993 and 
                                                          
361 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Safeguarding Privacy in a Connected World, A European Data 
Protection Framework for the 21st Century, COM (2012) 9 final, at 6. 
362 Hielke Hijmans. ‘Understanding and Assessing the Contribution of the CJEU to the Mandate Under Article 16 
TFEU.’ In The European Union as Guardian of Internet Privacy, pp. 185-261. Springer, Cham, 2016. 236 et seq 
363 Ibid, 175 
123 
 
Law No.005 of 16 April 2001 are silent on the issue. So too is Decree No. 08/0249/MINESUP of 11th 
September 2008 on the Common Status of Students in University Institutions of Cameroon. This 
implies that it is up to the discretion of the universities to determine whether or not to grant such a 
right to their studentts. The internal rules of the state universities are equally silent on this aspect; the 
closest to such a right being the right to request for a re-evaluation of the evaluated script in case a 
students is not satisfied with their grade, and whether or not any re-evaluation shall be done is 
completely at the discretion of the Faculty Dean. In the University of Yaoundé I, for example, the 
student has a time limit of up to three days after the official date of publication of the examination 
results to file such a complaint to the Faculty Dean, and the latter reserves the power whether or not 
to order for such re-evaluation.364 Also, the student can request apply to the Faculty Dean for a 
verification of the total count of marks on his/her script.365 However, in both cases, the student does 
not have a right of direct access to the evaluated script. 
 This is strikingly different to what obtains in Europe, where some universities expressly provide 
their students with a right of access and verification of their evaluated examination scripts. Leiden 
University, for example, explicitly grants this right to its Masters students. 366 
4.5.2   Right of Access to Evaluated Exam Scripts: Deterring Sexual Abuse for Grades 
Despite having ratified most international conventions protecting the women’s and children’s rights, 
Cameroon is yet to develop and adopt specific, comprehensive national policies directly addressing 
sexual abuse in institutions of higher learning in the country. Given such a state of affairs, an EU-
interpreted access to personal data in Cameroon could very well be a useful complementary tool to 
deter sexual abuse. If offering natural persons some level of control over their personal data empowers 
them with a right of access and verification as illustrated in Nowak, then providing students with 
control over their evaluated examination scripts represents an opportunity to put some checks on the 
powers of their lecturers or professors. Students who enjoy a right to access their evaluated 
examination scripts and to verify the accuracy of this evaluation are, as a result, indirectly protected 
                                                          
364 Article III.2.3 of the Internal Pedagogical Regulations of the University of Yaoundé I of 27th December 2012. 
Retrieved from http://www.webuy1.uninet.cm/uy1/images/fichiers_attaches/Reglement_Interieur_UY1.pdf 
Accessed 27th September, 2018 
365Ibid, Article III.2.6 
366 Article 4.8.1 of the Course and Examination Regulations of the Master’s Programme International Relations and 
Diplomacy, 2018-2019 of Leiden University. Retrieved from 
https://www.organisatiegids.universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/content/assets/governance-and-global-affairs/oeren/oeren-
juli-2018/oer-m-ird-2018-2019.pdf Accessed 28/9/2018 
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from being compelled by an unruly university professor or member of staff to perform sexual favours 
for better grades. 
 If students have a fundamental right to access their evaluated examination script as personal 
data in the sense of Article 8 CFR, then they can always expose the unfairness in the grading by a 
professor who may have done the grading unfairly because the student rejected their sexual demands. 
This certainly would also auto-regulate related conduct of such professors and discourage them from 
demanding sexual favours in return for allowing a student pass their course; because being aware that 
a student can always verify and hence publicly question the professor’s grading will certainly be a 
strong deterrence incentive to deter unfair grading. Granting some personal data control over evaluated 
examination scripts could therefore contribute significantly in ridding the university milieu of this 
phenomenon. 
4.5.3   Right of Access to Evaluated Exam Scripts: Checking the Teacher-Student Power 
Imbalance 
As discussed above, professor-student relations can be viewed as an imbalanced power relationship, 
with the student being the weaker party. Some professors tend to abuse such powers, which could take 
the form of failing a student for personal reasons, or if the student refuses to succumb to the ‘sorting’ 
antics of a professor, for example failing to buy their handouts. Coupled with the fact that the professor 
reigns supreme in his course with very little or no supervision from the university administration, 
victimised students prefer silence than protest.  
However, qualification of examination scripts as students’ personal data in Cameroon could be 
a useful tool in balancing the professor-student power equation. As discussed above in Nowak, 
personal data protection guarantees a right of access to evaluated examination scripts. Consequently, 
as data controller institutions, universities shall suddenly have an obligation towards students to, upon 
request by the latter, grant them access to their evaluated examination scripts and proceed to process 
any reasonable rectification claims. Such right to access and rectification, because it exposes and 
subjects the professor’s grading to the scrutiny of the student and that of any other person the student 
choses to share that data with, manifestly reduces the risk of power abuse by the professor. As similarly 
concluded in the preceding subsection, knowing that their evaluation can be accessed (and hence 
questioned before others) at any time by their students would most certainly represent a strong 
incentive for professors to grade the former accurately and fairly; hence tipping the power balance in 
the students’ favour. 
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4.5.4   Right of Access to Evaluated Exam Scripts: Complementing Criminal Law 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Cameroon criminal law offers protection to abused students principally in 
relation to sexual abuse, with the other identified incidents of teacher-student abuse being more of an 
educational discipline nature. And even such protection is not easily enforced because most cases go 
unreported, and the Cameroon criminal process, in practice, faces problems of logistics and trained 
personnel, similar to most third world countries. In light of this state of affairs, this paper argues that 
the introduction of a right of access to evaluated examination scripts as personal data could lend a 
helping hand to criminal law by acting as an ex ante a regulatory deterrent with regard to sexual abuse 
by lecturers on students in a Cameroon university setting. 
Considering that unruly lecturers usually use examination grades based on inaccessible evaluated 
examination scripts as bait to compel students to do their bidding, it appears much easier, instead of 
depending on criminal law for sanctions ex post, to deter such practices simply by rendering evaluated 
examination scripts accessible to students as a personal data protection right. Thus giving them the 
opportunity to access and verify the accuracy and fairness of their grades. In other words, instead of 
relying on criminal procedure which is triggered only after the commission of an offence, a right of 
access to evaluated examination scripts will serve as a means of keeping potential unruly professors 
in check; as knowing the student can have access to their script and see first-hand how they have been 
evaluated (and raise an alarm, if need be) would certainly compel the professor to grade the student 
fairly. This represents a less rigid and more practical defence mechanism for the students, instead of 
leaving everything to the bureaucracy of criminal procedure law which will require the issuing of 
warrants and other cumbersome investigatory processes to uncover evidence of teacher-student abuse. 
4.5.5   The Right of Access to Evaluated Exam Scripts: Potential Enforcement Hindrances 
In as much as a right of access to personal data, as illustrated above, could help regulate teacher-
student abuse in Cameroon universities, its practical application may however be faced with some 
difficulties. The first probable hindrance can be deciphered in the overlapping and possible clash 
between the university administration as the state-instituted guarantor of the safety and well-being of 
the student on the one hand, and the national DPA as guarantor of the personal data protection of 
(Cameroon) citizens on the other. There could be a power struggle between both authorities: with the 
DPA being empowered by the AU Data Protection Convention to investigate and sanction data 
controllers, it appears to have the competence to order a professor or concerned/relevant university 
staff member (who, as regards an evaluated examination script, is the data controller) to produce an 
evaluated script on the request of the evaluated student. However, professors generally are subject to 
administrative rules and regulations of their university, and such an order, depending on the 
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circumstances, could possibly go against university rules or protocol. It therefore could be interesting 
to see, in the eventuality of the adoption of the Convention and resulting creation of a DPA in 
Cameroon, how this and similar situation(s) will be managed between both authorities. 
 Another potential hindrance, closely related to the first, concerns the immunity status of both 
entities. While the AU Data Protection Convention grants judicial immunity to the DPA (Article 11), 
Cameroon university campuses also benefit from an inviolability status granted by national law. 
Article 49 of the Decree of 19th January 1993 for example expressly forbids entry by any law 
enforcement officer into a university campus to investigate or establish a crime, or to execute any legal 
order on a university professor or member of staff without a written authorisation of the regional state 
attorney (Procureur Général) presented to the Rector of the concerned university. Similarly, Article 
9 of Decree No. 2001/832/PM of 19 September 2001367 also proclaims the inviolability of private 
university campuses. While looking forward to a regime of regulatory cooperation between university 
authorities and the DPA, this state of affairs nevertheless leaves open the possibility of a university 
invoking its inviolability to block any investigatory mission into its campus by the DPA. Such 
situations may not be unusual especially where the investigation involves a high-ranking professor of 
the university, or who weaves significant political influence. Such circumstances could likely hinder 
the smooth investigation for an access complaint brought by an alleged abused student before the 
DPA, hence obstructing the practical applicability of a right of access. It is opined in any case that the 
national legislator shall consider all these circumstances when adopting a national data protection 
framework guaranteeing a right of access to personal data (including evaluated examination scripts) 
in the country. 
4.6   Conclusion 
This paper argues that an EU-standard interpretation of the right of access to personal data under the 
AU Data Protection Convention (when it eventually comes becomes effective) in Cameroon by 
Cameroonian legal practitioners could contribute positively and significantly to prevent the 
propagation of teacher-student abuses on university campuses in the country. Professors do wield 
academic powers over students, which is necessary for the teaching and evaluation process. But when 
such power is abused, there arises a need to put some checks and balances on it. Nowak, though not a 
case of on-campus abuse, happens to provide a useful tool to attain this need: giving examination 
candidates a data protection right of access and verification over their evaluated examination scripts. 
                                                          




As noted by De Hert et al, data protection law tends to provoke the personal data processor into 
transparency and accountability by giving some level of control over that processing to the 
individual.368If individuals have a possibility of verifying and rectifying their processed data, as they 
presently do under EU data protection law, then the processors will consequently adopt more 
responsible behaviour vis-à-vis their personal data. 
 The same effect could be transposed into Cameroon’s higher learning setting, to limit the 
progression teacher-student abuse. In the likely eventuality that personal data and a related right of 
access under the AU Data Protection Convention, when it becomes effective, are interpreted in 
Cameroon by Cameroonian legal practitioners as they are interpreted in Europe, then students could 
have a right of access and verification of their evaluated examination scripts, just as it was decided in 
Nowak. Which in turn implies that potential unruly professors or lecturers, who usually use unfair 
grading as the main compelling weapon to force students into accepting their sexual propositions, 
‘sorting’ transgressions or compel other forms of abuse, would suddenly be constrained to grade all 
students fairly. For a student could then be able to gain access to and verify how their script was graded 
and, given the parallel data protection right to object to processing, can raise an alarm if he/she feel 
cheated. Moreover, the country does not currently have any official code of ethics binding university 
professors and lecturers, which further leaves room for ethical decadence within the higher learning 
corps. Also, despite abusive conduct like sexual harassment being punishable by the Cameroon Penal 
Code, such cases are hardly reported for fear of unwanted publicity, or simply because students wish 
to avoid open confrontations with professors. Coupled with the problem, as in many third world 
countries, of slow judicial bureaucracy and the lack of qualified, trained judicial staff to effectively 
investigate such allegations. In light of the above, this paper concludes that that the right of access 
under the AU Data Protection Convention, if interpreted as in Nowak, would provide another means 
of ex ante regulation against teacher-student abuse. This would complement the currently inadequate 
measures in place and ultimately provoke more responsible behaviour from unruly university 
professors and members of staff, hence serving as a major deterrence against the phenomenon in 
Cameroon and other affected African countries in general. 
 
                                                          
368 Sjaak Nouwt, Reinventing data protection? (Serge Gutwirth, Yves Poullet, Paul de Hert eds) (Preface) 2009. Ibid 
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Abstract 
The proliferation of ICTs and computational power in processing personal information has long 
been documented to expose individuals to risks of privacy violations and other fundamental rights 
abuses. This prompted calls, about five decades ago, for the development of a legal regime to ensure 
that processing of personal information, especially using ICTs, follows certain rules in order to 
protect fundamental and human rights. Deliberations in this direction were undertaken at the 
OECD, and led to the adoption of the OECD Guidelines of Privacy Protection in September 1980 
(revised in July 2013), which listed eight principles of data processing around which national and 
supranational regimes were expected to build their personal data processing laws. 
It is in this light that this paper attempts a comparative review on how these principles are 
consolidated in Europe and Africa: that is, between the EU’s GDPR on the one hand and the Ghana 
and Kenyan data protection instruments on the other hand. Being a more advanced legal regime in 
terms of data protection, the GDPR serves here as a measuring rod to examine how the basic OECD 
Principles are reflected in the personal data processing rights and obligations provided in the Ghana 
Data Protection Act of 2012 and the Kenyan Data Protection Act of 2019. The paper concludes 
with a general note that while the Kenyan Act appears to duplicate the GDPR risk-based approach 
in consolidating the OECD data protection principles, the Ghanaian Act rather adopts a less 
rigorous approach with lesser burdens on data controllers. 
 
 









5.1     Introduction 
As the world keeps adopting innovations in Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and other 
forms of computational machinery to facilitate human interactions, the last few decades are equally 
witnessing a global shift by national, international and supranational legal regimes increasingly giving 
individuals some level of control over information about themselves processed by means of ICTs. 
Following the documentation of the ever growing risks people expose themselves to as they increasingly 
rely on ICTs and other technologies369, the reaction by main legal frameworks has been to impose some 
rules to be observed and rights to be considered when processing information about individuals. We are 
in a time when governments and private bodies are enthusiastically investing in the use of ‘Big Data’ 
analytics to solve governance problems or study consumer behaviour respectively, and there is a high 
demand for ‘smart’ technologies as well as the unprecedented generation of personal information by 
every web click or online activity. In the midst of all the hype about the praiseworthiness and added value 
which technology and personal information processing has added to humanity, there have also been 
concerns about the implications of the extensive monitoring and/or surveillance of our online activities 
by multilateral institutions and governments.370 
   These concerns were principally privacy concerns and began following the increasing use of 
computational power to process information in the 1960s and 1970s371, and it soon it became apparent 
that the traditional right to privacy may not be adequate to guarantee the necessary safeguards for other 
fundamental rights of individuals in a context of easy data generation, processing and recycling with the 
aid of sophisticated ICTs. This led to calls for enhanced protection over personal information372, to be 
implemented through imposing certain restrictive or security obligations on public or private institutions 
processing personal data, while simultaneously granting individuals some rights geared towards 
exercising some level of control over the information about them being processed by these institutions.  
In light of these developments, the 1970s witnessed the emergence of a novel set of principles aimed 
at protecting the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals in a context of ubiquitous ICTs. These 
                                                          
369 Daniel Solove. ‘The New Vulnerability: Data Security and Personal Information. In: Anupam Chander, Lauren 
Gelman, and Margaret Jane Radin (eds) Securing privacy in the Internet age. Stanford University Press. (2008) 111. Also 
Xavier Caron, Rachelle Bosua, Sean B. Maynard, and Atif Ahmad.: The Internet of Things (IoT) and its impact on 
individual privacy: An Australian perspective. Computer Law & Security Review 32, no. 1 (2016): 4-15. 6. Also see 
generally, Gloria Gonzales Fuster: The Emergence of Personal Data Protection as a Fundamental Right of the EU. 
Springer Science & Business. (2014) 
370 See generally Taewoo Nam: ‘What determines the acceptance of government surveillance? Examining the influence 
of information privacy correlates.’ The Social Science Journal (2018). 
371 ibid 
372 Orla Lynskey: The foundations of EU data protection law. Oxford University Press. 2015. 1 
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principles later inspired the adoption of the OECD 373  Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and 
Transborder Flows of Personal Data of 23rd September 1980 (revised on 11th June 2013), and are today 
generally referred to as principles of ‘personal data protection’ (in Europe and later Africa) or 
‘information privacy’ (USA)374. They sought to provide safeguards when processing information about 
individuals, and especially where such processing is done by means of ICTs — based on the conviction 
that the extensive use of ICTs for this processing data could have far reaching effects for the rights and 
interests of individuals375.  
  Following the above-mentioned privacy and surveillance concerns, supranational and national legal 
responses based on the OECD Guidelines have been developed around the globe to safeguard individuals’ 
privacy and data protection rights within a context of ubiquitous ICT usage for personal data processing. 
Reason why data protection laws exist in over 120 countries worldwide including 25 African countries376, 
and instruments have been introduced by international and regional institutions such as the European 
Union, ECOWAS377 and the African Union378. It should be pointed out that legal literature has constantly 
discussed the relationship between the concepts of privacy and data protection in the information age, 
with scholars still debating as to whether they are two dimensions to the same right or two distinct rights 
founded on different principles. While Bignami379 basically considers data protection as a means to 
guarantee the right to privacy in the information age, Lynskey380 appears in favour of their interpretation 
as two separate though heavily interlinked concepts and rights, while de Hert and Gutwirth 381 
acknowledge that the former was conceived to address the shortcomings of the law to guarantee the right 
to privacy in an increasingly digitised era; shortcomings equally observed by Solove 382 . While 
                                                          
373 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development is an intergovernmental economic organisation with 
36 member countries, founded in 1961 to stimulate economic progress and world trade. See www.oecd.org Accessed 
14/9/2019 
374 Robert Gellman. "None of Your Business: World Data Flows, Electronic Commerce, and the European Privacy 
Directive." The George Washington International Law Review 32, no. 1 (1999): 179. 
375 Peter Hustinx: “EU data protection law: The Review of Directive 95/46/EC and the proposed General Data Protection 
Regulation.” Collected courses of the European University Institute’s Academy of European Law, 24th Session on 
European Union Law (2013): 1-12.1 
376 See Graham Greenleaf. ‘Global data privacy laws 2017: 120 national data privacy laws, including Indonesia and 
Turkey’. Privacy Laws & Business International Report, 10-13, UNSW Law Research Paper No. 45 available at: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2993035 Accessed 11th October 2019 
377 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Supplementary Act A/SA.1/01/10 on Personal Data 
Protection Within ECOWAS. 
378 African Union Convention on Cyber security and Data Protection, 2014 
379 Francesca Bignami. "The Case for Tolerant Constitutional Patriotism: The Right to Privacy before the European 
Courts.” Cornell Int'l LJ 41 (2008): 211.224 
380 Orla Lynskey. The foundations of EU data protection law. 2015. Supra. 91-106 
381 Paul de Hert & Serge Gutwirth. "Data protection in the case law of Strasbourg and Luxemburg: Constitutionalisation 
in action." In Reinventing data protection?, pp. 3-44. Springer, Dordrecht, 2009. 5-6 
382 Daniel Solove: ‘The digital person: Technology and privacy in the information age.’ Vol. 1. NyU Press, 2004.9 
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acknowledging the importance of this debate in conceptualising the right to data protection, it is not the 
objective of this article to discuss the differences or similarities between both concepts. Nevertheless,  
the debate influences the adoption by this article, as a definition of data protection, the position of the 
Council of Europe’s Convention 108 and equally as observed Hustinx383, as those set of rules observed 
when processing personal data in order to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of persons 
(including privacy) from any eventual violation.  
 In light of the above, this paper intends to review in general how the data protection principles 
embedded in the OECD Guidelines are reflected within the European legal framework as opposed to 
African national responses. In particular, it comparatively examines the consolidation of these principles 
in Europe’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) on the one hand, and their materialisation in the 
Ghana Data Protection Act 2012 and Kenyan Data Protection Act 2019 on the other hand. The choice of 
the Ghanaian and Kenyan legislations for this comparison is two-fold: first, both countries are Common 
law countries and represent two sub-regional African intergovernmental organisations384. Secondly, and 
most important, both legislations represent African data protection law pre and post GDPR: the EU 
Regulation being adopted in 2014, hence between both selected Acts (the Ghanaian Act adopted in 2012 
and the Kenyan Act adopted in 2019). So by comparing all three legislations, the article also specifically 
seeks to examine the influence of the GDPR on the Kenyan Data Protection Act (post-GDRP) as opposed 
to the Ghanaian Data Protection Act (pre-GDPR) in their consolidation of the OECD Guidelines. 
This introduction shall be followed by a second section briefly reviewing the events leading to the 
conception, adoption and subsequent revision of the OECD Privacy Guidelines. A third section shall 
briefly present the GDPR, the Ghanaian and Kenyan data protection instruments. The fourth section, the 
main part of the paper, shall examine the consolidation of the OECD Principles of data processing under 
all three instruments, showing the effect of the GDPR on the Kenyan instrument as opposed to the 
Ghanaian instrument. A fifth and final section shall present the conclusive remarks. 
 
                                                          
383 Hustinx observes: “…the Convention's approach is not that processing of personal data should always be considered 
as an interference with the right to privacy, but rather that for the protection of privacy and other fundamental rights 
and freedoms, any processing of personal data must always observe certain legal conditions”. Peter Hustinx: ‘EU data 
protection law: The Review of Directive 95/46/EC and the proposed General Data Protection Regulation.’ 2013. Supra. 
9.  
384 Ghana being a member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Kenya a member of the 
East Africa Community (EAC) 
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5.2   The 1980 OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of 
Personal Data 
The OECD Guidelines was the first international embodiment of international principles regulating the 
processing of data—a text agreed upon both by the US and European countries385. The build-up towards 
its adoption can be said to have concretely began in 1972 with the creation of a Data Bank Panel within 
the OECD charged with ‘reflecting on the regulation of the processing of information about individuals 
in automated databases’, which organised, in 1974, an OECD Seminar on Policy Issues in data protection 
and privacy, which had on the agenda discussions on privacy as well as harmonizing the already disparate 
rules relating to transborder data flows among member states. Three years later, in 1977, the Data Bank 
Panel organised a Symposium on Transborder Data Flows and the Protection of Privacy, which led to 
the dismantlement of the Data Bank Panel, and the creation of an Expert Group in 1978, immediately 
charged with the task of drafting Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Data Flows of 
Personal Data for the OECD386. After two years of negotiation, the Guidelines were finally adopted on 
23rd September 1980. 
 The Recommendations of the Council on the Guidelines (to which the Guidelines were attached as 
annex) affirms the dual intention of the OECD member states to, through the Guidelines, protect ‘privacy 
and individual liberties’ while ‘advancing the free flow of information between member states387. It is 
worth mentioning that the Guidelines repeatedly use the term ‘privacy protection’ rather than ‘data 
protection’, a choice of words largely in favour of the US approach which has always formally employed 
the term ‘informational privacy’ in both US law and doctrine to refer to the legal regime established 
under the Principles in the Guidelines, instead of ‘data protection’ as it is referred to in Europe.388 In 
terms of scope, the Guidelines applies to any personal data which processing, whether by a public or 
private body or through automation or manually, poses a danger to privacy and individual liberties 
(Article 2, OECD Guidelines). It defined personal data ‘any information relating to an identified or 
identifiable individual (data subject)’389, subjecting its processing to eight ‘principles’: the collection 
limitation principle, the data quality principle, the purpose specification principle, the use limitation 
principle, the security safeguards principle, the openness principle, the individual participation principle, 
                                                          
385See the Working Party for Information Security and Privacy (WPISP). 2011. The evolving privacy landscape: 30 years 
after the OECD Privacy Guidelines. Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry—Committee for Information, 
Computer and Communications Policy, DSTI/ICCP/REG(2010)6/FINAL,6.4.2011. DSTI/ICCP/REG(2010)6/FINAL. P.12 
386 Gloria Gonzales Fuster: The Emergence of Personal Data Protection as a Fundamental Right of the EU. (2014) supra, 
76-78 
387 Recommendations of the Council concerning Guidelines governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows 
of Personal Data (23 September 1980) 
388 Fuster, (2016) supra, 79. 
389 Article 1(b), OECD Revised Guidelines 2013 
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and the accountability principle. On 11 July 2013, the OECD Council adopted a revised edition of the 
Guidelines. The eight Principles of the original version remained unchanged, but some new principles 
were added, including: National Privacy strategies, Privacy management programmes, and Data security 
breach notification. 
Being the first body of data protection principles embodied in an international instrument, the OECD 
(Revised) Guidelines can be considered a principal foundation stone from which are constructed other 
data protection rules at national or regional level. It is on this basis that this paper seeks to comparatively 
review the consolidation of the OECD Revised Principles by the European GDPR on the one hand, and 
the Ghanaian Data Protection Act 2012 and the Kenyan Data Protection Act 2019 on the other hand. The 
following section briefly presents these selected legislations. 
 
5.3   The EU GDPR390, the Ghanaian Data Protection Act 2012 and the Kenyan Data 
Protection Act 2019 
The following subsections briefly present the European GDPR and the current Ghanaian and Kenyan 
data protection instruments, as well as their objectives and subject matter. 
5.3.1 The European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 
Coming into force on 25th May 2018 and repealing the EU 1995 Data Protection Directive391, the GDPR 
is Europe’s main instrument regulating the processing of personal information. Being a Regulation, it is 
directly applicable and enforceable in EU Member States according to Article 288 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). With the Directive serving as guidance for national data 
protection laws but not directly applicable on EU member states, there were concerns about the unequal 
levels of data protection across the EU. The GDPR was hence conceived to ‘ensure a robust protection 
of the fundamental right to data protection throughout the European Union and strengthen the functioning 
of the [European] Single Market.’392 Also, the right to data protection officially acquiring the status of a 
fundamental right under the 2000 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Article 8) warranted its 
consolidation under a directly applicable Regulation. The GDPR establishes rights to guarantee and 
obligations to comply with when processing information about or relating to individuals located within 
                                                          
390 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), published in Official Journal of the European Union, L 119, 4 
May 2016 
391 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard 
to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, Official Journal L281, 23/11/1995, 0031–0050 
392 Communication From The Commission To The European Parliament, The Council, The European Economic And 
Social Committee And The Committee Of The Regions Safeguarding Privacy in a Connected World A European Data 
Protection Framework for The 21st Century COM/2012/09 Final (2012) 
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the European Economic Area, or where such processing is done by an entity located within the latter. It 
is widely considered the standard to follow in terms of data protection/digital privacy, lauded as the ‘most 
profound privacy law of our generation’ for being ‘majestic in its scope and ambition’ due to its broad 
definition of personal data and its attention-grabbing penalties, among other things393. It however runs 
concurrently with the e-Privacy Directive394 and Police Directive395 which apply lex specialis where the 
processing takes place respectively over a publicly accessible telecommunication network or within the 
context of a criminal investigation. 
Two significant peculiarities can be identified with the GDPR. The first is what has been 
termed its risk-based approach to data protection i.e. it systematically requires data controllers and 
processors to assign more resources to processing which present greater risks to individuals in case of 
any processing misfortunes. Secondly, data controllers (i.e. persons responsible for the collection and 
processing of personal data) are the main actors in charge of the application of data protection law, with 
national data protection authorities playing a more or less subsidiary role396. In other words, it is up to 
data controllers to take initiatives to protect individuals whose data they are processing, while the data 
protection authorities are there to verify if such initiatives are adequate. The reasons for this approach, as 
advanced by the EU Commission, include reducing the administrative burden on data controllers397, and 
that companies are in the best place to know their processing activities which could harm data subjects398. 
  5.3.2   The Ghana Data Protection Act 2012 
The Ghana Data Protection Act entered into force on 16th October 2012, with the aim to ‘…protect the 
privacy of the individual and personal data by regulating the processing of personal information, to 
provide the process to obtain, hold, use or disclose personal information and for related matters’399. It was 
introduced to further reinforce the right to privacy guaranteed by Article 18 of the 1992 Constitution of 
Ghana, following the apprehension by the Government that misuse of personal information could be used 
                                                          
393 Solove, Daniel: Why I Love the GDPR: 10 Reasons. Available online: https://teachprivacy.com/why-i-love-thegdpr/ 
(accessed on 11 October 2019) 
394 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of 
personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and 
electronic communications) 
395 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural 
persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, 
investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA 
396 Maria Eduarda Gonçalves: The risk-based approach under the new EU data protection regulation: a critical 
perspective.  Journal of Risk Research. 2019. DOI: 10.1080/13669877.2018.1517381. 2 
397 Ibid, 3 
398 Ibid, 6. 
399 Ghana Data Protection Act 2012 (title) 
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in a manner that is detrimental to individuals and the Ghanaian society at large400, especially in light of 
technological advancements401. Agyei-Bekoe also asserts that another plausible if not the principal motive 
behind the legislation could be the desire to comply with the then trendy adequacy principle of the 1995 
EU Directive (Article 25) which prohibited EU countries from making data transfers to third countries 
without an adequate level of privacy and (data) protection. He posits that the Ghanaian legislator was 
more concerned about international economic relations rather than the privacy rights of individuals, 
Ghana being an essentially collectivist society with people likely to have low value for privacy.402 In any 
case, the Act it remains one of the first national responses by an African state to privacy and data 
protection concerns. 
5.3.3   The Kenyan Data Protection Act 2019 
The Kenyan Data Protection Act 2019 represents Kenya’s most recent and main instrument regulating 
the processing of personal information of Kenyan residents. The Act’s historical background can be 
traced back to the cyber law reform process in the East African Community (EAC) of which Kenya is a 
member state, which began on 28 November 2006 leading to the adoption of the EAC Framework for 
Cyberlaws Phase I recommending EAC member states to adopt data protection legislation based upon 
international best practices 403 . The country later adopted a new constitution on 27th August 2010 
explicitly providing for a right to privacy to include a right not to have ‘information relating to their 
family or private affairs unnecessarily required or revealed’ or ‘the privacy of their communications 
infringed.’(Article 31). To further consolidate this right, significant attempts were made to produce a 
draft bill in 2012, and 2013, with the Ministry of Information and Communication Technology finally 
releasing, in August 2018, the Privacy and Data Protection Policy 2018 and draft Data Protection 
Bill, 2018. The latter was then subject to further deliberation in Parliament and later released by the 
Directorate of Legal Services in July 2019 as the Data Protection Bill 2019. It was signed into law by the 
President of the Republic on 8th November 2019, and entered into force on 25th November 2019. It 
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consists of 75 Articles arranged into 11 parts, offering a broad range of protection to Kenyan citizens 
with regard to personal data processing. 
 
5.4   Consolidating the OECD (Revised) Principles (and corresponding rights and obligations) 
of data processing  
This section, the main focus of this paper, reviews the consolidation of the above-mentioned OECD 
Principles of data processing listed in the Guidelines into the GDPR, the Ghanaian Data Protection Act 
2012 and the Kenyan Data Protection Act 2019. 
 
5.4.1   Collection Limitation Principle (Paragraph 7 OECD Revised Guidelines) 
Paragraph 7, laying down the first Principle of the OECD Revised Guidelines, states that ‘there should 
be limits to the collection of personal data and any such data should be obtained by lawful and fair means 
and, where appropriate, with the knowledge or consent of the data subject.’ Information individuals share 
about themselves determines the inferences society makes about their lives. This Principle hence acts like 
the first line of defence of individuals against inferences from data about them. With the proliferation of 
ICTs and social media platforms, rise of Big Data and IoT, and companies investing hugely in data 
analytics, all kinds of data are used to study consumer behaviour; even data which, most at times, we do 
not even know exist or which we generate unconsciously404 but could nevertheless be used to make 
inferences and decisions about us. Under this Principle, data controllers should have a valid, 
proportionately reasonable and legitimate reason for collecting personal data. Also, such data should be 
lawfully obtained i.e. not through fraudulent means or by harassing the individual. 
 In Europe, the GDPR embeds this Principle in its Article 5(1)(a), requiring personal data to be 
processed ‘lawfully’ and ‘fairly’, while Article 5(1)(c) demands that the data collected should be relevant 
and limited to the exact needs for the specific processing activity. Article 6 lays down the confines within 
which data can be collected for processing (the data subject has given their consent, performance of a 
contract to which the data subject is party, compliance with a legal obligation, to protect the vital interests 
of the data subject or of another natural person; the performance of a task done in the public interest or 
in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller, or for the legitimate interests405 pursued by 
the data controller, except where the data subject’s fundamental rights override such interest).  
                                                          
404 Luci Pangrazio & Neil Selwyn. ‘Personal data literacies’: A critical literacies approach to enhancing understandings of 
personal digital data." New Media & Society 21, no. 2 (2019): 419-437.420 
405 ‘Legitimate interest’ could exist when there is a relevant relationship between the data controller and data subject, 
like where the data subject is a client or is at the service of the data controller (Recital 47 GDPR) 
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 In Ghana, Article 19 of the Data Protection Act, titled ‘Minimality’ provides that personal data ‘may 
only be processed if the purpose for which it is to be processed, is necessary, relevant and not excessive.’  
Article 20(1) then lists the legal grounds for processing, which are the same as in the GDPR, listed in the 
same order. In Kenya, Articles 25(b) to (d) of the Data Protection Act require processing to be ‘fair’ and 
‘lawful’, and personal data collection should be specific, relevant and limited to the object of processing. 
Article 30(1) also lists the same legal basis for data processing as in the GDPR, adding processing for 
historical, statistical, journalistic, literature, art of scientific research (Article 30(1)(b)(viii)). 
 
5.4.2   Data Quality Principle (Paragraph 8, OECD Guidelines) 
Paragraph 8 of the OECD Guidelines requires that personal data ‘be relevant to the purposes for which 
they are to be used, and, to the extent necessary for those purposes, should be accurate, complete and 
kept up-to-date.’ It aims to prevent inaccurate and unfair decisions being taken from processing 
individuals’ personal information. For example, an individual seeking a loan could find it denied if the 
database consulted by the bank to check his/her creditworthiness contains inaccurate or outdated details 
about his/her financial situation, history or behaviour. It is up to the data controller to ensure that the 
information based on which decisions are taken about individuals are relevant and accurate.406 
  The GDPR’s Recital 39 and Article 5(d) require reasonable steps to be taken to ensure that 
inaccurate personal data upon which decisions are or are to be taken with regard to individuals are 
rectified or deleted. It also provides individuals with a right to have rectified inaccurate or incomplete 
data concerning them with regard to the purpose for which the data is processed (Article 16).  
  In Ghana, the Data Protection Act mentions ‘quality of information’ as a principle in its Article 
17(e), and Article 26 imposes a duty on the data controller to ensure that processed data ‘is complete, 
accurate, up to date and not misleading having regard to the purpose for the collection or processing.’ In 
terms of related individual rights, Article 33(1) permits an individual to request the correction or deletion 
of ‘personal data that is inaccurate, irrelevant, excessive, out of date, incomplete, misleading or obtained 
unlawfully…’ It is interesting to note the applicability of this right in the Act vis-à-vis unlawfully 
obtained data: even if such data may apparently be accurate, the individual can still request its deletion 
if they can show it was unlawfully collected. 
                                                          
406 This principle founded the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal in the famous US case of Spokeo v. Robbins, 
867 F. 3d 1108 - Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit 2017. The Court found that Mr Robbins had grounds to sue an 
employment placement company for having, on his profile, and for not taking the necessary steps to update inaccurate 
information about his marital and employment status, age and educational background, which could have been the 
reason why he could not find a job through that company. 
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  In Kenya, Article 25(e) of the Data Protection Act requires personal data to be ‘accurate and, where 
necessary, kept up to date’ with reasonable steps taken to ensure ‘inaccurate personal data is erased or 
rectified without delay.’ While Article 26 (d) and (e) and Article 40(1) grant individuals a right to request 
the correction and deletion of false or misleading data about them. 
 
5.4.3   Purpose Specification and Use Limitation principles (Paragraphs 9 and 10, OECD 
Revised Guidelines) 
Paragraph 9 of the OECD Revised Guidelines states that ‘the purposes for which personal data are 
collected should be specified not later than at the time of data collection and the subsequent use limited 
to the fulfilment of those purposes or such others as are not incompatible with those purposes and as are 
specified on each occasion of change of purpose’. And Paragraph 10 complementarily requires personal 
data ‘not to be disclosed, made available or otherwise used for purposes other than those specified in 
accordance with Paragraph 9 except…with the consent of the data subject or…by the authority of law.’ 
Together, both principles place material and time-based limits on the usage of personal data by data 
controllers.  
  In essence, Paragraph 9 requires that personal data collected from an individual should be processed 
strictly within the confines of the purpose for which it was originally collected with no further processing, 
unless the individual consented to it or such further processing is clearly compatible with the original 
purpose or is necessary for other purposes permitted by law. For example, if an individual submits their 
home address to a company in order to have a service delivered to them, that company should not further 
use that home address for another purpose e.g. to advertise other products to the individual, unless the 
individual expressly consents to such further use. This principle targets the limitation of non-intuitive 
inferences which could be generated from further processing of personal data, which currently are not 
uncommon occurrences407. Paragraph 9 also limits the timeframe within which personal data can be 
stored by the data controller i.e. personal data should not still be kept after the specified purpose for which 
it was processed has been completed. This reduces the risk of processed data becoming excessive, 
irrelevant, inaccurate or outdated, or that the data is erroneously reused to the detriment of the individual. 
Practically, it helps complement the accuracy principle, which is discussed later. 
  The GDPR embeds this Principle in Article 5(b), obliging data controllers to stick to the original 
purpose of processing unless, inter alia, further processing is not incompatible with original purpose. 
Paragraph 10 of the Guidelines is materialised on its part in Article 5(e) GDPR, which requires personal 
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big data and AI." Columbia Business Law Review (2019).4 
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data to be ‘kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for 
the purposes for which the personal data are processed’, exceptionally permitting their storage for longer 
periods ‘if processed for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research 
purposes or statistical purposes.’ Also relevant in this respect is the right available to data subjects, subject 
to some exceptions or unless they expressly consent, not to be subject to decisions based solely on 
automated processing which produces legal effects concerning or affecting them (Article 22). This 
prevents the data controller from using other data they may have previously (and lawfully) obtained from 
the data subjects to infer behavioural traits or generate digital profiles for other purposes without prior 
consent. 
  In Ghana, Article 17(c) of the Ghana Data Protection Act demands ‘specification of purpose’ when 
processing personal data, while Article 25 requires the data controller to process data solely for the 
purpose for which it was collected, and any further processing must be in compatibility with the original 
purpose, or unless consented to or if required by law). As regards storage limitation, Article 24(1) states 
that data controllers, subject to exceptions inter alia like research or statistical purposes, ‘shall not 
retain…personal data for a period longer than is necessary to achieve the purpose for which the data was 
collected and processed’. In terms of corresponding data subject rights, Article 41(1), however, unlike 
the GDPR, grants a right against automated decision-making using personal data only upon a written 
request by or on behalf of the data subject asking the controller to refrain from using their data for such 
processing. And this, apparently, only if the decision ‘significantly’ affects the data subject. This conveys 
an interpretation that organisations could generate pure automated-decisions from individuals’ data if the 
latter do not expressly and unilaterally request the contrary, or if the decision does not ‘significantly’ 
affect them. In any case, if the decision significantly affects the individual, they are entitled to a written 
notice by the controller, and a chance to challenge the decision (Article 41 (2)). But then, the Act 
establishes no test to determine when a result can be said to ‘significantly’ affect an individual. 
   Article 25(c) of the Kenyan Data Protection Act specifies that data be collected for ‘explicit, 
specified and legitimate purpose and not further processed in a manner incompatible with those purposes’ 
and Article 30(2) expressly obliges controllers to process personal data in accordance with the (original) 
purpose for processing. As regards storage time limits, the Act requires controllers and processors not to 
keep personal data ‘for longer than is reasonably necessary to satisfy the purpose for which it processed 
unless authorised or required by law, is consented to by the individual or is processed for historical, 
statistical, artistic, journalistic or related research purposes (Article 39(1)).  The Act also replicates the 
GDPR by granting to individuals a general right not to be subject to decisions arrived solely by automated 
decision-making systems (Article 35(1)). 
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5.4.4   Security Safeguards Principle (Paragraph 11 OECD Revised Guidelines) 
Paragraph 11 OECD Guidelines state that ‘Personal data should be protected by reasonable security 
safeguards against such risks as loss or unauthorised access, destruction, use, modification or disclosure 
of data.’ Data controllers are therefore required to ensure that personal data is processed securely without 
unwanted disclosure. 
 The GDPR incorporates this principle in its Article 32, demanding controllers and processors to 
implement appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure a level of security appropriate to 
the risk [which a given processing activity could expose the individual to], including…the 
pseudonymisation and encryption…the ability to ensure the ongoing confidentiality, integrity, 
availability and resilience of processing systems and services…ability to restore the availability and 
access to personal data in a timely manner in the event of a physical or technical incident’.  
  On its part, Article 28(1) of the Ghanaian Act demands that the data controller takes ‘reasonable, 
technical and organisational measures to prevent the loss of, damage to, or unauthorised destruction; and 
unlawful access to or unauthorised processing of personal data’. In Kenya, the Data Protection Act 
requires the implementation of measures to identify and maintain safeguards against risks of processing, 
psudonymisation and encryption of personal, and availability to restore processing in the event of a 
technical incident (Article 41(4)). 
 
5.4.5   Openness principle (Paragraph 12 OECD Revised Guidelines) 
Paragraph 12 of the OECD Guidelines advocates ‘a general policy of openness about developments, 
practices and policies with respect to personal data.’ This is a very crucial data protection principle, and 
is geared towards establishing trust between individual and organisations which process their personal 
information. It compels controllers to provide individuals with sufficient information on the processing 
being carried out408, empowering them to scrutinize processing of their data through exercising rights like 
the right of access, modification and/or deletion of their processed information. 
  In the GDPR, this principle is materialised in Article 5(a) as the ‘transparency’ principle, and is 
reflected in a number of obligations imposed on the data controller. For one, the controller is required to 
‘provide any information…relating to processing to the data subject in a concise, transparent, intelligible 
and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language…’ (Article 12(1)). It equally has to be very 
clear about its processing objectives when obtaining the individual’s consent for data processing, and 
should also inform them of their right to withdraw their consent at any time (Article 7 (1) to (3)). In terms 
                                                          
408 See Fanny Coudert. "Towards a new generation of CCTV networks: Erosion of data protection 
safeguards?" Computer Law & Security Review 25, no. 2 (2009): 145-154.151 
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of rights under this principle, Article 13(2)(f) notably grants individuals the right to obtain, where 
automated decision-making is involved using their data, ‘meaningful information about the logic 
involved, as well as the significance and the envisaged consequences of such processing’ on them. 
   In Ghana, Article 17(f) lists ‘openness’ as one of the principles of data processing. Article 18 
requires that the controller processes personal data ‘without infringing the privacy rights of the data 
subject…’ and ‘in a lawful manner’. Article 27(2) lists a rather exhaustive list of items which the 
controller, before collecting data for processing, must ensure the data subject is aware of. These include, 
inter alia, the nature of the data being collected, name and address of the person responsible for the 
collection, the purpose for collection, whether or not the supply of the data by the data subject is 
discretionary or mandatory, the recipients of the data, the existence of the right of access to and the right 
to request rectification of the data collected before the collection. Moreover, the Act requires that when 
a decision which significantly affects an individual is taken by automated processing, the data controller 
should notify the individual, hence providing an opportunity for objection (Article 41). Unlike in the 
GDPR however, there is no express right available for the individual to obtain meaningful information 
about the logic involved in processing their data. 
  The Kenyan Data Protection Act on its part guarantees this principle in its Article 25(b), requiring 
processing transparency on the part of the data controller. The latter is equally required in Article 29 to 
inform the individual about, inter alia, their rights with regard to processing, the purpose of processing 
as well as the contact details of the data controller or any third party who will receive the data as part of 
the processing procedure. While Article 32(1) places a burden of proof on the controller to prove consent 
for processing. In terms of data subject rights, Article 26(a) grants a right for data subject to be informed 
of the use for which their data is processed. This right proves useful for regulating further unauthorised 
processing by the controller, hence complementing the Purpose and Use Limitation principles. It should 
be noted however that just like with the Ghanaian Act, the Kenyan legislation appears offer no express 
right to data subjects to obtain an explanation from the data controller on the logic involved in processing. 
 
5.4.6   Individual Participation Principle (Paragraph 13 OECD Revised Guidelines) 
Paragraph 13 of the OECD Guidelines recommends that individuals should have the right to ‘to obtain 
from a data controller, or otherwise, confirmation of whether or not the data controller has data relating 
to them; to have [the data] communicated to them…in a form that is readily intelligible to them’ and ‘to 
challenge data relating to them and, if the challenge is successful, to have the data erased, rectified, 
completed or amended.’ This principle falls line with the somewhat supervisory role data protection law 
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seeks to grant individuals over the processing of their information. As de Hert et al409 generally observe, 
once an individual relinquishes their data, they are excluded from the processing, and have no say in how 
such processing may affect them in future e.g. as regards automatic inferences. This principle flows from 
one of the main objectives of data protection legislation, namely making the data subject a participant in 
the outcome of their own data processing. 
     Accordingly, the GDPR grants a list of rights to data subjects from Article 15 to 18. Article 15 
guarantees a right of access to personal data, which in essence gives individuals the right to ‘obtain from 
the controller confirmation as to whether or not personal data concerning him or her are being processed, 
and, where that is the case, access to the personal data and the following information inter alia: the 
purposes of the processing, categories of personal data being processed, third party recipients if any, 
storage period of the data, right to restrict processing, or the right to lodge a complaint with a data 
protection supervisory authority’410. 
    Article 16 complements the right of access with a right to rectification of inaccurate data. A right to 
erasure (also referred to as a right to be forgotten) is introduced in Article 17, which permits the data 
subject to request the data controller to erase all personal data it may have about them if, inter alia, 
processing is no longer compatible with the purpose of processing, they have withdrawn consent to the 
processing, or their fundamental rights override the processor’s legitimate interest for processing. 
However, this right has to be balanced with other fundamental rights listed in Article 17(3) like freedom 
of speech and expression or general public interest (especially if the data subject is a public 
personality411). Article 18 then consolidates a right to request restriction of processing if, inter alia, the 
data is no longer accurate or needed for the purpose for which it was collected. Equally related to this 
principle is the right to data portability introduced by the GDPR’s Article 20, which is a rather peculiar 
right in terms of granting control over personal data. The right permits data subjects to request their data 
under processing by a data controller to be transferred to another controller, where such data is processed 
by automated means. 
                                                          
409 See Paul de Hert, Vagelis Papakonstantinou, David Wright & Serge Gutwirth S. ‘The proposed Regulation and the 
construction of a principles-driven system for individual data protection.’ Innovation: The European Journal of Social 
Science Research 26, no. 1-2 (2013): 133-144.138 
410 Ideally, a data protection supervisory authority is an independent public authority in charge of overseeing 
compliance with data protection principles in a given jurisdiction. The GDPR’s Article 51 requires each EU Member 
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created by Article 1 of the Data Protection Act. In Kenya, the 2019 Data Protection Act 2019 establishes the Office of 
the Data Protection Commissioner in its Article 5. 
411 See Paragraph 99 of the ECJ’s decision in Google Spain SL, Google Inc v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos and 
Mario Costeja González [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:317 
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     In Ghana, Article 17(h) of the Ghana Data Protection Act notably mentions ‘data subject 
participation’ as a personal data processing principle, while Articles 32 and 35 list a relatively exhaustive 
set of provisions cumulatively arranged into 18 subsections relating to the right of access to personal 
data. It equally confers to data subject a list of rights similar to Article 15 of the GDPR, adding, inter alia, 
the need for consent of any other person who may be identified from the requested data or the data 
controller taking measures to de-identify them (Articles 35 (4) and (7)). Article 33(1)(a) confers a right 
to data rectification for individuals, while Article 33(1)(b) grants a ‘right to be forgotten’ similar to the 
GDPR. However, unlike the GDPR, there is no express right to data portability in the Ghana Data 
Protection Act. 
     In Kenya, similar to the Data Quality Principle, Article 26 (d) and (e) and Article 40(1) of the Kenyan 
Data Protection Act grant individuals a right to request the correction and deletion of false or misleading 
data about them. Article 34 grants rights on restriction of processing very identical to those listed under 
Article18 of the GDPR, and Article 36 provides a general right for individuals to object to processing 
unless the data controller proves legitimate interest which overrides the individual’s interest. And, as in 
the GDPR, the Kenyan Data Protection Act provides for a right to data portability (Article 38). However, 
the Act does not appear to limit this right to data processed by automatic means. Apparently therefore, 
all forms of personal data, as long as they are structured and in a usable format, can be subject to the right 
to data portability. 
 
5.4.7   The Accountability Principle and the Implementing Accountability Principle 
(Paragraphs 14 and 15 (b), OECD Revised Guidelines)  
Paragraph 14 of the OECD Revised Guidelines makes data controllers responsible for giving effect to 
the principles advanced in the Guidelines. Complementing this positon, Paragraph 15 requires that they 
be prepared to show, upon request, a privacy management programme giving effect to the Guidelines. In 
essence, the Accountability Principle requires data controllers to always be in a position to demonstrate 
compliance with data processing requirements. It could be viewed as a supervisory mechanism to ensure 
that individuals are always guaranteed their data protection rights. The Implementing Accountability 
Principle follows up on this by requiring data controllers to always be poised to demonstrate at any time 
that they are compliant with data protection obligations. 
      Incorporating this principle, the GDPR’s Article 5(2) provides that the data controller ‘shall be 
responsible for, and be able to demonstrate compliance’ with all the above data-processing principles. 
Article 25 requires data controllers to construct their data processing activities in avid awareness of the 
data protection principles of the Regulation i.e. the conception and running of data processing activities 
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should revolve around data protection principles (Data Protection by Design or by Default). Moreover, a 
‘Data Protection Impact Assessment’ requirement (Article 35 GDPR) obliges data controllers, where 
processing may be risky due to the nature of the data processed (like sensitive data), to carry out an 
assessment to clearly identify the dangers and risks such processing could present to data subjects. If 
risks are imminent, the processing could be ordered to stop (by the supervisory authority), or may be 
permitted to continue after a verified adoption of appropriate countermeasures. 
The Ghanaian Data Protection Act mentions the term ‘accountability’ (Article 17(a)) as a principle 
to ensure the privacy of individuals but is silent as regards the data controller’s use of default compliance 
mechanisms i.e. no express data protection by design requirement. There also appears to be no express 
obligation on data controllers to carry out a prior impact assessment (in the event of risky processing): 
rather, the Act only grants ‘affected’ individuals the possibility to request the Data Protection 
Commission to make such an assessment on a data controller’s processing activity (Article 77). The 
Kenyan Data Protection Act on its part does provide for a ‘Data protection by Default or by Design’ 
requirement (Article 41), as well as a data protection impact assessment (Article 31). 
 
5.4.8 Security breach notification (Paragraph 15(c), Implementing Accountability, Revised 
OECD Guidelines) 
Paragraph 15 (c) of the Revised OECD Guidelines requires data controllers, as a measure to implement 
the Accountability Principle, to ‘provide notice, as appropriate, to privacy enforcement authorities or 
other relevant authorities where there has been a significant security breach affecting personal data. 
Where the breach is likely to adversely affect data subjects, a data controller should notify affected data 
subjects.’ Apparently complementing the Security Safeguard Principle, this Principle was introduced in 
the 2013 Revised OECD Guidelines. It is worth mentioning that by the time of this revision, data breach 
notification requirements were already being implemented in a handful of countries, and had been 
introduced in the US by the state of California in 2002412. They have been asserted to serve three 
purposes: they ‘provide a systematic feedback about the actual risk and the actual weaknesses of existing 
security measures; they enable authorities and consumers to assess the relative capabilities of data 
controllers with respect to data security; and they force data controllers to assess and understand their 
own situation regarding security measures.413 
                                                          
412 See Gina Marie Stevens. ‘Data security breach notification laws.’ CRS Report for Congress (2012). Retrieved from 
http://dev.journalistsresource.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/R42475.pdf.  Accessed 13th October 2019 
413 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Paper SEC (2012) 72 final. Impact Assessment Accompanying the 
General Data Protection Regulation (2012), p. 100 
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 This Principle is materialised in the GDPR’s Articles 33 and 34. Article 33 demands the data 
controller to record and/or report personal data breaches 414  to their data supervisory authorities, 
depending on the severity of the breach. Article 33(5) also compels data controllers to document or record 
the details of any eventual breach, its effects and the remedial action taken, and the documentation shall 
enable the supervisory authority to verify compliance with this Article. Article 34 requires that data 
subjects be informed in case of the breach is likely to affect them significantly, but then avails the data 
controller of this requirement if it had applied, on the breached data, relevant measures to render the data 
unintelligible (like encryption), or has taken other relevant measures to ensure that the breach does not 
materialise into a risk for data subjects. 
 In Ghana, Article 31 of the Data Protection Act requires the data controller, in event of a reasonable 
suspicion of a security compromise, to inform the Data Protection Commissioner and the data subject. It 
is important to note here that the Ghanaian Act uses the term “security compromise” without offering a 
definition of the term; but this remains the closest equivalent concept to a data breach under the GDPR 
in terms of consolidating the Security Breach notification principle. The Act, as regards reporting security 
incidents, does not adopt a risk-mitigating approach like the GDPR: not only does it require the reporting 
of (mere) “suspicions” of security com-promises, it appears all security incidents must be reported, 
whether or not they are significant or the controller had encrypted the data or adopted other pre or post-
mitigating measures.  
 Contrarily, the Kenyan Act, after adopting, in its Article 2, a definition of a personal data breach 
identical to that in Article 4(12) of the GDPR, requires notification in its Article 43(1) if a personal data 
breach presents a ‘real risk of harm’ to the data subject. And just like the GDPR, it adopts a risk-mitigation 
approach by availing the controller or processor of the duty to notify the data subject if the latter took 
appropriate safeguards like encryption. A slight difference with the GDPR here though is that apparently 
nothing avails the data controller from notifying the Data Protection Commissioner despite adopting such 
post-breach mitigating measures (Article 43(6)). But then Article 43(8), just like the GDPR, requires the 
data controller to record the details of [every] personal data breach, its effect and the remedial actions 
taken.  
 5.5   Conclusive Remarks 
This article set out to review how the Ghanaian and Kenyan data protection legislations fare before the 
European GDPR in consolidating data protection principles embedded in the 1980 OECD Guidelines 
                                                          
414 A personal data breach is defined by Article 4(12) of the GDPR as a ‘breach of security leading to the accidental or 




Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, including its 2013 revision. 
Specifically, it attempted to demonstrate the influence of the GDPR on the Kenyan Data Protection Act 
2019 (post GDPR) as opposed to the Ghanaian Data Protection Act 2012 (pre-GDPR). First, it presented 
an overview of the importance of data protection as a legal regime and an essential, complementary 
safeguard against the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals in today’s world of ubiquitous 
computer and IT processing of personal information. It then briefly reviews the emergence of the 1980 
OECD Guidelines (and later its revision in 2013) which laid down essential data protection principles 
around which related national or supranational legislations around the globe could be developed. The 
article then presents proceeds to comparatively examine the GDPR’s materialisation of these principles 
with their materialisation in the Ghanaian Data Protection Act of 2012 and Kenyan Data Protection Act 
of 2019.  The objective was to identify the similarities and differences between the contemporary EU 
approach in consolidating these principles as opposed to the approach of the selected African legislations, 
and by so doing, examine how the approach of the GDPR influences the Kenyan Data Protection Act 
2019 (adopted post GDPR) as opposed to the Ghanaian Data Protection Act 2012 (adopted pre-GDPR). 








EU 2014 General Data 
Protection Regulation 
Ghanaian Data Protection 
Act 2012 




- Article 5(1)(a): Lawful and fair 
processing. 
- Article 5(1)(c): data collected 
should be relevant and limited 
- Article 6: Lawfulness of 
processing 
- Article 19: Processed data 
should be relevant, not 
excessive. 
- Article 20(1): Legal 
grounds for processing 
- Articles 25(b) to (d): 
Processing should be ‘fair’ 
and ‘lawful’ 
- - Article 30(1): Legal grounds 
for processing 
Data Quality - Article 5(d) (also Recital 39): 
Inaccurate data should be 
rectified 
- Article 16: Right of rectification 
- Articles 17(e) and 26: 
Processed data should be 
complete and up to date. 
- Article 33(1): Right to 
have inaccurate data 
corrected or deleted. 
- Article 25(e): Personal data 
should be accurate and kept 
up to date. 
- Article 26 (d) and (e) and 
40(1): Right to have false 
information (about the data 





- Article 5(b): Processing should 
be limited to the original 
purpose. 
- Article 5(e): Data should not be 
stored for longer than necessary 
for processing. 
- Article 17(c): Specification 
of purpose of processing. 
- Article 25: Data should be 
processed strictly within this 
specified purpose. 
- Article 25(c): Processing 
shall be for explicit, specified 
and limited purpose 
- Article 30(2): Processing 




- Article 22: Right not to be 
subject to purely automated 
decision-making 
- Article 41(1): Right not to 
be subject to purely 
automated decision-making 
only upon a written request. 
- Article 35(1): Right not to be 




- Article 32: Implementation of 
appropriate technical and 
organisational measures to 
ensure a level of security 
appropriate to the risk of 
processing. 
-Article 28(1): Take 
reasonable, technical and 
organisational measures to 
prevent the loss of, damage 
to, or unauthorised 
destruction; and unlawful 
access to or unauthorised 
processing of personal data 
- Article 41(4): Implement 
measures to identify and 
maintain safeguards against 
risks of processing, and  
restore processing in the event 
of a technical incident 
Openness - Article 5(a): Transparency 
principle of processing. 
- Article 12: Detailed processing 
information to be provided to 
data subject (including right to 
withdraw consent to processing) 
- Article 17(f): Openness as a 
processing principle. 
- Article 27(2): Detailed 
information about the 
processing to be made 
aware to data subject. 
- Article 41: Notify data 
subject in the event of 
injurious automated 
processing. 
- Article 25(b): Transparency 
principle of processing. 
- Article 29: Inform data 
subjects about their rights 
with regard to the processing. 
- Article 26(a): data subjects 
should be informed of the use 




- Article 15: Right of data subject 
to know if data about them is 
being processed, and to request 
access to the processed data. 
- Article 16-18: Right to request 
rectification, erasure (right to be 
forgotten) and restriction of 
processing. 
- Article 20: Right to data 
portability (limited to data 
processed by automated means) 
- Article 17(h): Data subject 
participation as a 
processing principle. 
- Articles 32 - 35: Right of 
access. 
- Article 33(1)(b): Right to 
be forgotten. 
- No right to data portability. 
- Article 26 (d) and (e) and 
40(1): Right to request the 
correction and deletion of 
false or misleading data 
- Article 36: Right to request 
restriction of processing. 
- Article 38: Right to data 
portability (not limited to 






- Article 5(2): Data controller is 
responsible for demonstrating 
compliance to data protection 
rules. 
- Article 25: Data protection by 
Design or by Default. 
- Article 35: Data Protection 
Impact Assessment. 
- Article 17(a): 
Accountability as a 
principle of processing. 
- No direct requirement for 
Data protection by Design 
or by Default. 
- No direct requirement for 
Data Protection Impact 
Assessments or similar. 
- Article 41: Data protection 
by Default or by Design. 




- Article 33 and 34: Notify 
severe data breaches to 
supervisory authorities and data 
subjects respectively 
- Article 31: Data Protection 
Commissioner and data 
subject should be informed 
in case of ‘reasonable 
suspicion’ of a security 
compromise. 
- Article 43(1): Notification 
if personal data breach 
presents a ‘real risk of harm’ 
to the data subject. 
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As illustrated in the above table, compared to the GDPR, the Ghanaian and Kenyan data protection 
instruments have made quite commendable effort to consolidate the OECD data protection principles to 
their respective citizens. As Agyei-Bekoe suggests in the case of Ghana415 , this move by African 
countries to adopt comprehensive data protection laws is significantly motivated by economic factors; 
i.e. a desire not to be left out of the European consumer market. This has been termed the “Brussels 
effect”, term coined by Anu Bradford in 2012 to denote the regulatory influence of the EU through its 
institutions and standards on the rest of the world, mostly through market mechanisms416. Also, African 
legal systems are heavily influenced by European legislation, with most African states today inheriting 
and still using legal systems left behind by their former colonial masters after independence in the 1960s, 
and are hence no strangers to European law.417 So just like the GDPR, both Ghanaian and Kenyan data 
protection laws feature provisions addressing data collection limitation, purpose limitation, use 
limitation, and include a requirement for data controllers to take measures to ensure security of 
processing. 
However, a number of differences can be identified between the two Acts. These include, as regards 
the Ghanaian Act, the absence of a right to data protability, absence of a ‘data protection by design or by 
default’ requirement, no express requirement on the data controller to do a prior data protection impact 
assessment in the event of risky processing (the data subject has to seize the Data Protection 
Commissioner so the latter seizes the data controller to request n impact assessment), or the absence of 
an obligation to record personal data breaches. It is important to note here that the Ghanaian Act uses the 
term “security compromise” (rather than “personal data breach”) and without offering a definition of the 
term; but this remains the closest equivalent concept to a data breach under the GDPR in terms of 
consolidating the Security Breach notification principle. The Act, as regards reporting security incidents, 
does not appear to adopt a risk-mitigating approach like the GDPR: not only does it require the reporting 
of (mere) “suspicions” of security compromises, it appears all security incidents must be reported, 
whether or not they are significant or the controller had encrypted the data or adopted other pre or post-
mitigating measures, as is the case with the GDPR’s Article 34(3). This demonstrates a difference in 
approach with the GDPR.  
                                                          
415 See note 34 
416 See Anu Bradford. "The Brussels Effect’ (2012)." Northwestern University Law Review 107 (2012): 1. 
417 For a discussion on the inheritance of European legal systems by African colonies after independence, see Sandra 
Fullerton Joireman. "Inherited legal systems and effective rule of law: Africa and the colonial legacy." The Journal of 
Modern African Studies 39, no. 4 (2001): 571-596. Also see Alex B Makulilo.: “One size fits all”: Does Europe impose its 
data protection regime on Africa?. Datenschutz und Datensicherheit-DuD 37, no. 7 (2013): 447-451.451 
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Another noticeable difference is the Ghanaian Act’s apparent ‘laissez faire’ latitude to data controllers 
to subject data subjects to decisions of purely automated systems unless the data subject expressly notifies 
the data controller not to refrain from doing so. This which could be problematic because, practically, as 
Africa and Ghana rapidly advance towards an Internet of Things, individuals would never be able to keep 
track of or even know about all the data they generate, much less the data a given data controller has 
about them and is ready to process for profiling and other profit-making purposes.  
   The Kenyan Data Protection Act, on the other hand, consolidates the OECD Principles much more 
in like manner as the GDPR, literally copying the latter quite considerably. The Act adopts a similar risk-
based approach in materialising the Security Breach Notification principle(requiring the reporting only 
of breaches which pose significant risks), places more responsibilities on data controllers as opposed to 
its Ghanaian counterpart by providing for a ‘data protection by design’ requirement as an implementation 
of the Accountability Principle, as well as a default right not to be subject to purely automated decisions 
as a means to consolidate the Use Limitation principle. And just like the GDPR, it also provides for a 
right to data portability to reinforce the Individual Participation principle. From the above, it can therefore 
be safely asserted that the 2019 Kenyan Data Protection Act, adopted five years after the GDPR, is 
significanly influenced by the latter in its consolidation of the OECD data potection guidelines, as 
opposed to the 2012 Ghanaian Data Protection Act, which came into force two years before the adoption 
of the GDPR. Bradford terms this development a “de jure Brussels effect,” where foreign countries 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
6.1   Review of background and problem questions 
This thesis sought to appreciate the significance of rights and obligations under EU and African data 
protection law, while identifying the differences between both jurisdictions and, notably, examining 
the current and potential impact of EU data protection law on its contemporary African counterpart. 
The research interests stemmed from the background of the emergence and popularity of a relatively 
new right known as the right to personal data protection in Europe and the US in the 1970s and 1980s 
introducing and popularizing several rules regulating the processing of personal information, 
embedded in in national and international instruments. This coupled with Europe’s capacity to export 
and even impose its (legal) standards and best practices on other parts of the world due to its 
institutional and regulatory strength as well as its lucrative market share. The research also took 
general interest in Europe’s relationship with Africa historically engraved in colonization, European 
powers’ pre-independence administration of their African colonies and the inheritance by the latter of 
the European systems of governance left behind after independence in the 1960s. Which explains the 
ease with which African states incorporate European contemporary standards, and lays a convenient 
setting for the various EU-African data protection analyses presented in this thesis. 
While the right to personal data protection was first introduced to consolidate the right to 
privacy following the rise and unprecedented use of computerized technology to collect and process 
personal information by the 1970s, it has become clear that this right goes beyond protecting privacy 
to include protecting all individual rights as long as these rights could be at risk due to the processing 
of an individual’s information. In other words, the right to data protection (or data protection law) is 
regulates the entire cycle of the processing of an individual’s information in order to protect the 
individual from any eventual violation of all other fundamental human rights like the right to 
information, employment, non-discrimination, education, a fair hearing, free speech, movement, 
health, and even information security etc, It is in this light that this thesis focused on data protection 
law in Europe and Africa through an analysis of specific and relevant data protection themes: personal 
data security and the influence of EU data protection standards on African data protection law. The 
analyses made use of descriptive, exploratory and comparative methods of research, and was 
conducted through a number of relevant publications, which ideally constitute the chapters of the 
thesis. Needless to say that they represent the starting point of a future wider inquiry on the relationship 
between EU and African data protection law. More analytically, the thesis had a two-fold objective:  
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1) With a specific focus on personal security, our analysis contributes to the literature by examining 
what constitutes a “breach of security” under the GDPR, and discussing the state of the art of Africa’s 
multilateral response to the personal data security concerns of the continent, in comparison with its 
EU counterpart  
2) Focusing on selected social effect of data protection law enforcement, our analysis strove to 
illustrate the potential impact of EU law on African data protection law through the latter’s adoption 
of the notion of personal data, and also by virtue of the adoption of EU standards into substantive 
African national data protection law. 
 Accordingly, the thesis posed the following research questions: What is the state of the art of 
personal data security law in the EU and Africa? How can EU data protection law and practice 
influence African national and multilateral data protection regimes? These questions were subdivided 
into five sub-questions, each addressed by the five publications regrouped in the thesis, as follows: 
i) What are the limitations in the current definition of a personal data breach in EU law with 
regard to its difference with a breach of security and the protection of data subjects through 
breach notification? This part of the analysis focused only on European law, and involved 
an analysis of EU data protection legislations to determine the scope of a “personal data 
breach”, its difference with a “breach of security” and the resulting effect of this difference 
on the protection of data subjects with regard to contemporary breach notification 
requirements. 
ii) ‘What is the current state of the art of Africa’s multilateral response to personal data 
security concerns in the continent?’ Response to this question led to an analysis of African 
personal data protection standards against those of the EU. It essentially necessitated an 
analysis of selected international African instruments addressing personal data security as 
against their EU counterparts. 
iii) How can EU data protection law and practice lead to examination results be considered 
personal data in Africa, and what are the benefits and hindrances in implementing 
corresponding data protection rights on examination results within an African setting? This 
formed the subject matter of the first paper observing the influence of EU standards in 
Africa. Focusing on the domain of education, it led to an analysis of the outcome of the 




iv) Similarly, how can EU data protection law potentially influence the application of a data 
protection right of access to evaluated examination scripts in Cameroon universities, and 
how could this contribute to curtailing teacher-student abuses? With particular focus on 
Cameroon, attempting this question led us to examine personal data protection as a tool for 
addressing other ills of the education sector, specifically abuses in institutions of higher 
learning. At a time when the state is not faring so well in handling teacher-student abuse in 
universities, the question addressed a highly probable and perhaps revolutionary impact of 
EU data protection  case law on the Cameroonian (and hence African) higher educational 
sphere in terms of regulating teacher-student abuse. 
v) What are, and how has the GDPR been instrumental in the differences between the 2012 
Ghanaian Data Protection Act and 2019 Kenyan Data Protection Act in their consolidation 
of the OECD personal data processing guidelines? This final part of our analysis was purely 
comparative. The question led us to strive to identify similarities and differences between 
the above laws, but with peculiar focus on how the differences between the selected 
national African Acts were influenced by the GDPR. 
 
6.2   Review of analysis and findings 
The first Chapter, in order to situate the limitation of the definition of a breach of security in protecting 
data subjects as regards breach reporting, first discusses what would constitute a ‘breach of security’ 
within the definition of a personal data breach in EU data protection law, considering the absence of 
a definition of the term across EU legislations. This was achieved by researching researches through 
scholarly literature on information security and provisions of the EU NIS Directive, with the resulting 
analysis then analysed in relation to rules addressing security of processing in EU data protection texts. 
This method revealed that in EU law, a ‘breach of security’ involves two eventualities: the violation 
of EU data protection security standards (e.g. as listed in Article 32 of the GDPR, and even without 
any security compromise actually happening) on the one hand, and an actual defeat of a data 
processing security infrastructure on another hand. The Chapter then reviews the definition of a 
personal data breach across EU data protection texts, which in essence considers the term to mean an 
a breach of security (i.e. violation of security standards or an actual defeat of a security infrastructure) 
system) which leads to the compromise of personal data. It makes the observation, and as reiterated 
by the EU Article 29 Working Party, that this definition excludes, from its scope and hence from 
breach notification requirements, breaches security for which no data compromise can be readily 
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ascertained. However, some security breaches by their very nature could be be complex or 
sophisticated, making the certain determination of a breach time consuming, difficult or even 
impossible; and excluding these from being reported simply because a data compromise cannot be 
ascertained by the controller could be risky for data subjects, especially where sensitive data is 
involved. On this premise, the Chapter proposes an alternative approach as an attempt to address this 
setback: inclusion of a reasonable probability (alongside certainty or confirmation) of data 
compromise in the substantive definition of a data breach. Or on the other hand, the notification to 
data subjects of security breaches which are very likely to result or have resulted in a data compromise 
but where such compromise is currently impossible to determine. However, notification shall remain 
subject to risk mitigating measures implemented on the data by the controller as provided in the 
notification requirements, like encryption or anonymisation. 
  Through descriptive and exploratory research, this Chapter contributes to clarifying the 
standard of what constitutes a breach of security in EU data protection law. It also presents a base from 
which data controllers and processors can better understand their expectations under breach reporting 
requirements. With all breaches of security not necessarily being personal data breaches,419 controllers 
and processors can make use of this study to separate both concepts and get a better idea about when 
or not to report or notify a security incident to the data protection authorities or to the data subjects. 
Also, the Chapter could help kick-start a thought process and hence further research on the substantive 
definition of terms in EU data protection texts, their effects on the protection of individuals and, if 
need be, the exploration any alternative approaches to optimise data subject protection. 
The second Chapter paper examines the response of two principal African international organisations 
(ECOWAS and the AU), to personal data security threats to which are (or would be) exposed African 
data subjects as Africa embraces ICTs and other tech-related innovations, in occasional comparison 
with the European response. The legislations under focus were the 2010 ECOWAS Data Protection 
Act and the 2014 AU Convention on Cybersecurity and Data Protection. The Chapter identified, 
through a literature review, some factors which may not favour the adoption and efficient 
implementation of personal data security norms in Africa, which include the continent’s weak 
cybersecurity institutions, fragile privacy culture and unaccountability of its governments in 
maintaining satisfactory levels of human rights. It then identified and discussed current data security 
measures provided under the selected ECOWAS and AU legislations, observing that though these 
                                                          
419 Article 29 Working Party. Guidelines on Personal data breach notification under Regulation 2016/679. Adopted on 3 
October 2017. As last Revised and Adopted on 6 February 2018. p.7 
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instruments do feature some data security provisions like confidentiality and the requirement to adopt 
appropriate measures for secure processing, they still remained limited especially in comparison with 
EU data security provisions in the GDPR and even with regard to the OECD Privacy Protection 
Guidelines. These limitations are manifested, in both African legislations, by the absence of a 
requirement to report a personal data breach, lack of a Data Protection by Design provision, absence 
of the use of privacy certifications, as well as the absence of the establishment of a direct liability 
relationship between data controllers and data subjects; all of which are provided for in the EU GDPR. 
It is proposed here that relevant protocols be adopted within these organisations to modify these 
legislations and include provisions addressing these oversights. 
 This Chapter was researched upon for an African scientific conference bringing together many 
tech experts of the continent, and hence was a great opportunity to present Africa’s advancements in 
personal data protection and security law. What motivated the research and presentation of this 
Chapter was principally to illustrate not only the shortcomings lack of a conceptually exhaustive 
framework on personal data security in Africa, but also demonstrate the apparent lack of a political 
will for legal integration in the continent. The comparative method of research played an essential role 
in demonstrating how far back the continent is as regards personal data security in relation to Europe, 
whose data protection standards are widely considered as the universal model for every other region 
or country to follow. With only five states having ratified the 2014 AU Data Protection Convention 
(out of the target fifteen) as of June 2020, the instrument is still a long way from becoming enforceable 
in all AU states. 
  Chapter 3 discusses the first part of the potential influence of EU case law on African data 
protection law. Taking cue from the decision by the ECJ (and the reasoning of its Attorney General) 
in the 2017 Nowak case, the Chapter examines the potential granting of a personal data status to 
academic examination results in Africa, specifically under the ECOWAS Data Protection Act and the 
AU Convention on Cybersecurity and Data Protection. Based on the Convention’s adoption of a 
definition of personal data virtually identical to that of the 1995 EU Data Protection Directive, and 
considering Africa’s historical precedence of inheriting and domesticating European law, the Chapter 
finds that examination results, considered personal data in Europe, can equally have the same status 
all over Africa when AU Convention becomes effective. In this light, the Chapter observes that a data 
protection status will bring along data protection rights, which will help guarantee a right to 
information self-determination to examination candidates, as well as limit risks of unwanted (Big data) 
profiling of Africans by applying the restricting unjustified further use of their examination results. 
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On the other hand, it identified some challenges in implementing personal data protection rights on 
examination results in an African context: the lack of a strong privacy culture an awareness among 
Africans, and the difficulty in obtaining informed consent for the further processing of candidates’ 
results especially in rural areas. Also, the lack of privacy case law in African courts coupled with what 
Bakibinga terms “privacy myopia” dominating African societies would make it challenging for a 
candidate to bring an action in damages against an examination board or academic institution in the 
event of a breach leading to unauthorised access to or loss of stored but already published examination 
results. 
  Also prepared for presentation at an international tech conference in Africa, this descriptive 
and exploratory research was geared towards raising awareness on the personal data protection and 
informational privacy among African administrators and tech experts. Particularly, it is hoped that the 
general African public gets much more conscious about big data, and that all sorts of information they 
generate may be processed in ways which affect them. And no information is trivial enough to be 
ignored, especially information like examination results which may not only illustrate the intelligence 
levels of a person but also, when combined with other datasets, can infer other information like their 
professional orientation, religious beliefs or consumption preferences. There also was a personal 
attachment to the paper, with my home country Cameroon still reading and publishing public 
examination results (with candidates’ full names and scores) on national media outlets with little 
regard to privacy or consideration of how this information may be used for Big Data purposes. The 
paper also served as a means to criticize this practice. 
 Chapter 4 focuses on the right of access to evaluated examination scripts in Cameroonian 
universities. In a follow up on Chapter 3 on the potential influence on EU case law in African data 
protection law, this Chapter set out to examine the possibility of the evaluated examination scripts 
obtaining a status of (students’) personal data in Cameroon universities, and how such an eventuality 
could help prevent teacher-student abuses on campus. Following an analysis of the definition of 
personal data under the 1995 EU Data Protection Directive as adopted in more or less identical manner 
by the AU Data Protection Convention, coupled with the ECJ decision in Nowak and Cameroon’s 
inheritance of European common and civil law, the Chapter finds that evaluated examination scripts 
could very likely be considered personal data under the above Convention, when it becomes effective. 
The Chapter then argues that this development would help in the fight against prevailing teacher-
student abuse in university campuses mainly because the absence of a national law requiring 
universities to allow students access their evaluated scripts was a principal means for lecturers to fail 
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students without any means of supervision. This is also aggravated by the absence in the country of a 
comprehensive national Code of Ethics binding university lecturers. However, in the absence of any 
national laws to the contrary, students would be able to exercise a data protection right of access under 
Article 17 of the AU Convention to access their evaluated examination scripts, once the Convention 
comes into force. This development would discourage defaulting lecturers and encourage transparency 
in evaluations, hence contribute to limit incidents of teacher-student abuse. The Chapter however 
identifies two possible hindrances in guaranteeing this right to students. First, there is the possibility 
of a power clash between the Cameroon Data Protection Authority (DPA) and university 
administration in enforcing the right of access, as a DPA’s order to have an evaluated script produced 
may be against university rules. And secondly, the immunity of campuses of higher education from 
interference by law enforcement authorities could hinder the investigations of a DPA who may want 
to investigate a complaint by students regarding the refusal of their right of access to their evaluated 
examination scripts. 
 This Chapter has as main motivation to demonstrate the importance of personal data protection 
as an instrument of social regulation. Away from automatic processing of personal data and other tech-
related privacy concerns for which it was originally conceived, data protection as a fundamental right 
has evolved to be of significant service in situations which have very little to do with technology. By 
making a case for the adoption of EU standards of interpreting personal data protection law into 
Cameroon (and Africa as a whole) to solve social problems within the country, the Chapter also 
demonstrates the benefits of comparative law in through legal transplant. 
  Chapter 5 had as objective to explore the influence of the GDPR on national African data 
protection laws, and set out to achieve this through a comparative analysis between the GDPR, the 
2012 Ghanaian Data Protection Act and the 2019 Kenyan Data Protection Act in consolidating data 
protection principles embedded in the 1980 OECD Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy 
and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, including its 2013 revision. It sought to identify similarities 
and differences in how all three selected legislations materialize the OECD principles, while showing, 
in the process, how the GDPR influences the Kenyan Data Protection Act 2019 (adopted post GDPR) 
as opposed to the Ghanaian Data Protection Act 2012 (adopted pre-GDPR). Compared to the GDPR, 
the Ghanaian and Kenyan data protection instruments have made quite commendable effort to 
consolidate the OECD data protection principles to their respective citizens. As Agyei-Bekoe suggests 
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in the case of Ghana420, this move by African countries to adopt comprehensive data protection laws 
is significantly motivated by economic factors; i.e. a desire not to be left out of the European consumer 
market. This has been termed the “Brussels effect”, coined by Anu Bradford in 2012 to denote the 
regulatory influence of the EU through its institutions and standards on the rest of the world, mostly 
through market mechanisms421. Also, African legal systems are no strangers to European law; African 
states actually inherited European legal systems left behind by their former European colonial masters 
after independence in the 1960s. Similarities between their legal approaches to a global issue like 
personal data protection could therefore be expected. This is demonstrated in this article as, like the 
GDPR, both Ghanaian and Kenyan data protection laws feature provisions addressing data collection 
limitation, purpose limitation, use limitation, and include a requirement for data controllers to take 
measures to ensure security of processing. 
However, a number of differences can be identified between the two Acts, with some measures 
missing from the Ghanaian Act but present on both the GDPR and the Kenyan Act. These include, as 
regards the Ghanaian Act, the absence of a right to data protability, absence of a ‘data protection by 
design or by default’ requirement, no express requirement on the data controller to do a prior data 
protection impact assessment in the event of risky processing (the data subject has to seize the Data 
Protection Commissioner so the latter seizes the data controller to request n impact assessment), or the 
absence of an obligation to record personal data breaches. Also, in the event of a breach, it does not 
appear to limit reporting only of breaches which pose a (significant) risk to data subjects or if measures 
have been taken to adequately minimise the damage, as is the case with the GDPR’s Article 34(3). 
This demonstrates a difference in approach with the GDPR, and consequently the Kenyan Act.  
  The Kenyan Data Protection Act, on the other hand, contains the above data processing 
measures in very like manner with the the GDPR. It adopts a similar risk-based approach in 
materialising the Security Breach notification principle by requiring the reporting only of risky data 
breaches breaches, and provides for the recording of data breaches. Significantly, it adopts an identical 
definition of a personal data breach as the GDPR, and features a ‘data protection by design’ 
requirement, and right to data portability, just like the GDPR. These illistrate that the GDPR has 
significant influence in the standards set by the Kenyan data protection legislator, as opposed to the 
Ghanaian standards which were adopted pre-GDPR. 
                                                          
420 See Chapter 1 (Introduction) note 34 
421 See Anu Bradford. "The Brussels Effect’." Northwestern University Law Review 107 (2012): 1. 
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  Also prepared for an African tech conference in Nairobi, this Chapter was conceived, in the 
first place, to raise general awareness among African tech experts on globally-recognised personal 
data protection principles. Also, measuring the EU data protection system against African national 
laws serves as a means to illustrate the fragmented levels of data protection among African states, 
which could be a significant hindrance to the international free flow of personal data within the 
continent. The Chapter is thus expec”ted to provoke awareness among tech experts of this discrepancy 
so they may pressurise policy makers to push for better harmonisation and integration of data 
processing laws among African states. 
6.3 Final observations and further research 
 Personal data protection law has been documented to offer significant benefits to society in the 
wake of technological innovations which process information about individuals.422 Concieved in the 
US and Europe in the early 1970s to consolidate the right to privacy amidst the introduction and 
increasing use of computational power to automatically process and share persinal information and 
vast surveillance, this relatively new branch of law birthed certain rights and obligations aimed at 
ensuring that such information is processed in ways which may not negatively affect the privacy of 
the individuals to whom they relate. Some of these rules as have been developed over the years include 
consent before processing, limited storage of personal information to only when strictly necessary, no 
further processing to infer new information from information already acquired unless such processing 
is consented to, processing should have justifiable legal grounds, and processing should be secure. 
While this branch of law initially targeted the right to privacy, perhaps one of its peculiar 
characteristics is its ability to affect all forms of fundamental rights attributed to humans in relevant 
international instruments, as long as these rights may be affected by information processing. In other 
words, besides the right to privacy, data protection can be involved to protect a person’s right to a fair 
trial423, protect our right to employment by ensuring accuracy of personal data within job search 
websites,424 or other rights which could be at risk through misuse of personal information, and which 
                                                          
422 See generally Gloria González Fuster. The emergence of personal data protection as a fundamental right of the EU. 
Vol. 16. Springer Science & Business, 2014; Paul de Hert &Serge Gutwirth. "Data protection in the case law of 
Strasbourg and Luxemburg: Constitutionalisation in action." In Reinventing data protection?, pp. 3-44. Springer, 
Dordrecht, 2009. 
423 See for example the critique of the use of the software COMPAS (Correctional Offender Management Profiling for 
Alternative Sanctions) in US courts to calculate the chances of recidivism of accused persons. To decide on recidivism 
risk, the software took in account the age of the accused, arrest history, vocation education etc. Following a study in 
May 2016, it was asserted that the algorithm was biased against black people than whites. See Julia Angwin, Jeff 
Larson, Surya Mattu and Lauren Kirchner. “Machine Bias: There’s software used across the country to predict future 
criminals. And it’s biased against blacks.” ProPublica. May 23, 2016. Available at 
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing Accessed 5th June 2020 
424 Spokeo Inc. v. Robins,  742 F.3d 409 (9th Cir. 2014 
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may not always fall within the traditional right to privacy. It is with these findings that this research 
explored, besides normative personal data securtiy issues within the EU and Africa, the potential 
benefits which personal data protection law could offer to the average Africans. 
  This research led us to examine the origins of personal data protection law and privacy 
particlarly in the EU and US, the extraterritorialy of EU (data protection law) and the legal relationship 
between Africa and Europe. By comparing the levels of personal data protection in the EU and Africa, 
as well as examining the possibilites of transposing EU data protection standards into African legal 
practice, the research concludes on two principal findings. Firstly, there is a lot still to be done in 
Africa in terms of reaching a harmonised framework for personal data protection and data security 
among states, which seems a reflection of the lack of political will for legal integration as well as the 
absence of a privacy culture in Africa. And secondly, transposing EU data protection standards into 
Africa could be a convenient starting point to consolidate a privacy and/or data protection 
consciousness and culture, promote information self determination and even solve social problems 
like sexual harrassment in university campuses. Needless to say, any transposition needs to come with 
efficient enforcement institutions. This would translate into the establishment and staffing of data 
protection supervisory authorities, imposing the appointment of data protection officers in 
organisations processing large amounts of personal data and, considering the lack of privacy case law 
in the continent and hence lack of expertise of our judiciary system, educating and sensitising national 
judgdes on data protection and tech regulation in general. 
  As regards further lines of research, this work makes it evident that the benefits of personal 
data protection are very vast, with the ability to stretch its effects to affect a wide variety of domains 
in as much as they involve human activity. The principles of personal data processing set by the OECD 
for example could be researched further to understand and suggest where they can serve as additional 
protection for Africans where other branches of law are lacking. Just as the right of access has been 
demonstrated in this thesis to be potentially able to help protect students against lecturer abuse in 
African universities, we remain positive that the prevalence of other societal ills may be curtailed with 
the help of well-researched data protection principles within national our administrative and 
governance projects.  We therefore intend to launch future research projects into exploring how 
personal data protection can address other societal problems in Africa or complement other laws in 
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